Why did the Soviets fail to achieve military victory in Afghanistan? First, they were unable to seal the border with Pakistan and Iran to prevent the mujahideen resupply of their forces. Second, they were unable to bring enough force into the country due to public opinion (particularly in the third world) and their inability to provide the logistic support necessary with a larger force. Third, Afghanistan is a country of strong beliefs and traditions and the population opposed the Soviets and the hostile communist ideology of the government of Afghanistan. The communist ideology directly attacked the ethnic structure, community structure and religious beliefs of the people and the people violently rejected this ideology. Fourth, the Soviets had little respect for the people of Afghanistan. They used the Afghan Peoples Army, Sarandoy, the Khad and the local militias (“Defenders of the Revolution”) as cannon fodder. These demoralized and inefficient forces regained some of their lost respectability only when the Soviets left. Further, the Soviets conducted indiscriminate air and artillery attacks against the rural population in order to force them out of the countryside in order to dry up the mujahideen supply lines. Finally, the Soviets were reluctant to accept the casualties necessary for such a victory and tried to substitute fire power for infantry close combat.
What is equally apparent from the book is that the Soviet Union failed to maintain adequate personnel strength within its units. The battalion in Vignette 18 is short an entire company. The regiment in Vignette 19 is short two battalions and each battalion is short one company. Even these companies are at one-third strength. Granted, this regiment was returning from hard fighting during operation “Magistral’”, but the personnel strength of the regiment is less than that of a full-strength battalion. These are skeleton figures. A MRR should have 2,315 men. An MRB should have 455 men. An MRC should have 103 men. An MRP should have 28 men. Soviet forces were badly understrength and Afghan forces were in even worse shape. Other sources describe the significant Soviet problems with disease which cut into units’ present-for-duty strength in Afghanistan. From 1/4 to 1/3 of a unit’s strength was normally sick with hepatitis, typhus, malaria, amoebic dysentery, and meningitis. Guard, details and LOC security cut further into the strength. Units were filled twice a year from the spring and fall draft call-ups. Conscripts sent to the Turkestan Military District had 6–12 month’s training before going to Afghanistan for the rest of their service. Further, military districts and Groups of Forces were levied for troops twice annually. These levies were quite significant. Yet, the unit strengths are appallingly low. Apparently, units need to be filled well in excess of 100% in some regions of the world if one hopes to field a reasonable fighting force.
Next: Chapter 3: The Application of Tactical Air Assaults
Footnotes
1. An assault group is a platoon or company-size detachment temporarily created for blocking and destroying a single strong point or permanent structure(s) during an assault. An assault group typically consists of motorized rifle forces, engineers, and flamethrower operators. An assault detachment is normally battalion-sized and also has armor or direct-fire artillery attached (ed.). [return]
2. V. M. Bogdashkin served in the Republic of Afghanistan from June 1983 through June 1985 as a platoon leader and a company commander in a motorized rifle battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”. [return]
3. Field post numbers (FPN) were postal numbers assigned to division and higher headquarters, regiments and separate battalions and companies. A compilation of field post numbers was considered classified. The field post numbers referred to here are probably of the 12th, 101st and 371st Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). [return]
4. The mountain motorized rifle battalions retained most of their regular MRB TO&E equipment, but had special training, and additional equipment for mountain warfare (ed.). [return]
5. The BMP-2 is an upgrade of the BMP-1 (Boevaya mashina pekhoty) which first appeared in 1967. Both BMPs are tracked infantry fighting vehicles that carry a three-man crew and a squad of eight soldiers. The BMP-1 mounted a 73mm cannon, a 7.62mm machine gun and an anti-tank missile. The BMP-2 substituted a 30mm automatic gun for the 73mm cannon as well as a different anti-tank missile and launcher. The BMP-2, introduced in 1981, has a greatly enhanced elevation and depression capability over the 73mm cannon (ed.). [return]
6. SU-25 FROGFOOT (ed.). [return]
7. S. A. Nikitin served in the OKSVA as a company commander in a separate security battalion in 1985. [return]
8. Probably the 201st MRD (ed.). [return]
9. The launch bomb was a 122mm rocket designed to fire from the BM-21 MRLS. Although the resistance had access to some RPU-14 launchers, most launch bombs were simply rockets fired from a tripod or even a pair of crossed sticks. It is not an accurate weapon, but can do an effective job when fired against a city, military base or other area target (ed.). [return]
10. The BRDM is a four-wheeled armored car which is used primarily for reconnaissance. It has two auxiliary wheels for extra mobility. In its various configurations, it carries either a 12.7mm machine gun, a 7.62mm machine gun or both. This amphibious vehicle protects the crew against small arms fire and shrapnel, so the fuel tank was probably penetrated by heavy machine gun fire (ed.). [return]
11. S. Yu. Pyatakov served in the Republic of Afghanistan from March 1984 through June 1985 as the deputy commander of a motorized rifle battalion. He was decorated with the “Order of the Red Star.” [return]
12. The SPETSNAZ battalion garrisoned at Kandahar airfield (ed.). [return]
13. Battalions of the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade garrisoned in Kandahar (ed.). [return]
14. Each SPETSNAZ group consisted of 16 men armed with the AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher, two PK machine guns, an SVD sniper rifle and various other small arms. [return]
15. A. N. Shishkov served in the Republic of Afghanistan from February 1986 through June 1988 as the Senior Assistant to the Chief of the Operations Section of an airborne division. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Banner”, the “Order of the Red Star”, and the order “For Service to the Fatherland in the Armed Forces”, Third degree. [return]
16. Either the 860th or 191st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment, most probably the 191st. General Gromov doesn’t list this unit by number, probably because of its abysmal performance (ed.). [return]
17. The 345th Separate Airborne Regiment part of the 105th Guards Airborne Division invaded Afghanistan and, through attrition, eventually shrunk to the 345th Separate Airborne Regiment (ed.). [return]
18. In the Soviet Army, maintenance, guard, work details and special projects always detracted from the time available for training. The army used to train only those people who were not on detail, but eventually realized that this was producing a very uneven quality in the readiness of the force. Therefore, they developed a program whereby regiments and battalions would pull guard and details for the division on a rotating basis and then have 12 days for training when they would not be involved in post, camp and station details. This cycle continued even in the combat zone (ed.). [return]
19. V. D. Vlasyan served in the Republic of Afghanistan from October 1986 through June 1988 first as a deputy commander and then as the commander of a motorized rifle battalion. He was decorated with the “Order of the Red Banner” and the “Order of the Red Star”. [return]