In terms of the qualities required of a Roman imperator, Claudius' major weakness, like that of Caligula when he had come to power, was that he had no military experience. This explains his almost obsessive need to advertise any military success achieved during his reign; Claudius chose to accept twenty-seven imperatorial acclamations, more than any other emperor. Even in his first year, coins showed off a triumphal arch with trophies won by his father Drusus 'from the Germans'. Soon there were genuine military successes. In Mauretania, Suetonius Paulinus dealt successfully with a war against nomad tribes that had arisen out of Caligula's removal of King Ptolemy and imposition of direct Roman rule (see chapter 13/ on Africa). Paulinus' successors completed the process of pacification; it gave Claudius the opportunity to honour Marcus Crassus Frugi, both a central figure of the old aristocracy and the father-in-law of Antonia. Crassus was now awarded triumphal ornamenta for finishing off the war effectively won by the novus homo Suetonius Paulinus.
Claudius reserved for himself the glory of conquering Britain. Ever since the time of Iulius Caesar, Britain, as an island in the Ocean, had had a symbolic importance for Romans: its conquest would indicate that not just the whole world, but even lands beyond the edge of the world, were subject to the dominion of the Roman people. The occupation of Britain would have the additional benefit of removing several legions from within striking distance of Rome: Caligula's new legions had raised the number in each of the German armies to five, and that made their commanders too powerful.
Claudius felt that he could trust the Pannonian governor, Aulus
Plautius, to undertake the actual military operation. Son of an officer of Claudius' father Drusus and brother Germanicus, Plautius had remained loyal during Scribonianus' rebellion, and he was a cousin of Claudius' first wife (although he had divorced Urgulanilla, Claudius is said to have remained on good terms with her). The other person Claudius trusted was Lucius Vitellius, the consul of 34, son of a mere eques but with two consular brothers. Loyal supporters of Germanicus, Vitellius and his brothers had returned to prominence during Tiberius' last years because of the support of Caligula's grandmother (and Claudius' mother) Antonia. Vitellius held a second consulship in 43, and Claudius entrusted the capital to his care for the duration of the expedition.
There were few others he trusted not to plot in his absence: a large number of senators had to accompany him. It was even said that Claudius put off the voyage to Britain by a few days because Galba claimed that he was too ill to travel. Galba was one consular Claudius could not afford to leave behind. Among others in the party were both Valerius Asiaticus and Marcus Vinicius. The Britons themselves presented considerably fewer problems (see chapter 1 $e), and the resultant triumph enabled Claudius to distribute the ornamenta triumpbalia to all those consulars he brought with him, thus putting them under a stronger obligation to be loyal. For much of the rest of the reign, Claudius ensured that no one would forget the symbolic success of carrying the frontiers of the empire beyond the Ocean; coins advertised trophies won 'from the Britons'. An inscription dating to c. a.d. 51/2 and probably originating from his triumphal arch alludes to 'the surrender of eleven British kings without loss', and asserts that 'he was the first to subject to the rule of the Roman people barbarian tribes beyond the Ocean'. During his fourth consulship in a.d. 49, Claudius extended thepomerium of the city to demonstrate his success in extending the empire.42
But the integration of Mauretania, south-east Britain, and also Lycia- Pamphylia during these years did not imply a 'policy' of general expansion, in contrast to that initiated by Tiberius. Military adventures can be seen as a function of a weak emperor's need to buttress his gloria. There could be no question of allowing other commanders such military gloria. The imperial legate in Lower Germany, Cn. Domitius Corbulo (half-brother of Caligula's wife Caesonia), took action to suppress raids into Gaul by a Chaucian chieftain, Gannascus, in 47; Claudius had to restrain him from proceeding with operations along the Frisian coast.[422]
While the administrative measures of these years can be seen primarily as responses to Claudius' political weakness, the form they took suggests that Claudius was keen to represent himself as following in the footsteps of the Claudii of old, and - like Caligula - of Iulius Caesar. This lay behind the policy of extending Roman citizenship to the provinces, and looking after the interests of the army. Serving soldiers were granted the legalprivilegia maritorum. Claudius was also anxious to retain the support of the Roman plebs. When he released some of the quaestors from their archaic obligations as prefects of Ostia and 'Gaul' (possibly Senonian Gaul, the region south of Rimini), it was not so much as part of a 'policy of centralization', but rather — so Suetonius tells us — so that young men interested in a political career could pay more attention to providing the plebs with games. As far as the propertied classes were concerned, an emperor's chief function was to ensure that the law courts functioned swiftly and effectively. Service as 'jurors' ('lay judges' might be a better translation) was irksome, but essential for the peaceful ordering of citizen society; Claudius reduced the age at which equestrians were required to present themselves for such service from twenty-five to twenty-four. More courts required more presidents, and one of the reasons for the transfer in a.d.44 of responsibility for the aerarium Saturni from two of the praetors to a pair of titular quaestors, selected by the emperor himself for a term of three years, will have been to make these praetors available for court service. Certainly there is nothing sinister in the fact that the two new quaestors were the emperor's personal appointees: by this stage no magistrate was elected to office without the implicit support of the princeps, and an emperor who did not personally select the men who were to look after the state treasury would have been curiously negligent of his responsibilities. We need not ascribe any conscious policy of centralization to Claudius; centralization was implicit in the patronage system of the Principate.
The important role that ex-slaves were said to have played in Claudius' household is more interesting, and should not be dismissed entirely as hostile propaganda. Claudius had had little experience of politics, even during the reign of Caligula. He depended for advice on amici of his family like Aulus Plautius and Lucius Vitellius, and on freedmen such as Narcissus, the ab epistulis (secretary for correspondence), Pallas, the a rationibus (keeper of accounts), Callistus, the a libellis (petitions), and Polybius, the a studiis (perhaps a speech-writer). But it does not follow that Claudius was systematically creating departments of state, or using his own dependants instead of freeborn citizens as part of a conscious 'policy' of rationalizing or controlling everything that was going on. During the Julio-Claudian period, men of wealth and standing were not yet as prepared as they later were to serve the emperor in a subordinate capacity. Freedmen were not only obedient, but also expendable; it might be politic for a weak emperor to blame unpopular measures on his ex-slaves - or his wives. (For the imperial court, see chapter 7.)