Editor’s Commentary: The companies in this vignette and the first vignette in the chapter (#35) are from the same battalion. There is a year’s difference between the two incidents. It would seem reasonable to check for improvements and a learning curve. There appears to have some tactical improvements made in this time. The force now moves with a reconnaissance force forward and with more responsive air cover. But, the commander still rides in the lead vehicle, bridges are not checked for mines, and likely ambush sites are not probed by dismounted forces. Broken-down convoy vehicles are still towed at the front of the column right behind the command vehicle. There is no apparent attempt to control dominant terrain or check it before the convoy’s advance. There is no discussion of using air assault forces to leapfrog from one dominant height to the next to cover the convoy’s movement. Apparently, not all the lessons on convoy escort had been learned.
This chapter started out by saying that the mujahideen attacked convoys with mines during the early stage of the war and, as the war progressed, they began to conduct full-scale attacks on convoys. All these examples are from 1981 or 1982 – the early stage of the war – and yet the mujahideen seem well advanced in convoy attack by this point. In these vignettes, however, the Soviets are not taking steps that are standard in western armies. There seems to be no road-opening force on these routes. Evidently, there are no “bait-and-hunt” decoy convoys. Rapid reaction forces supporting the convoy escorts are not apparent. There is no evidence of any planning to use airmobile forces on likely guerrilla escape routes. Artillery fire support planning also seems absent. These examples fail to show map and terrain work to identify choke points, kill zones and ambush sites in advance. Reconnaissance forces seem road-bound. The effort appears passive and reactive.
Next: Chapter 6: Conducting Ambushes
Footnotes
1. V. I. Rovba served in the OKSVA from 1981 to 1983 as the platoon leader of a motorized rifle platoon. He was awarded the medal “For Bravery”. [return]
2. The 9th MRC, 3rd Battalion, 191st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (ed.). [return]
3. The R-142 radio system is actually an R-130 shortwave radio, two R-111 medium-range FM radios and one R-123 short-range FM radio mounted on a GAZ-66 truck. The R-142 can communicate over distance and with helicopter aviation (ed.). [return]
4. A. M. Portnov served in the OKSVA from 1979 through 1982 as the assistant company commander of an air assault company and then as the company commander of an air assault company. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star” and the medal “For Military Valor”. [return]
5. Both cities bordered the Soviet Union and cotton was one of the commodities with which the Afghan government paid the Soviet government for their aid. Afghan export of cotton to the Soviet Union started with an agreement in the 1930s in exchange for Soviet gasoline and manufactured goods. Cotton was only a small part of Afghan exports to pay for Soviet arms. Natural gas, uranium, precious stones, fruit, and other resources were also sent north (ed.). [return]
6. BMD or boevaya mashina desanta is an air-droppable, armored personnel carrier that carries up to nine men (usually a maximum of seven). It has the same turret as the BMP, so the BMD-1 has the 73mm cannon of the BMP-1, while the BMD-2 has the 30mm chain gun of the BMP-2. They both mount three 7.62mm machine guns. They were widely used by Soviet airborne and air assault forces (ed.). [return]
7. The Russian here is fugas, similar to the western word fougasse. The Russian term means a large explosive charge buried in the ground and covered with rocks and debris. The western term describes a flame weapon that is a buried 55-gallon drum of thickened gasoline with a propelling explosive charge at the base (ed.). [return]
8. A. A. Agzamov served in the OKSVA from 1981 through 1983 as the commander of a reconnaissance group of a reconnaissance company. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”. [return]
9. The BTS-4 bronirovanyy tyagach sredniy is a turretless T-55 tank equipped for towing tracked vehicles (ed.). [return]
10. The BMP-2KSH is the command version of the BMP-2 series (ed.). [return]
11. A. I. Guboglo served in the OKSVA from 1981 to 1983 as a motorized rifle platoon leader. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star” and the medal “For Valor”. [return]
12. The 7th MRC, 3rd MRB, 191st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (ed.). [return]
Chapter 6:
Conducting Ambushes
Combat experience in Afghanistan shows that not only is the ambush an accepted form of reconnaissance, but it is also one of the more widely used methods of combat practiced in the areas of responsibility of regimental-sized and division-sized units. Reconnaissance, air-assault, airborne, and SPETSNAZ subunits routinely conduct ambushes and motorized rifle subunits may also conduct them once they receive special training.
Ambushes are widely employed in all types of combat. This is conditioned by the fact that the tactics of the guerrilla forces were very different from those of regular forces and more closely resembled those of partisan warfare. Therefore, it was necessary for Soviet forces to find more effective ways of combatting the mujahideen under these circumstances.
39. A reinforced motorized rifle company conducts an ambush in Kandahar Province
by Major V. I. Pavlenko1
Our separate motorized rifle brigade completed its road march to its new base camp in March 1981.2 Its movement was covered from the air by a squadron of helicopter gunships. At the same time, the squadron began reconnaissance of enemy forces located along the Kandahar-Shindand road.
The squadron commander reported that at 1820 hours, a truck convoy carrying supplies entered Musa-Kala village. Further, a number of enemy were concentrated at Musa-Kala, which is located about 20 kilometers from Kandahar. The brigade intelligence officer also confirmed this information.
We could not waste any time. The village of Musa-Kala is located close to the border with Pakistan and was a rest stop and a staging point for the mujahideen bases. Weapons and ammunition were brought through this village for distribution throughout the country. Our brigade commander, LTC Yu. P. Shatin, devised the following plan. He would seal off the village from the north and the southeast with two motorized rifle battalions. Then he would use the air-assault battalion and some Afghan Army subunits to sweep the village. At the same time, in order to halt the northwest movement of the enemy convoy, he would fly a reinforced motorized rifle company ahead of the convoy to establish an ambush.
My battalion commander, S. V. Antonov, designated my 8th Motorized Rifle Company as the ambush company. I was a Senior Lieutenant at the time and the company commander. My brigade commander personally gave me my mission. My company had three motorized rifle platoons. The brigade commander reinforced my company with three AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers with their crews, three sappers with twenty mines, and two RTOs with two radios. Seven Mi-8T transport helicopters were to deliver my company close to the ambush site. I had two hours to prepare my force for the mission.