6. S. V. Mos’kin served in the OKSVA from September 1980 through November 1982 as a platoon leader. [return]
7. The 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion, 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were mounted on BTRs while the 3rd Battalion was mounted on BMPs (ed.). [return]
8. I. A. Egiazarov served in the OKSVA from 1982 through 1984 as the commander of a SPETSNAZ group. He was awarded the medal “For Military Merit.” [return]
9. A SPETSNAZ detachment is equivalent to a battalion command, although its personnel strength was less than 100. They are sometimes called SPETSNAZ companies. SPETSNAZ groups were equivalent to company commands, but had a personnel strength of 15–16 men or less. Some were four-man groups. They were sometimes called SPETSNAZ platoons (ed.). [return]
10. The 31st SPETSNAZ Group of the 177th SPETSNAZ Detachment (ed.). [return]
11. This Soviet tanglefoot obstacle is different than that used in western armies. It is a large, compressed, banded spring made of high-quality wire. It is similar to an uncontrolled “Slinky” toy. When unbanded during set up, it uncoils wildly in every direction. It will stop dismounted soldiers, animals, vehicles and even tanks. It is almost impossible to extricate anything from this without heavy-duty wire cutters, pliers and lots of time. These obstacles are called MZP (malozametnye prepyatstviya) or concealed obstacles (ed.). [return]
12. F. V. Zhitoryuk served in the OKSVA in 1985 as a battalion commander. [return]
13. Most likely the 177th MRR of the 108th MRD (ed.). [return]
14. F. V. Zhitoryuk served in the OKSVA in 1985 as a battalion commander. [This is the same author of the last vignette.) (ed.)]. [return]
15. V. G. Serebryakov served in the OKSVA from May 1986 through June 1988 as an airborne battalion commander. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Banner”, the “Order of the Red Star”, and the Afghan “Order of the Red Banner”. [return]
16. This and the following vignette are not part of the Frunze book. They are extracts from P. Alexseev’s “Okhranenie” [Security], Voyenny vestnik [Military herald], April 1994, p. 42–46. Colonel Alexseev is on the faculty of the Frunze Department of the History of Military Art. He apparently used LTC Yunakov’s report that was in the Frunze Afghanistan archives. Although both examples lack the element of combat, they show how base camp and LOC security were organized (ed.). [return]
17. Probably the 5th Motorized Rifle Battalion, 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. The article (which is riddled with typographical errors) says the 2nd Battalion, but this is unlikely (ed.). [return]
18. The 3rd Battalion of either the 180th or 181st Motorized Rifle Regiments, 108th Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). [return]
19. The ZSU-23-2. These 23mm machine guns could fire 2,000 rounds per minute and could be mounted on a truck bed or BTR (ed.). [return]
20. There is no single Afghan language. Pushtu and Dari are the official languages, while Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Baluchi, Turkmen, and Arabic are also spoken (ed.). [return]
21. The combat load [boekomplekt] is a logistic planning term which differs from the U.S. “basic load”. Five combat loads is a significant amount – probably enough for six good fights (ed.). [return]
22. Duty weapons were manned, crew-served weapons in temporary positions. Only these weapons would engage enemy reconnaissance or probing elements while the rest of the force moved to battle positions. The duty weapons would then move to battle positions. Enemy return fire would be on the temporary position and the enemy knowledge of the locations of defending Soviet crew-served weapons would be faulty (ed.). [return]
Chapter 5:
March and Convoy Escort
Side by side with the mission of destroying guerrilla forces, the Soviet forces had a mission of delivering cargo and escorting convoys. Analysis of enemy tactics shows that during the first years of the war, the enemy hit convoys mainly by mining isolated stretches of road. During the later years of the war, the enemy became far more focused on the convoys and used special diversionary groups to attack the convoys physically.
The enemy’s attacks on the convoys were characterized by: a maximum effort to achieve surprise; a skillful selection of ambush sites; well-prepared, excellently fortified and masterfully concealed ambush positions; a well-prepared route of withdrawal; a process for mining the roads which included the shoulders and detour routes; and the simultaneous destruction of equipment in several locations of the convoy to prevent maneuver and the movement of the convoy out of the kill zone.
35. Escorting a truck convoy from Kabul to Gazni
by Major V. I. Rovba1
At the end of 1981, guerrilla forces were very active in the province of Gazni. Especially bitter combat was fought along the Ghazni-Kabul and Ghazni-Kandahar highways. The enemy paid special attention to mining the roads where convoys would pass.
The 9th MRC was stationed six kilometers west of Ghazni with our parent regiment.2 On 5 September, our company commander was ordered to provide an escort on the next day for an 80-vehicle convoy from Ghazni to Kabul. On 7 September, we would offload the cargo and would return on 8 September. Two motorized rifle platoons were detailed to provide security and convoy escort. The company commander would command the detail on an R-142 radio set from the regimental communications company.3 The route is 160 kilometers long.
The only preparation that the troops had for the mission was drawing their ammunition and cleaning their individual and crew-served weapons. The drivers pulled maintenance on their vehicles by themselves.
My company commander decided to keep the convoy together in one single column. He put a BTR in the lead of the convoy and two at the tail. He spaced the remaining BTRs between every 15 or 16 trucks in the convoy. Altogether, he committed seven BTRs to the mission. In the event that the mujahideen would attack a motorized rifle squad, each squad’s BTR would pull over to the side of the road from which the enemy was firing and return fire with all its weapons. Thus, it would provide covering fire for the trucks driving out of the kill zone. Once the convoy was clear, the BTRs would rejoin the column and re-occupy their positions in the march column. Under no circumstances were we to allow the enemy to stop the column. It would be very difficult to get the convoy going again should it be stopped.
The road march to Kabul passed without incident. However, there was a delay in refilling the fuel trucks that constituted the bulk of the convoy back to Ghazni. The return trip was supposed to start at 0600 hours and finally got started at 1030 hours. We had sat on the outskirts of Kabul for four hours waiting for all of the fuel trucks. While we were waiting, individual Afghan trucks loaded with men and cargo continually passed by the entire convoy.
Map 35: Defeating an enemy attack on a convoy.
When the loaded fuel tankers finally arrived, they took their place in the convoy. The commander gave the order and the march began. After driving for an hour and a half, we entered the minor Kabul-river canyon and traveled through a green zone. Three kilometers ahead of us was an Afghan Army post which guarded a river bridge. The presence of this post had a certain psychological effect and we relaxed our vigilance as we approached the post. The company commander’s BTR and the truck with the R-142 radio set traveled at the front of the column. Right behind them was a fuel truck towing a broken-down fuel truck. Once the entire convoy was flanked by the green zone, the enemy opened fire on the lead vehicles with grenade launchers at a range of 25 to 30 meters. The fuel truck towing the other fuel truck was hit. Simultaneously, the enemy opened fire on the tail end of the convoy and knocked out a trail BTR with a RPG.