Tacitus' account of the unrest among the Pannonian legions includes a speech encapsulating the soldiers' (largely legitimate) grievances, such as long terms of service, often over twenty years, low pay and the deduction of money to buy exemption from unpleasant duties, and the quality of the land allotments granted to soldiers by the aerarium militare on completion of their period of service. The speech is attributed to Percennius, said to have been a professional claque-manager for the Roman theatre-audiences before having been called up during the emergency levy that followed the destruction of Varus' three legions just five years previously. The Pannonian commander, Quintus Iunius Blaesus (cons. a.d. 10; uncle of the praetorian prefect L. Aelius Seianus) was unable to prevent his soldiers from looting civilian settlements. Although he promised to send his son, a tribune, to Rome at the head of a delegation to request improved terms of service, he was only able to reimpose discipline when Tiberius' son Drusus arrived on the scene with two praetorian cohorts commanded by Sejanus (now described as co- prefect of the guard along with his father, Lucius Seius Strabo). Tacitus describes Tiberius' decision to send his son as though it was a response to a major threat; but we should remember that the theme of civil discord is basic to the Annals.
The story told by Tacitus implies that the mutineers were by no means inclined to accept Drusus' promise to refer their complaints to Tiberius as their commander, and through him to the Senate. But a coincidental eclipse of the moon on the night of 25-6 September served them as an excuse to back down, enabling Drusus to execute the two ringleaders and return to Rome without even bothering to await the return of the soldiers' delegation to Tiberius.
The legions on the Lower Rhine, under the command of Aulus Caecina Severus, also used the death of the imperator to whom they had sworn their military oath as an occasion to express their discontent about the unremitting military operations which Augustus had imposed upon them for so many years. One theme which runs through Tacitus' account of the politics of Tiberius' reign is the conflict between the widow and children of Germanicus on the one hand, and Tiberius and his direct descendants on the other. Even if this analysis (probably going back to the younger Agrippina's memoirs) were correct, it would be wrong to accept the implication that Germanicus was a rival or a threat to Tiberius during his lifetime. On the contrary, there is epigraphical and other evidence that Germanicus was recognized as Tiberius' successor by men who had no wish to show disloyalty to Tiberius himself. When Ovid, in exile at Tomi on the Black Sea, addressed Germanicus as a princeps, he will hardly have assumed that he would be understood to want Germanicus to be emperor in Tiberius' place.13
According to Tacitus, the major difference between the mutinies in Pannonia and on the Rhine was that some of the soldiers on the Rhine offered to make Germanicus emperor if he acceded to their demands. We may be sceptical about how serious this offer was; an anecdote about a soldier who was prepared to help kill Germanicus himself is just as likely to be authentic. Whatever the political significance of the mutiny, it is clear from Tacitus' account that (some) soldiers who had completed long terms of service had to be discharged, and that in return the legions on both the lower and the upper Rhine were prepared to take the military oath to their new imperator. But the arrival at Ara Ubiorum (Cologne) of a delegation of senators sent by Tiberius led to renewed outbreaks of insubordination, since the soldiers correctly feared that Tiberius would
13 Ov. Fast. 1.19. G. Herbert-Brown, Ovid and the Fasti (Oxford, 1994), ch. An Ephesian inscription describes Germanicus and Drusus together as the 'New Dioscuri' (SEG iv.j 1j).
use the authority of the Senate as an excuse to reject the newly won concessions. The legate Lucius Munatius Plancus, who had been consul in the previous year, was humiliated; and Germanicus ostentatiously sent his wife and children (including the two-year-old Gaius, often dressed in 'little boots' - hence his later name Caligula) away to safety at Trier. Tacitus suggests that the mutiny was now so serious that Germanicus should have called on the upper Rhine legions to suppress it by force; in fact he seems to have been able to restore order without difficulty at Cologne, and Caecina was able to do the same for the two legions stationed at Xanten (when Germanicus inspected the bodies of those executed, he claimed to be appalled at the catastrophe). The mutinies on the Rhine and in Pannonia were not unimportant, but they were by no means the threat either to Rome or to Tiberius that Tacitus, or his sources, imply. Spectacular though the mutinies may have been, they were an expression of Augustus' failure, or inability, to provide for the real costs of his military policy, rather than a threat to Tiberius.
