Выбрать главу

18 PRO 8/315, War Cabinet to CAS, 29 August 1940.

19 Maier, ‘Luftschlacht’, p. 391; PRO AIR 16/365, Fighter Command operational strength, 19 September 1940.

20 Library of Congress, Washington DC, Arnold Papers, Box 246: Chief of Intelligence memorandum, ‘Estimate of German Air Strength’, 21 January 1941, enclosing G2 report, ‘Germany, Domestic Production, Capacity and Sources of Aviation Equipment’, 16 January 1941, pp. 1–9. PRO AIR 8/463: CAS memorandum, ‘Strength of the GAF’, 8 July 1940; ‘Present and Future Strength of the German Air Force’, 1 December 1940, pp. 1–3.

21 Orwell, ‘War-time Diary: 1941’, p. 443, entry for 8 April 1941.

22 R. Churchill (ed.), Into Battle: Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill (London, 1941), p. 234, speech broadcast 18 June 1940; Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, p. 132, diary 31 December 1940; PRO AIR 16/635, HQ 11 Group to HQ Fighter Command, November 1940, p. 4.

23 See S. Ritchie, ‘A Political Intrigue against the Chief of the Air Staff: The Downfall of Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall’, War & Society, 16 (1998), pp. 83–104.

24 PRO AIR 19/258, letter from Air Ministry to Sinclair, 5 April 1941, for details on the pamphlet; on the Despatch see AIR 2/7771, circulation list for Dowding’s Despatch, 14 September 1941, CAB 120/311: Churchill to Sinclair, 15 June 1941; Churchill to Portal, 23 August 1942; Portal to Churchill, 27 August 1942.

25 PRO CAB 120/294, Churchill to Sinclair, 21 August 1940. See N. J. Cull, Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American ‘Neutrality’ in World War II (Oxford, 1995), ch. 3.

26 PRO INF 1/849, Ministry of Information Policy Committee, meeting of 21 June 1940, p. 1.

27 PRO INF 1/292, Home Intelligence weekly report, 18–24 December 1940, p. 1.

28 PRO AIR 22/100, ‘Fighter Command Daily Casualties’. According to the daily statistics reported to the Air Ministry, from 1 July until 1 November 1940 Fighter Command lost 284 pilots killed on operations and 159 killed in non-operational situations. The discrepancy between the two figures is difficult to explain. Post-war calculations of total pilot casualties give a slightly higher figure of 458, most of whom died in combat. The number of genuinely accidental deaths has been calculated at somewhere between 30 and 50. The Air Ministry figures suggest that combat was defined more narrowly at the time, which may explain the difference between wartime and post-war statistics. In addition to the pilot deaths, more than 200 suffered serious injury.

29 W. J. West, Orwelclass="underline" The War Commentaries (London, 1985), pp. 168–9, broadcast 24 October 1942.

TABLES AND MAPS

THE HURRICANE AND THE SPITFIRE: PRODUCTION, OPERATIONAL STRENGTH AND LOSSES

Table 1: Production per week, June–November 1940
Date Hurricanes Spitfires
1–7 June 87 22
8–14 June 79 22
15–21 June 67 25
22–28 June
75 21
29 June–5 July 68 26
6–12 July 65 32
13–19 July 57 30
20–26 July 67 41
27 July–2 August 65 37
3–9 August 58 41
10–16 August 54 37
17–23 August 43 31
24–30 August 64 44
31 August–6 September 54 37
7–13 September 54 36
14–20 September 56 38
21–27 September 57 40
28 September–4 October 58 34
5–11 October 60 32
12–18 October 55 31
19–25 October 55 25
26 October–1 November 69 42
Total 1,367 724
Table 2: Operational strength: number of squadrons, July–October 1940
Date Hurricane squadrons Spitfire squadrons
14 July 1940
10 Group 2 2
11 Group 12 7
12 Group 6 5
13 Group 5 5
Total 25 19
1 September 1940
10 Group 4 4
11 Group 14 6
12 Group 6 6
13 Group 9 2
Total 33 18
30 September 1940
10 Group 6 3
11 Group 13 7
12 Group 6 6
13 Group 9* 3
Total 34 19
28 October 1940
10 Group 6 3
11 Group 13 8
12 Group 7 6
13 Group 7** 3
Total 33 20