The escort vehicles reacted as they had been briefed and returned fire. The truck column began to drive out of the kill zone while the enemy was rattled by the return fire. The company commander radioed for air support and 30 minutes after the battle began, helicopter gunships arrived. They hit the enemy and supported the motorized riflemen in their battle. The enemy ceased fire and began to withdraw to fall-back positions. In this combat, we lost one soldier KIA and seven WIA.
Frunze Commentary: This vignette shows insufficient preparation for the convoy duty and further insufficient preparation in its accomplishment. On the day before the mission, the company commander did not conduct training with his personnel including training on coordination of actions in the event of enemy attack. The prolonged wait along the roadside permitted the enemy to closely study the convoy as he drove by the column. The use of helicopter gunships to cover the column from the air did not come soon enough to ward off the enemy attack. Reconnaissance was not used during the course of the march. Nevertheless, the high psychological preparation of the drivers and the selfless actions of the motorized rifle soldiers allowed the column to rapidly exit the kill zone.
Editor’s Commentary: In this vignette, the commander is taken to task for not carefully supervising the preparation of his troops for the march. Part of this criticism is based on lack of trust of subordinates and the lack of a Soviet professional NCO corps. The commander is expected to personally conduct all training. In armies with a professional NCO corps, such training and preparation is done by trained, seasoned sergeants who understand the unit missions and train their forces to meet them. The commander checks his sergeants, but does not have to get involved in training to the extent that his Soviet counterpart had to. This leaves more time for carefully planning the action. The Soviet system overburdened the company grade officers and limited individual training opportunities.
The mujahideen learned to take out command vehicles early in the battle. Command vehicles were always distinguished by extra antennae and convoy commanders usually rode in the first vehicle of the main column. This is the case throughout this chapter. Other Soviet writings talk about strapping extra antennae on all vehicles before going into action and varying the commander’s position in the column. This did not happen. Consequently, when the commander’s vehicle was hit, communications were usually lost and the commander, if he survived, could not control the fight. In this vignette, the essential communications were in a soft-bodied truck, instead of an armored vehicle. The Soviets used radio almost exclusively to control the battle. Although the mujahideen had little jamming capability, once they knocked out the Soviet vehicles with the multiple antennae, they usually had disrupted the tactical control net.
36. An air assault company escorts a convoy in Kunduz Province
by Major A. M. Portnov4
Enemy activity was a problem near Imam-Sahib in Kunduz Province at the end of October 1981. The enemy would launch diversionary attacks against Soviet bases, while simultaneously trying to prevent the export of cotton from the cities of Shekravan and Imam-Sahib.5
On 26 October 1981, I received an order to provide escort to a convoy of 70 trucks hauling cotton. My 7th Air Assault Company was to provide escort along the 114-kilometer route from Shekravan to Shirkhan. My company had two air assault platoons and was reinforced with a mortar platoon, a machine-gun squad, and two AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers mounted on BTR-D carriers.
While preparing for the mission, I brought in all my officers, sergeants and drivers and we went over the route on a terrain model in detail. We developed several courses of action for each vehicle in the event of an enemy attack on the column. In my forward security patrol, I had two BMDs6 and a BTR-D mounting the AGS-17. They moved at one-kilometer intervals in front of the main body.
After the cotton was loaded, the convoy left Shekravan at 1200 hours on 27 October. I augmented my Soviet security force by putting three or four Afghan armed police from the “Sarandoy” company on each cotton truck. In the event of an attack on the convoy, the Afghan armed police would act under my command.
Map 36: The 7th Air Assault Company destroys the enemy.
When our column approached Basiz village, the enemy fired on the forward security patrol with grenade launchers and blew up a command-detonated mine.7 The enemy was trying to destroy the bridge across the canal and the BTR-D that was on it. Thus, they hoped to stop the convoy. Thanks to the skilled handling by the driver of the BTR-D, it was not damaged. However, at the same time, the enemy was firing rifles and grenade launchers at the column from 70–100 meters away and knocked out four cotton trucks.
I ordered my forward security patrol (the 2nd Air Assault Platoon) and the 3rd Air Assault Platoon to maneuver behind the enemy and take him from the rear. The fires from one BMD, the AGS-17 crew and the mortar platoon were sufficient to pin down the enemy and allow the Afghan police company to deploy.
Having failed their mission, the enemy began to withdraw from prepared positions and came under fire from my platoons which had encircled them from the rear. The trapped guerrilla force continued to resist and we destroyed them. I had one air assault trooper wounded in my company.
Frunze Commentary: Combat experience shows that when preparing for a march, it is necessary to conduct coordination not only with your officers and sergeants, but with your armored-vehicle drivers as well. Your forward security patrol must not only have a route reconnaissance mission, but must also be instructed as to what actions to take when necessary in order to fight in coordination with the rest of the subunits. When combat is joined, it is necessary to maneuver subunits boldly to take the enemy on the flank and in the rear.
Editor’s Commentary: The column deployed a forward security patrol, but their reconnaissance effort seems lacking. Although they went over the route on a terrain model, it appears that simple map reconnaissance was neglected and choke points and potential kill zones were not identified and planned for. The bridge is an obvious choke point and a place for reconnaissance elements to dismount and check for mines. Flank security is never discussed and evidently seldom deployed.
37. Convoy escort and combat in the village of Daulatabad
by LTC A. A. Agzamov85
At the end of 1981, enemy attacks against convoys mounted along the Termez, Shebegan, Andkhoy, Maimana route. It was particularly difficult in the region of Daulatabad. Intelligence reports indicated that a guerrilla force of 25 to 30 men armed with rifles operated in this area. Acting secretly, the enemy would attack a single vehicle or column. Their goal was to paralyze resupply into the area.
On 2 December 1981, the 2nd Reconnaissance Company, which was garrisoned in Maimana, was ordered to escort a 120-vehicle convoy loaded with supplies from Andkhoy to Maimana. The distance was 110 kilometers. The company reinforcements included a sapper squad, a flamethrower squad armed with the RPO flamethrowers, a ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense gun, and a BTS-4 towing vehicle.9