By 1600 hours, the enemy had broken off his main attacks and concentrated his main forces to defend the villages of Fuloli and Darayi-Pashay.
The 1st Battalion having reached the village of Darayi-Pashay at 1700, was unable to take the village from the march mounted on BMPs. They dismounted and tried to encircle the village by climbing the mountain and coming over the southern flank. However, they were unable to do this since the encircling force came under interlocking enemy fire. The battalion fought for possession of the village for the next 24 hours, but was unable to take it.
The 2d Battalion attacked Fuloli from the march mounted on BMPs. They were also unsuccessful, so they dismounted and blocked Fuloli from the south. The 2d Battalion and the reconnaissance battalion fought for possession of Fuloli for the next 24 hours. They were finally able to take it, but discovered that most of the enemy had slipped out under the cover of fog and darkness and escaped into the mountains to the southeast.
During 20 and 21 January, we destroyed the organized, main guerrilla force in the Ishkamesh region. The enemy lost up to 150 men killed and captured. Further, we captured a large amount of weapons and ammunition.
Frunze Commentary: The following points are particularly noteworthy:
deception against the enemy (using the Mi-б helicopter instead of the normal Mi-8);
misleading the enemy as to the actual region in which the combat actions were planned (through information supplied to the Afghan division);
widespread use of maneuver, combining frontal strikes with flanking attacks, encirclements, vertical envelopment, and on foot as well as mounted on various carriers;
tight coordination between the combined arms subunits and the aviation and artillery support (an artillery FO accompanied every company and TO&E FACs accompanied every battalion, while additional FACs accompanied every company. They all had adequate communications);
inadequate quantity of forces for a 20x10 kilometer area denied us the opportunity to seal off and destroy all the guerrilla forces;
use of reconnaissance forces as combat forces; and
paying closer attention to the increasing scale of activities which lead toward sealing and destroying the enemy.
Editor’s Commentary: Tactical surprise gained from air landings and air assaults dissipates rapidly. Once the enemy has dug into a mountainside, green zone or village, heavy forces with superior numbers and superior fire power are necessary to blast them out. Once the surprise had worn off on this raid, the Soviets were fighting two separated actions and lacked the combat power to win either of them.
The use of the Mi-6 transport helicopters for the air assault fits the motto “never set a pattern but do the unexpected.” One has to ask, however, was it deliberate deception or were they just lucky that these were the aircraft available?
7. Sweeping a green zone in Helmand Province
by Major V. I. Kurochkin17
In May 1984 we conducted an army operation to clear guerrilla forces from Helmand Province. The mujahideen in this region were very well trained and bore an undying hatred toward the government of Afghanistan. By this time, Soviet forces had accumulated a great deal of experience in conducting sweeps of separate regions and inhabited areas. Usually, motorized rifle soldiers dismounted from their carriers and conducted the sweeps on foot without their carriers. Practically speaking, this meant that they conducted these sweeps without the immediate fire support of tanks, artillery and BMPs (or BTRs). The mujahideen had also amassed experience in countering subunits conducting these sweeps in various regions and developed tactics and techniques to deal with the sweep. As a rule, they would lure us into predetermined areas and then open fire on us at a distance of no more than 50 to 100 meters. They would only fight in close contact to us since we could not use our artillery or aviation support within 100 meters of friendly forces. The mujahideen knew the local area and local terrain features quite well and were thus able to outmaneuver the Soviet forces.
Planning for this operation began long before its start and was very thorough. After being briefed on the concept of the operation, LTC Romanov, the commander of an airborne battalion, decided to push his attached tanks and his personnel carriers into the green zone ahead of his dismounted paratroopers. The tanks would provide armored cover for the paratroopers while cutting firing lanes in front of them. This was a very bold and original idea since the enemy usually mined those areas where tanks could maneuver and the terrain was laced with irrigation canals and potential ambush sites. The battalion commander planned that the combat formation would consist of two bronegruppa in column, each one led by tanks followed by personnel carriers which would push through the green zone. An airborne company would move on each flank of the bronegruppa.
Map 7: Sweeping the green zone with an airborne battalion, 11–13 May 1984.
The sweep began at 0800 on the morning of 11 May and by the day’s end of 13 May, we had completely cleared the mujahideen out of the oasis. We captured a large amount of weapons and ammunition. Despite the fact that one of the companies came under fire more than 10 times and that over 40 RPG rounds were fired at our tanks, our battalion did not have a single casualty.
Frunze Commentary: The battalion’s success was mainly due to the skillful use of tanks to destroy the enemy by direct fire. Engineer subunits found the enemy obstacles, particularly their mine fields, in timely fashion. The dismounted sappers worked under the cover of armored vehicles. The commander skillfully used artillery fire to suppress the enemies’ fires. The tanks and dismounted soldiers coordinated their movements as they moved from line to line. They would not move forward until the enemy was suppressed by artillery fire from the supporting artillery battalion. An artillery officer from the supporting battery accompanied the company it supported and adjusted artillery fire for that company. Thus, as soon as the enemy was spotted, firing data was transmitted to the supporting battery. The enemy was unable to conduct accurate, aimed fire, since such fire instantly resulted in an answering artillery barrage. Consequently, not one of the anti-tank RPG rounds hit a tank. Thus, thanks to well organized fire control and engineer support, the battalion was able to use tanks successfully in the green zone and successfully fulfill its mission in a short time with no casualties.
Editor’s Commentary: This vignette could be subtitled “if it’s dumb and it works, it’s not dumb”. On the other hand, this is a slow and expensive way to clear a zone. No mujahideen casualties are mentioned, so at the end of three days, the force blasted it’s way through 14 kilometers of vegetation and owned it until they left. Then the mujahideen came back.
8. Sweeping villages with Afghani and Soviet subunits
by Major S. G. Davydenko18
Throughout the time that Soviet forces operated in Afghanistan, the Panjsher Valley was the site of the sharpest ideological and military struggles between the government of Afghanistan and the armed opposition led by Ahmed Shah Massoud.19 Operations which had been conducted in this valley earlier had resulted in heavy casualties. The mountain massif (located high above sea level) and the severe climate limited the capabilities of machines and men.