Map 18: Storming Spinakalacha village, 31 December 1987.
At 1100 hours, I put my battalion on the road flanked by security patrols. As we entered the area, we began battle and I lost two KIA and three WIA. By 1210 hours, I assembled the bulk of my battalion 1.5 kilometers south of Spinakalacha. From 1220 until 1240, I conducted a personal reconnaissance, finalized my plans for the assault groups and finalized air and artillery coordination. I reported my plan to the senior commander at 1240.
Ten minutes later, my reconnaissance platoon began to climb mountain ridge from the west to destroy enemy security outposts on dominant terrain and on the canyon approaches and the approaches to Spinakalacha village. During their advance, the reconnaissance patrol uncovered a launch-bomb cache with 150 launch bombs and two launchers. The patrol rigged the cache for detonation and proceeded up the hill where they could secure the left flank of the assault detachment. At 1320 hours, the patrol attacked and destroyed an enemy outpost and established solid communications with me.
At 1320 hours, I signalled the start of an artillery preparation. A 152mm SP howitzer battalion, a separate 122mm SP howitzer battalion and a MRLS battalion participated in a 10-minute artillery preparation. This was immediately followed by a bombing and strafing attack by two squadrons of SU-25 FROGFOOT ground-attack aircraft.
At 1335 hours, my 5th MRC moved out to its jumping-off point some 250 meters from the village. The 5th MRC was commanded by Captain В. M. Mikul’skiy. The 5th MRC was configured as Assault Group #1. It had 46 men, including a squad of sappers, and eight BMP-2s. I added a tank with a mine plow and an Afghan infantry company of 40 men to this company. As the 5th MRC moved out, I covered its movement with the fires of a sniper squad, a flamethrower platoon, an AGS-17 platoon and a mortar battery. At 1340 hours, I had the MRLS battalion lay down a smoke screen to blind the enemy.
At 1340 hours, my subunits attacked Spinakalacha. We met strong resistance on the right flank and the Afghan army company withdrew to the jumping-off area. I was not able to get them to come back and they did nothing further toward accomplishing our mission. The enemy began to shift his forces to his left flank in order to put flanking fire on the 5th MRC. For a while, we were held back by the thick adobe walls of the village. Then, however, my troops were able to blow gaps in the adobe walls and my platoons burst through these gaps in three-man groups on the attack. My 5th MRC faced the enemy main force.
At 1355 hours, my 4th MRC (Assault Group #2) attacked on the battalion’s left flank. The 4th MRC, commanded by Captain Yu. A. Shalkin, broke the enemy defense and destroyed his covering forces guarding the entrance to the canyon. One of his platoons was able to hit the enemy in the rear which helped the 5th MRC’s fight. Two more 4th MRC platoons grabbed the western edge of the village and established blocking positions. At 1500 hours, these platoons got into a firefight with mujahideen who were retreating into the mountains.
By 1600 hours, the 5th MRC completed the destruction of the enemy in the eastern part of the village and established blocking positions against the access points from the neighboring green zone. The surviving enemy had fled into the green zone. At 1800 hours, I organized the defense of Spinakalacha and provided fire support to an Afghan infantry regiment which attacked north to seize the southern slope of Grakalacha.24
Frunze Commentary: Analysis of the organization and conduct of combat in this advance in a village shows:
First, the totally successful march and concealed concentration of the battalion near Kandahar was possible due to the thorough and complete preparations for the march and follow-on combat.
Second, prior combat experience allowed the subunit leaders to correctly use initiative during combat in the village.
Third, the battalion commander’s actions merit attention, particularly when you consider how he coordinated actions and rapidly conducted his personal reconnaissance and arranged the necessary fire support to destroy the enemy and then decisively used their results to conduct the advance of his subunits.
Finally, the battalion commander’s interesting maneuver of his reconnaissance platoon’s supporting fire on the enemy from dominant terrain, his skillful use of snipers and portable flamethrowers, and the actions of his platoons’ three and five-men sections during the assault on the village are all worthy of study.
19. A motorized rifle battalion offensive at night in the mountains of the Andarab Canyon
by Major V. G. Tarasyuk25
After the end of February 1988, my regiment returned through Kabul from the successful completion of Operation “Magistral’” (the opening of the road to Khost) to our base camp in Kunduz.26 After we negotiated the Salang tunnel, the division commander ordered our regiment to halt in the Andarab Canyon. With his orders came the following important information: exactly 24 hours earlier, the mujahideen kidnapped the governor of Baghlan Province and his commander of the Ministry of Security Forces in Andarab Canyon.
Our regimental commander, LTC V. V. Telitsyn, received orders to move to the borders of a zone controlled by Afghan government forces, gain contact with the enemy, punish him with massed fires and create the conditions necessary to free the province leadership.
The regimental commander was able to muster two motorized rifle battalions, the reconnaissance company, and the SP artillery battalion (minus one battery) for this mission. In addition, two artillery batteries supported this force with illumination missions from positions along the Salang-Puli-Khumiri highway. Each motorized rifle battalion was down to two motorized rifle companies, the battalion reconnaissance platoon and the mortar battery (in reduced strength). In all, the regiment consisted of 40–45 BMPs, 25–30 howitzers, six vasilek (“cornflower”) automatic mortars, four 82mm podnos (“tray”) mortars and about 300 men.
The regimental commander decided to advance to the border of the Afghan controlled zone at night and drive to the foot of the mountain on BMPs with one MRB and the reconnaissance company. At the base of the mountains, the subunits would dismount and begin the ascent in three company-sized groups (two motorized rifle companies and the reconnaissance company). They would advance about a kilometer or a kilometer and a half to establish contact with the enemy and accomplish their mission.
Fire destruction during the approach, deployment and ascent would be provided by the regiment’s artillery battalion, the mortar batteries of the battalions, the two supporting artillery batteries and the BMP-2 automatic guns of the trail battalion.
The reconnaissance company moved out an hour before the motorized rifle battalion in an attempt to deceive the enemy and conducted a reconnaissance sweep along the opposite canyon wall.
The 1st MRB was ordered to move out, under the cover of artillery fire and the 2nd MRB, which would be firing over the heads of the advancing column as it broke into company columns. Then, the 1st MRB was to cross the dry river and deploy into a combat line at the base of the mountain. At this point, the 1st MRB would dismount the 1st and 3rd MRC and the reconnaissance company plus the recon platoon of the battalion. The battalion would form into two groups. The first group was the 1st MRC commanded by Captain A. V. Ribakov. The second group was the 3rd MRC plus the recon platoon. I was the battalion chief of staff and I commanded this second group. We were to climb the mountain, find the enemy and cut off his escape. The battalion bronegruppa would support us with BMP-2 30mm automatic gunfire into the gap between our two groups.