20. Afghan 2nd Army Corps headquarted in Kandahar (ed.). [return]
21. 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). [return]
22. The battalion could be from the 5th MRD if it came from western Afghanistan (Shindand area) or from the 108th MRD if it came from eastern Afghanistan (Kabul area) (ed.). [return]
23. The Afghan Army had both a brigade and a regiment force structure. This regiment was from either the Afghan 7th MRD or 15th MRD stationed in Kandahar (ed.). [return]
24. According to his map, the 7th Infantry Regiment (ed.). [return]
25. V. G. Tarasyuk served in the OKSVA from April 1986 through April 1988 as the Chief of Staff of a motorized rifle battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”. [return]
26. Either the 122nd, 149th or 395th MRR from the 201st MRD (ed.). [return]
27. Actually, both the 201st and 108th Motorized Rifle Divisions participated in the operation, but since neither could move their entire division and temporarily abandon their base camps and the LOCs that they guarded, they formed a composite division under the 201st headquarters. The airborne division was the 103rd Airborne Division. General Gromov, in an article in Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star) on 30 December 1993, listed the following Soviet units participating in Magistral’: the 108th and the 201st MRD, 103rd Airborne Division, 56th Separate Air Assault Brigade, the 345th Separate Airborne Regiment and other units and subunits. He also lists the following Afghan government units: 8th, 11th, 12th, 14th, and 25th Infantry divisions, 15th Tank Brigade and several special forces subunits (ed.).[return]
Chapter 3:
The Application of Tactical Air Assaults
The study of combat experience in Afghanistan allows us to perfect the theory and practice of tactical air assaults. Afghanistan practice demonstrated that tactical air assaults were successfully employed for independent, surprise attacks against guerrilla forces and base camps in remote locales or difficult terrain. Air assaults were also employed in joint actions involving other subunits and regiments, advancing along the front.
Air assaults were normally conducted to seize dominant terrain and road junctions. They would land directly on the target or adjacent to it. As a rule, prior to landing the first lift and the main body, we would use air, artillery and even small-arms fire to suppress the enemy.
20. Tactical air assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces
by Major S. A. Urban1
In February 1983, the brigade intelligence section reported that approximately 150 enemy were functioning in groups in the brigade area of responsibility (AOR).2 They were shelling security outposts and civilian facilities with 81mm mortar fire and were mining roads.
The brigade commander decided to eradicate these groups in our AOR. He planned to attack the enemy in the village of Kama (located in Nangarhar Province about 12 kilometers from our base camp) and the village of Ghaziabad. He would air-land two companies, one into the area near Kama and would later follow this landing with one against Ghaziabad. The bronegruppa of the participating motorized rifle battalion and airborne company would move out from Jalalabad to Ghaziabad in support. The air landing would be preceded with a 10-minute artillery preparation. Captain Kostenko, the acting battalion commander, would command the air landing. Major Ermolaev, the deputy commander for technical support, would command the bronegruppa. The first lift would consist of an air assault platoon, an engineer squad and a flamethrower squad.
Map 20: Air assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces.
On 12 February, the air landing took place near Kama. The 2nd AAslt company swept through the green zone, but did not find any enemy. The bronegruppa moved toward the village of Ghaziabad.
On 13 February, we conducted an air landing with the 1st AAslt company, this time near Ghaziabad to seize the crest of the southern mountain and block the enemy withdrawal. However, before the bronegruppa reached Ghaziabad from the north, the enemy withdrew into the mountains. On the morning of 14 February, the battalion commander decided to pick up the two air assault companies and air land them near the village of Charbagh (in Laghman Province). From there, they would advance across the mountains to Bailam village. According to preliminary intelligence, the mujahideen stored ammunition and had a hospital in Bailam. The advancing companies would work with the bronegruppa to seal off Bailam and destroy the enemy inside it. We had 24 hours to accomplish our mission.
The area around Bailam was well-fortified and had reinforced security. The enemy observed our air landing and the battalion lost the element of surprise. We lacked the necessary combat power to take the village. Finally, toward the end of 17 February, our brigade commander gave us the necessary air and artillery support to take the village. The battalion lost 25–30 men.
Frunze Commentary: This action shows that the first requirement for a successful air landing is surprise. Without surprise, it is impossible to dislodge the enemy unless you have sufficient aviation and artillery support.
Editor’s Commentary: The 66th and 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades were forces created especially for counter-insurgency. They were composed of two or three motorized rifle battalions, an air assault battalion, an artillery howitzer battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a tank battalion and support troops. There are also some indications that a MRLS battalion might have belonged to this organization. In this vignette, a MRLS battalion is part of the Brigade Artillery Group (BrAG) of the 66th. Evidently it was not brought in just for this action. In Vignette 18, an MRLS battalion supports an attack in the 70th’s AOR. The 70th was located in Kandahar and it was over 400 kilometers from Kandahar to the next major Soviet force. Perhaps the Afghan forces in the area had MRLS, but there is also the possibility that a MRLS battalion was part of both separate brigades.
Soviet military vocabulary is very precise when it differentiates between tactics and operations in the European theater. Tactics are the business of platoons, companies, battalions, regiments and divisions while operations are the business of armies and fronts. When the 40th Army conducts Operation Magistral’ (Vignette 17) it is an operation. When divisions and regiments fight, it is tactics. However, whenever the 103rd Airborne Division, the 56th Air Assault Brigade, the 345th Separate Airborne Regiment, the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, or the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade fight, it’s an operation. This is probably due to the unique combined arms mixes of the separate brigades and the level of impact of the airborne and air assault forces.
In this vignette, the actions of the bronegruppa spook the enemy before the air assault element is in a position to deal with them. Apparently, there were problems with the coordination and communications between the two elements.
It would also appear that intelligence for this operation was very poor. This may be a reflection of poor performance by the reconnaissance forces and a demonstration of an inability to identify enemy positions.
21. An air assault in the area of Rumbasi village
by Major V. V. Kovalev3
At the start of January 1985, the commander of our motorized rifle brigade4 received an intelligence report that the enemy planned to hold a conference on 25 January near the village of Rumbasi (located southwest of Kandahar). The meeting would involve the leaders of the main guerrilla forces in a three-province area and was being held to coordinate their future actions. The decision was made to destroy the enemy at this meeting.