Our regimental commander decided to destroy this force by sealing off the area and then sweeping it to find and destroy the enemy. My battalion, the 2nd MRB, was given this mission and reinforced with the regiment’s reconnaissance company and two artillery batteries. Six helicopter gunships from army aviation would be in support.
All the forces would be used for the initial blocking action. On the night of 11–12 February, two motorized rifle companies, moving out on foot, by morning had to to occupy the dominant terrain (hills 1864.4 and 1973.0) along the southern and eastern combat sectors. At 0600 hours on 12 February, our 4th MRC and the reconnaissance company had to land and secure the dominant terrain to the north and west of Karamagul’ village by tactical air assaults. The 5th MRC was to establish a platoon-sized ambush to cover any attempted mujahideen withdrawal from Karamagul’ to Batash.
Our plan was to begin the sweep at dawn only after we had seized and occupied the dominant terrain and had surrounded the enemy.
Map 13: Blocking the enemy in an inhabited region and destroying him during the sweep.
Following a 10-minute artillery and helicopter gunship preparation, the reconnaissance company moved forward and began sweeping the area. The enemy tried to break out of the encirclement through the various gullies and ravines. A group of mujahideen attempted to break out to the southwest. Then another group tried to break out of the encirclement. But all the enemy attempts were futile. Only a small part of his force was able to break out through a ravine in the direction of the village of Batash.
In the course of the combat, the enemy lost up to 60 killed or wounded and we captured 12. We also captured 25 weapons. The battalion’s losses were negligible.
Editor’s Commentary: Soviet block and sweep tactics in Afghanistan differed from their own tactical encirclement methodology that they developed for war on the northern European plain. Their normal methodology called for an inner encirclement force to hold the trapped force in place while an outer encirclement force pushed out from the encircled area to put distance between the trapped forces and an enemy rescuing force. Only after the two forces were in place, would the Soviets fragment and meticulously destroy the trapped force. Evidently, Soviets in Afghanistan lacked the forces necessary for establishing an outer encirclement and the mujahideen seldom launched attacks from outside the encirclement to rescue their trapped comrades. Further, the Soviet normal methodology was designed to work against encircled mechanized forces. They really did not care about small groups of dismounted soldiers escaping from the encirclement. In Afghanistan, the enemy was normally dismounted and could usually slip through the Soviet encirclement.
The Soviets apparently showed little concern for the civilian population and started each sweep with an artillery bombardment. This did not win many hearts and minds for the Soviet forces. Often the Soviet effort seemed deliberately aimed at killing civilians or forcing them out of the rural areas.
Next: Chapter 2: The Offensive in Populated Areas and Mountains
Footnotes
1. The bronegruppa (armored group) is a temporary grouping of 4–5 tanks, BMPS or BTRs, or any combination of such vehicles. The BMPs (tracked combat vehicles) or BTRs (wheeled combat vehicles) are deployed without their normally assigned infantry squad and fight away from their dismounted troops. The grouping has a significant direct-fire capability and serves as a maneuver reserve (ed.) [return]
2. S. N. Petrov served in the OKSVA from 1981 to 1983 as the commander of an airborne company. [return]
3. A system of underground tunnels used for the collection of ground water and for carrying water for surface irrigation. [return]
4. A. L. Makkoveev commanded a motorized rifle company in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan from December 1979 to November 1981. He was decorated with the Military Order “For Service to the Fatherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” Third Class. [return]
5. Evidently a part of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). [return]
6. Dry rations are similar to the old U.S. Army С-ration. There were three types of dry rations. The first contained a can of meat, some crackers or toast, some jam and a tea bag. The second contained two cans of meat mixed with oatmeal. The third contained a can of meat and a can of vegetables or fruit (ed.). [return]
7. The machine gun/grenade-launcher platoon was the fourth platoon of a motorized rifle company and provided suppressive fire from PKS or Utes machine guns and AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers. This platoon disappeared during force reorganization in the mid-1980s. [return]
8. V. A. Gukalov served in the OKSVA in 1979–1981 as the senior assistant to the Chief of the Operations Section on the staff of an airborne division. [return]
9. A.P. Pivovarenko served as a reconnaissance platoon leader in the OKSVA from January 1980 to December 1980. [return]
10. Most likely, the regiment was a part of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). [return]
11. The ZSU-23-4 is a self-propelled air defense weapon which fires four 23mm machine guns simultaneously. This weapon proved extremely effective in counter-ambushes and in the destruction of ground targets (ed.). [return]
12. S. V. Zelenskiy served in the OKSVA from 1981 to 1983 as the commander of an air assault company and as the senior assistant to the Chief of a brigade operations section. He was decorated with the “Order of the Red Star.” [return]
13. The 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). [return]
14. A. M. Kovyrshin served in the OKSVA from September 1982 through November 1984 as a platoon leader in a motorized rifle company. He was decorated with the Order of the Red Star. [return]
15. Most likely the 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). [return]
16. The 20th Infantry Division (ed.). [return]
17. V. I. Kurochkin served in the OKSVA from February 1984 until April 1986. [return]
18. S. G. Davydenko served with the OKSVA from September 1984 to September 1986 as the adviser to an Afghan battalion commander. [return]
19. Ahmed Shah Massoud is one of the best-known guerrilla leaders in the West. He is a minority Tadjik who assembled the largest single guerrilla army in Afghanistan. This army, put at 11,000 regulars by the Soviets, may have numbered 50,000 when part-time partisans are added. Massoud was born around 1950, studied engineering in Kabul and is fluent in French. His control of the 70-mile-long Panjsher Valley was frequently challenged by the Soviets, yet in the end Massoud dominated the valley. Massoud became the West’s favorite Afghan when Ken Follett based his best seller, Lie Down with Lions on this tough guerrilla commander (ed.). [return]
20. Probably the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). [return]
21. I. P. Tereshchenko served in the OKSVA from April 1984 until April 1986 as the deputy commander of a battalion. [return]
22. S. V. Krutyakov served in the OKSVA from 1985 to 1987 as the commander of a motorized rifle battalion. [return]
23. Probably the 1st Battalion, 860th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (ed.). [return]
24. P. A. Skovorodnikov served in the OKSVA from 1985–1987 as the Chief of Staff of an air assault battalion. He was twice decorated with the Order of the Red Star and was also decorated with the Combat Medal “For Bravery.” [return]
25. The air assault battalion of the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). [return]