On 29 November, following a short artillery preparation, the dismounted separate motorized rifle regiment (minus a battalion) started up the foothills to seize the dominant terrain along the crest. Following the capture of the crest, they were to establish a strong guard force on the east side and prevent the enemy reserve from moving into the Satukandav Pass from the northeast (from the direction of the Parachinar Salient).
Heavy enemy fire greeted the subunits. Indecisiveness and excessive fear on the part of the regimental commander bogged the regiment down in the initial stage of the operation. On the night of 29–30 November, the mujahideen took advantage of the commander’s mistakes and errors and launched attacks on his motorized rifle battalions along several axes.
The enemy knew the territory well and was well supplied with an ample supply of first-class weapons and munitions. He used these to inflict severe casualties on the regiment.
The regiment did not succeed for several reasons. First, the regimental CP was located a fair distance from the subunits where it could not provide direct combat leadership in the mountains. Second, there was no regimental forward observation post. Third, the commander incorrectly calculated the required amount of ammunition (and by the second day of combat, personnel were down to the emergency ammunition reserve). Fourth, the combat was led in a passive and indecisive manner and the regimental leadership had a poor grasp of the situation.
Map 17: The capture of Satukandav Pass.
General Gromov decided to continue the advance on the enemy positions with subunits of the airborne division together with subunits of the Afghan force. Therefore, on 1 December, the 1st Airborne Battalion of an airborne regiment and a battalion of the Afghan “Commandos” assembled near the CP of the separate motorized rifle regiment.
The airborne battalion commander, Major V. N. Petrov, and the Afghan “Commando” battalion commander thoroughly studied the situation and coordinated their actions. Then they began their assault on the main peak. Two airborne companies captured the nearest dominant terrain and used this lodgement to support the assault on the main peak by two assault groups. Enemy mortar and DShK heavy machine gun fire held up the advance until the airborne battalion commander called in the fires of the DAG on enemy fighting positions and firing points.
The simultaneous, headlong arrival of two airborne assault groups on the main peak took the mujahideen by surprise and they began to withdraw from their positions. The battalion commander called in artillery fire further into the enemy depths – primarily on the reverse slope of the peak and onto the path along which enemy reserves would be committed.
Major Petrov reported his situation and decision to the senior commander. He decided to continue the advance on the enemy in the area of the Satukandav Pass and strike the enemy on the flank and rear in order to control the pass.
Following an artillery preparation, the 1st Airborne Battalion and the “Commando” Battalion began the assault toward Satukandav Pass. The enemy had not expected the decisive attack and arrival of Soviet and Afghan forces at the main peak. The mujahideen lost the initiative. Part of the enemy force withdrew. The battalion advanced to the south under supporting artillery fire and did not allow the enemy to regain his composure.
The guerrilla forces defending the Satukandav Pass did not know the exact size of the Soviet and Afghan forces approaching on their flanks and rear. They began a hasty withdrawal, abandoning their crew-served weapons and ammunition at their firing positions.
Taking advantage of the panicked enemy withdrawal in the pass, the 1st Airborne Battalion captured the pass on the move and, along with the Afghan forces, dug in along their newly secured line.
This decisive and brave advance seized the prime defensive node which proved to be the key to the enemy defensive system – the Satukandav Pass.
Frunze Commentary: Analysis of combat in the initial stage of Operation “Magistral’” (November–December 1987) leads to the following conclusions:
1. Thorough knowledge of the situation, continual analysis, decisiveness, initiative and bravery are the basis for successful and informed mission fulfillment in combat.
2. Artful distribution of forces during an advance in mountains, careful coordination between combined arms subunits, and the constant support of artillery fires are the most important steps in such a successful operation.
3. Proper use of the protective characteristics of mountains along with constant reconnaissance will allow one to accomplish his mission with a minimum of personnel casualties.
4. Success in mountain combat under constantly changing conditions demands continuous troop control.
Editor’s Commentary: The dummy airborne drop was a masterful use of deception to discover enemy firing positions. Operation Magistral’ was the largest operation of the war and eventually involved large air assaults, attacks on different axes and the successful lifting of the siege of Khost. In this vignette, Operation Magistral’ massed the fires of an AAG and a DAG for a four-hour artillery preparation during the fight for the Satukandov Pass. The goal was complete destruction of the area by air and artillery and is far outside any Soviet artillery norms. This extensive artillery preparation still did not do the job. Nor did Magistral’. After the costly Operation Magistral’, the mujahideen once again cut off Khost and again put it under siege (a constant feature since 1981).
18. Storming Spinakalacha village
by LTC V. D. Vlasyan19
From 21–26 December 1987, a strong enemy force overran a series of security outposts in the Daman region. This area was the responsibility of an Army Corps of the Army of the Republic of Afghanistan.20 As a result, the enemy began freely moving arms and weapons into the Kandahar region. Two battalions of a Soviet Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade were unable to restore the situation.21
At 2000 hours on 27 December, our division commander, General-Major Uchkin, called me in and gave me my orders. At the time, I was a major and commanded a motorized rifle battalion. He ordered me to take my battalion on a 500-kilometer road march to Kandahar.22 My battalion had to be in the Spinakalacha combat area by the morning of 31 December. I was to seal off the Spinakalacha village from the major supply bases and create conditions which would allow the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade to recapture lost positions. In the course of preparing for our road march and ensuing combat, I added extra ammunition, water, fuel and rations to what we usually carried and picked up some reinforcing subunits. At 0400 hours 29 December, my battalion moved out to accomplish its mission.
At 1600 hours 30 December, we arrived in Kandahar. There, I was met by General-Major R. K. Pishchev, the Deputy commander of the 40th Army. He gave me specific orders. We were to enter the contested area at 1100 hours 31 December and assault and capture Spinakalacha village by 1500 hours. We were then to seal off the canyon and hold this area until 7 January 1988. During that time, an Afghan regiment23 would fortify the area and assume responsibility for the area defended by my 2nd MRB.