Soviet air assault tactics and techniques evolved rapidly in Afghanistan. The Soviets relied on helicopter maneuver to replace the mobility that they were unable to realize from their tanks and armored personnel carriers on Afghanistan’s rugged terrain. Armored vehicles were restricted to the roads and valley floors. Soviet infantry were uninspired conscripts who were generally reluctant to close with the dedicated and motivated mujahideen. The Soviet advantage was found in the skies. The Soviet helicopter gunship was a very significant system in the war. Their Mi-24 HIND was the most dreaded and effective weapons system employed against the mujahideen until 1988, when “Stinger” portable surface-to-air missiles limited their ability to range freely over resistance-controlled areas. The Soviet military would have liked to employ far more helicopters in Afghanistan, however, the lack of maintenance facilities, the increased logistics demand and the lack of secure operating bases prevented this. The Soviets were unwilling (or unable) to make a larger logistic and psychological commitment to the war.
Next: Chapter 4: Defense and Outpost Security
Footnotes
1. S. A. Urban served in the Republic of Afghanistan from December 1981 through April 1984 as a platoon leader and then a company commander in an air assault battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”. [return]
2. The 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). [return]
3. V. V. Kovalev served in the Republic of Afghanistan from June 1983 through July 1985 as a platoon leader, company commander and battalion chief of staff. He was decorated with the “Order of the Red Star” and the Republic of Afghanistan order “For Valor”. [return]
4. The 70th Separate Motorized Brigade (ed.). [return]
5. The 4th Air Assault Battalion (ed.). [return]
6. V. G. Chabanenko served in the Republic of Afghanistan from December 1983 through June 1985 as a battalion commander. [return]
7. The 103rd Airborne Division (ed.). [return]
8. V. V. Selivanov served in the Republic of Afghanistan as the Chief of Intelligence of an airborne regiment. [return]
9. KHAD (ed.). [return]
10. The 103rd Airborne Division (ed.). [return]
11. V. G. Istratiy served in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1984 through 1986 as a company commander. [return]
12. The 4th Air Assault Battalion of the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (ed.). [return]
13. Similar to the U.S. LAW (light anti-tank weapon) (ed.). [return]
14. S. I. Pariy served in the Republic of Afghanistan from September 1985 through October 1987 as the chief of staff of an airborne battalion and as a airborne battalion commander. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star” twice and the Afghanistan “Order for Bravery.” [return]
15. The 103rd Airborne Division (ed.) [return]
16. N. G. Ten’kov served in the OKSVA as the Deputy Chief of the Operations Section of a Separate Brigade. He received the order “For Service to the Fatherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” Third Class. [return]
17. The 56th Separate Air Assault Brigade stationed in Gardez (ed.). [return]
Chapter 4:
Defense and Outpost Security
The Soviet and Afghan government forces seldom went over to the defense in Afghanistan, so we have little defensive experience from the Afghanistan war. This was the result of several factors: there was no continuous front line; our assigned mission was to defeat the guerrilla forces; the nature of the mujahideen forces was to hit and run; and we enjoyed a qualitative and quantitative superiority in units, equipment and weaponry over the enemy. When we defended, most often it was subunits (platoons, companies and battalions) that went over to the defense.
But combat experience showed us that good, organized security actions were vital for protecting the day-to-day activities of entire regions, cities and our garrison base camps in Afghanistan. Effectively organized security yielded positive results in the battle with the mujahideen and helped in keeping convoys secure and in sweeping mujahideen from the areas around garrisons, airfields, electric power plants and transfer stations, mountain passes, tunnels and other important sites.1
27. A motorized rifle platoon defends outside Jurm village
by Major S. V. Milyuk2
In August 1980, a large guerrilla force was gathering in the area near Baharak village. Baharak village is located near Faizabad in Badakhshan province. A separate motorized rifle regiment was garrisoned in Faizabad and in the surrounding area. The regiment’s subunits provided stability and control in the province. Due to the large area the regiment had to control, it was split into two bases – one in the fortified village of Baharak (60 kilometers from Faizabad) and the rest in outskirts of Faizabad. The regiment’s tank battalion stayed behind in the Soviet Union.3
The regimental commander decided to destroy the enemy in the hills surrounding Faizabad and then move on the village of Jurm, surround it and then destroy the guerrilla forces which were gathering there. In order to support the timely entry of the regiment into the combat zone, my platoon was sent to fix several sections of road and a bridge over the Kokcha River which had been destroyed. [My entire platoon was not available for the mission, since all my dismounted motorized rifle soldiers were taken for other duties.] I was left with my three BMPs and their crews. I was reinforced with 20 Afghan soldiers on two trucks and a bulldozer. In preparing for this mission, I paid particular attention to the maintenance of my vehicles and their armaments. I loaded 72 hours worth of supplies on these vehicles.
On 3 August, I guided my rag-tag force into the area located two or two-and-one-half kilometers west of Jurm where the destroyed bridge stood. A quick scan of the countryside revealed that the enemy had constructed a well-prepared defense on the probable approaches to the village. I decided to establish a perimeter defense and ordered the force to begin digging-in the vehicles and individual fighting positions. I used the bulldozer to help in this effort. But the bulldozer operators and the local inhabitants who were employed in repairing the road [and bridge] categorically refused to stay with me overnight and returned to Baharak village.
Map 27: A motorized rifle platoon defends outside Jurm village.
We dug our individual and vehicle fighting positions within four hours and I dispersed the Afghan soldiers between the BMPs. Our fighting positions were circular and looked like wells. This design permitted firing throughout 360 degrees and also provided a place for the soldiers to rest. We reinforced the breastworks with stones and clay.
My BMP crews had been in battle before and, therefore, when the enemy began to shell our positions at dusk, they knew how to conduct night fire and were prepared to do so. My drivers started up their tracks at the right time and helped my gunners.4 My vehicle commanders stood outside the tracks and adjusted fire from the strike of the tracer rounds. They talked to the gunners on the intercom by linking the issue 10-meter extension cables to their tanker’s helmets and the intercom sets. They talked by toggling on the helmet’s breast-level switch. The attacking enemy finally withdrew at sunrise, but had not given up his intention to overrun my position. He proved this on the following night when he resumed his shelling.