Map 34: LOC security.
My LOC security was based on a series of security outposts running the length of the road. An outpost was usually occupied by a motorized rifle platoon, one or two AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, one or two heavy “Utes” or DShK machine guns, one or two 82mm mortars and a tank. These could be combined into a security detachment (a motorized rifle company or battalion reinforced with artillery, tanks, and engineers).
The security outposts functioned around the clock. During the day, one man per squad or tank was on watch while a two-man patrol worked the area. At night, every security outpost would send out one or two security points. These four-man points were located 500 to 800 meters from the security outpost and had wire and visual communications with the outpost. The outpost could cover the point with fire.
Each security outpost had a full perimeter defense in order to defeat a mujahideen attack from any direction. Each platoon had primary and alternate sectors of fire with interlocking fields of fire with adjacent units. Crew-served weapons had reserve positions and reserve sectors of fire. Artillery fire planning was carefully done. Artillery subunits were usually colocated in the security outposts with the motorized rifle subunits. The artillery was positioned in order to effectively support all the security outposts. Artillery fires were planned on all likely axes on which the mujahideen could move. Targets were registered and numbered. The targets and their coordinates were maintained by the security outposts, artillery guns crews and by the battalion headquarters. Fires could be adjusted from preplanned targets by the security outpost commander or, if he could not communicate directly with the artillery subunit, through the battalion commander. Normally, it took not more than two to four minutes to bring artillery fire onto a group of mujahideen.
We selected the positions for the outposts carefully and fortified them thoroughly. We piled up earth and stones to make complete trenchworks, bunkers, and ammunition, food and water points. We ran two rows of barbed wire fence around each outpost and put anti-personnel mines between the fences. We put trip flares and sensors at remote and concealed approaches to the outposts. The entrance and exit to the security outposts were closed and mined at night. Rules of conduct were posted at the perimeter of the security zone and outside the security outposts. The signs were in the Afghan, Russian and English languages.20
Every security outpost had five combat loads of ammunition,21 and 10 days worth of food, water and fuel. Night-vision devices, “Blik” binoculars, night scopes, parachute flares and tracer ammunition were available for night-time employment.
Each security outpost maintained the following documents and maps:
the combat mission of the outpost and the sequence of mission fulfillment:
the commander’s map marked with positions, fire plans and known enemy situation;
a diagram of the strongpoint;
orders from the battalion commander;
combat orders of the security outpost commander;
an observation schedule;
a patrol schedule;
a duty weapon schedule and sectors of fire;22
signal tables;
observer’s journals, combat journals and journals of enemy activities.
The battalion produces the security plan which shows the number and composition of each security outpost, the quantity of vehicles, weapons and ammunition at each security outpost, the security belt at each outpost, the defensive plan for key sites, the coordination measures between elements, the defensive fire plan, the signal plan for communication between garrisons, convoys, dispatch posts and the fire support elements. In addition, the battalion had a shift schedule for its subunits and also the battalion commander’s order for organization of the security zone. Subunits had their TO&E equipment plus additional radios, telephones and cable communication gear for command and control.
Radio is the primary mean of communications in LOC security. All armored vehicles, TO&E and attached subunits and passing convoys monitor a common channel. The battalion reconnaissance platoon is located close to the battalion command post. Its function is to cut off and destroy any groups of mujahideen in the battalion AOR. They usually do this by setting up ambushes on sites where mujahideen could approach the highway. Their ambush site is coordinated with the regiment’s ambush plan and usually lasts one night. There have been times, however, when the ambush party has stayed on site for three days.
Editor’s Commentary: The Soviet concept of LOC security appears to have been to establish a series of fortified positions, man them and then sit back and wait. This is a very passive, reactive posture. There is no aggressive patrolling or reconnaissance. Again, the Soviets used their reconnaissance force as a primary combat force and not for gathering intelligence. There seems to be no attempt to shift forces, occupy temporary sites and take actions to deceive or “wrong-foot” the enemy. The mujahideen could easily collect against this scheme and take appropriate actions to avoid or overcome it.
Next: Chapter 5: March and Convoy Escort
Footnotes
1. The Soviets see a big difference between a defensive position and a security post. They defend when they are in immediate danger of being overwhelmed and when the correlation of forces is against them. A security outpost is a control measure which incorporates defensive measures as combat multipliers (ed.). [return]
2. S. V. Milyuk served in the OKSVA from January 1980 through June 1981 as a platoon leader. He was awarded the medal “For Excellence in Military Service” First Class. [return]
3. The 860th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment was garrisoned in Faizabad. Its 1st Battalion was garrisoned in Khamrabad (Baharak) and, later, its 3rd Battalion was garrisoned in Kishim. The action takes place in the 1st Battalion area (ed.). [return]
4. When in use, the electrically-powered turret of the BMP rapidly drains energy from the vehicle. Therefore, during alerts and combat, the BMP engine must be kept running in order to keep the battery charged and provide adequate voltage to the turret (ed.). [return]
5. Soviet trip flares are not merely ground flares which illuminate the area. Soviet trip flares contain multiple green, yellow and red rockets which fire into the air and produce a whistling sound. These trip flares (more precisely signal mines – signal ‘nye miny) draw the sleepiest sentry’s attention with repeated lights and sounds (ed.). [return]