ii. the reign of tiberius14
In the autumn of a.d. 14, and during the following two summers, Germanicus employed his legions on a series of campaigns east of the Rhine. Both archaeological and literary evidence indicates that there was no serious attempt to expand the territory under direct Roman control. These campaigns were fought for reasons of prestige, both for Rome — whose reputation for military success had to be re-established after the Varus disaster of a.d. 9 - and for Germanicus himself. The fact that Germanicus received the news of Augustus' death while organizing a census of the Gallic provinces suggests that Augustus himself had planned these campaigns; they did not contradict the advice he allegedly appended to his summary of the resources of the empire, that its borders should not be expanded. Augustus' advice to his heir to restrict the opportunities for commanders to acquire military gloria was not intended to apply to Tiberius' own adopted successor. Tacitus' belief that historiographical literature required long military narratives, coupled with his desire to heroize Germanicus, gave him the opportunity for an epic account of a visit to the site of the defeat of Varus' army and the reburial of the corpses of the slain, and of a heroic retreat through the north German marshes. This does not hide the fact that Germanicus achieved nothing of permanence - and probably did not intend to.15
We should not accept Tacitus' suggestion that Tiberius was jealous of any successes Germanicus might achieve, and therefore recalled him
14 Tiberius' reign: see n. j above. The main narrative sources are: Tac. Ann. i-vi; Suet. Tib.; Dio, Lvii-Lvin; Veil. Pat. 11.125—)i, with Woodman 1977 (в 202). 15 Koestermann 1957 (c 362).
after two years. He wanted to make it clear to the Germans that Augustus' death did not mean the end of Roman military efforts on the northern frontiers. He also wanted Germanicus to win enough glory to make his virtus manifest; consequently he awarded his adopted son and successor a full triumph, the highest mark of military distinction, in a.d. 17. In the following year Tiberius made Germanicus' position as his designated successor explicit by sharing his third consulship with him.
It was because of a genuine concern that his successor should have the experience required of a ruler that Tiberius sent Germanicus on a tour of the eastern half of the empire in this year. There were precedents from the Augustan period: Agrippa, Tiberius himself, and Gaius Caesar had all ruled the east of the empire for a time when they had been heirs- apparent. Some practical tasks had to be performed. King Archelaus of Cappadocia had died at Rome in a.d. 17 (of natural causes, but exacerbated by the hostility shown by hispatronus Tiberius). In order to help solve the shortage of funds for military pay, Tiberius wanted Cappadocia integrated into the empire as a province (see ch. 14л). Germanicus was also to oversee the fiscal administration of Palmyra, and inspect earthquake damage suffered by several cities of Asia in a.d. 17. As his adviser Tiberius appointed Cnaeus Calpurnius Piso - who had been his colleague as consul in 7 в.с. — to accompany him as legate of Syria. Tacitus insinuates that the intention was to use Piso to control Germanicus. If we abandon the idea that Tiberius and Germanicus mistrusted each other, then Piso's task as a trusted amicus of the domus Caesaris was simply to give support and advice. But Piso's advice was irksome to Germanicus; it may be that he restrained Germanicus from engaging in unnecessary military adventures against the Parthians to enhance his own glory. In any case, Piso's bad temper was notorious. Germanicus avoided further advice from Piso by travelling to Egypt (from which Roman senators were excluded), where his attempts to win popularity by opening the grain reserves may have had the effect of exacerbating a grain shortage at Rome. Tiberius was displeased, and Piso misinterpreted his displeasure as permission to quarrel with Germanicus. Germanicus formally renounced the amicitia between Piso and the domus Caesaris. Piso had no option but to leave Syria. Unfortunately Germanicus died soon after (10 October a.d. 19), and Piso (despite the warnings of his consilium) thought he could return to take control of his province again. If Germanicus had acted provocatively, Piso's reaction was simply treasonable; he was arrested and sent to Rome to be tried before the Senate on the charge of having waged war on a province of the Roman people. Agrippina, bearing the ashes of her husband to Rome with her, saw to it that he was also accused of having had Germanicus poisoned; the charge was pressed by Publius Vitellius, who had been one of Germanicus' generals in Germany and whose brothers were to be loyal supporters of Germanicus' son Caligula and brother Claudius. There was no evidence to support it. But despite Tiberius' efforts to ensure that the affair was handled openly and fairly, Piso's suicide was later taken as a sign that he had done away with Germanicus — on Tiberius' orders.[412]