After examining the mistakes, we can draw the following positive experience from this operation: The success of the entire operation depended, to a great deal, on the courageous and decisive actions of the first lift. Every group, landing on a single or several LZs, must be ready for independent action, since follow-on lifts into the same LZ may not be possible. How helicopters are used will vary with the height of the mountains. An Mi-8MT helicopter can carry six to eight troopers with all their kit at 2000 meters altitude, but only four or five at 3000 to 4000 meters altitude.
Editor’s Commentary: Guerrilla warfare is a platoon leader’s and company commander’s war. Lower level initiative is essential for survival and success. This vignette shows a good example of how the Soviets were developing junior leader initiative in the airborne and air assault forces. Motorized rifle forces seemed to continue to suffer from top-driven lack of initiative.
Success in guerrilla war is hard to define and body count is certainly a poor criteria. However, example after example shows blocks, sweeps and raids into areas supposedly containing hundreds of guerrillas. At the end of a battle or operation, the mujahideen casualties are in the dozens and the action is termed a success because the guerrilla force has been smashed. From Vietnam experience, a guerrilla force is very difficult to destroy. After very rough handling, the majority of them seem to bounce back. It seems that what the Soviets were normally engaging were the rear guards and the slow or uninformed guerrillas. The Soviet block seemed very porous (especially at night) and the sweep seemed to miss a lot.
The lack of a professional NCO corps really hurt the Soviets during these block and sweep actions. According to interviews I have conducted, a conscript NCO was normally in charge of a blocking post. Time and time again, the Soviet troops would either go to sleep on post or fail to engage the enemy for fear of getting killed in the firefight. The NCO should have corrected this, but was often the instigator.
26. Conducting a tactical air assault in the “Melava” fortified region
by Major N. G. Ten’kov16
In the spring of 1987, intelligence reports stated that the mujahideen had constructed a fortified region near Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province. The so-called “Melava” fortified region contained huge stores of weapons, ammunition, medicine and foodstuffs which had been brought over from Pakistan. The dominant heights in this area were well-fortified with dense minefields and with deep trenches and dugouts dug into the rocky strata. Each mountain had been turned into a self-sufficient strong point, prepared for defense in all directions. Each mountain fortress had an anti-aircraft weapon, an 82mm mortar and a heavy machine gun. According to intelligence reports, about 500 men, armed with automatic weapons and sniper rifles defended the region. The enemy correctly manned his defenses around the clock.
The Separate Air Assault Brigade17 was commanded by LTC V. A. Raevskiy. He received orders to conduct a 120 kilometer road march with two reinforced airborne battalions, an artillery battalion and some of the specialized subunits of the brigade to Kabul. Once there, he refueled his equipment and rested his men before he conducted a 170 kilometer road march from Kabul to Jalalabad. At Jalalabad, he moved his brigade into an assembly area and prepared for action.
The plan for destroying the enemy in the fortified region was as follows: Conduct a 32-kilometer road march in the early hours of 12 April and in the morning air assault two battalions close to the enemy strong points. The battalions would destroy the enemy security elements and then, exploiting success, would engage the reserve; capture the stores, strong points and firing positions; and then blow up the enemy fortifications.
The day before the operation, the brigade commander and his assistants diligently studied the map and aerial photographs of the objective, determined the more expedient flight path, determined the LZs and calculated the time necessary to carry out the mission. The troopers who would participate in the operation trained in air assaults, taking out sentries and capturing supply caches. During preparations, special attention was given to coordination and command and control.
Map 26: Air assault brigade destroys the Melava fortified regions.
In accordance with the plan, the brigade moved out on its road march at 2030 hours on 11 April under black-out drive conditions. Due to the heavily mined roads, the brigade arrived three hours late at the staging area. They immediately began to load the helicopters.
Thanks to the skillful actions of the Deputy Brigade Commander, Colonel A. V. Maslov and the high level of training of the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Battalions (Captain A. V. Andreev and Major A. I. Samusev), the helicopters were ready for flight at the appointed time – 0630 hours. Using nap-of-the-earth flying, the helicopter pilots flew undetected to the mountain side of the strongpoints and landed the force at 0644 hours on 12 April. Mi-24 helicopter gunships supported the insertion while artillery fire closed down the enemy firing points. Simultaneously, two pair of Mi-8 MT helicopters hit the DShK heavy machine gun and the guards’ barracks.
The fight for the dominant heights lasted 17 minutes. Our force lost two KIA and three WIA, while the enemy, caught totally unawares, lost several dozen men. The next 24 hours were spent rooting out the survivors of the guerrilla forces. We captured a huge supply of arms and ammunition. The number of captured launch bombs alone surpassed 1,000.
Frunze Commentary: The success of the operation was achieved by thorough preparation, a high state of training for the troopers and helicopter crews, and a penetrating analysis of the enemy situation. The qualitative study of the enemy and terrain led to a correct understanding of the situation, defined the probable enemy courses of action, and resulted in a superior combat plan for our forces. The successful actions of our units and subunits at night allowed us to seize the enemy mountain positions with minimal casualties. The mountains should have been the enemy’s ally in battle. Instead, they were ours. Finally, the careful coordination and all-encompassing support of our combat allowed us to carry out the assigned task on time.
Editor’s Commentary: The force failed to clear the roads ahead of time and was three hours late. This appears to be a failure to conduct proper reconnaissance. Throughout this chapter, units are getting lost and getting surprised. Helicopters are being shot down. No one appears to be looking into these areas before the main force arrives. Apparently, the Soviet Army did not always employ pathfinder-type units prior to air assaults. Perhaps it should have. Most of the difficulties encountered seem to be due to a failure to use reconnaissance forces properly.
Why did the force perform the night march to a field helicopter staging site anyway? Jalalabad has a perfectly good airfield. The 56th Separate Air Assault Brigade could have flown from Gardez to Jalalabad and then staged out of the Jalalabad airfield. Apparently, they could have flown the same nap-of-the-earth route and achieved the same surprise.