On 12 June 1984, my fully-equipped motorized rifle company moved on BMPs to the Loy-Karez region to conduct ambushes. Captain V. Patrushev, the battalion chief of staff, was in charge of the mission. My company was divided into four ambush groups. One of these groups moved to a small river to block a fording site. The ambush group commander gave his orders, organized his lookouts and put the rest of the soldiers to work digging their firing positions.
After 0200 hours on 13 June, the look-outs spotted truck headlights as a truck drove down from the heights. In a few minutes, a 13-truck convoy followed the lead truck. They stopped about 300 meters from the fording site. With our night-vision device, we could see about 30 dismounted mujahideen moving in a cautious manner into our ambush site. The mujahideen observed the area carefully. The group commander decided to withdraw since the enemy action would preclude a successful ambush, the enemy force outnumbered the ambush force by 30 to 14 and the BMPs were seven kilometers away from the ambush site and unable to provide fire support.
Map 42: A MRC conducts an ambush near Loy-Karez, 12–13 June 1984.
At dawn, the ambush party arrived at the company assembly area. They posted look-outs and the personnel rested. After some time, one of the lookouts reported that the mujahideen were in a nearby valley strung-out in a column and heading our way. It appeared that the enemy had set out to search for our ambush party, for they had found the ambush site where our ambush party had concealed themselves at night. Our former ambush site was strewn with our tin cans, cigarette butts and empty cigarette packages. Apparently the mujahideen thought that only 10 to 15 men were in the area.
I ordered one of my platoons to deploy near the company assembly area in ambush and prepare for battle. I ordered the two other platoons to move stealthily to the flanks of the mujahideen using the terrain folds to hide their movement. We waited for the enemy to move onto the large plain on the valley floor, so we could complete the encirclement. At the right moment, I called for a pair of helicopter gunships to come to our assistance and gave the order to open fire.
We killed 28 mujahideen, and captured 32 weapons, including three grenade launchers. We also captured valuable documents and Islamic official seals. My company had no casualties.
Frunze Commentary: The ambush was successful for the following reasons: the thorough reconnaissance of the enemy forces and terrain; the precise planning of the group’s actions; the skillful siting of the company in ambush using the terrain features; the uninterrupted and resolute control of the subunits during the fight; and the support of helicopter gunships.
Editor’s Commentary: The Soviet Army seldom left a clean bivouac area or fighting position. They dug field latrines, but the troops were as likely to defecate and urinate around their area as to use the latrines. Trash was strewn everywhere. Apparently this sloppiness extended to their ambush sites and alerted the mujahideen to their presence. In this case, however, there apparently was not enough trash to reveal the true size of the ambush force and the company commander turned this to his advantage.
More disturbing than the trash is the fact that the ambush party was smoking in position. Even if the smokers were smoking under a poncho or tarp, cigarette smell carries – particularly in the damper, cooler night air. Russian cigarettes are strong and pungent. This demonstrates a basic lack of field sense or discipline.
Once again, the battalion commander or the battalion chief of staff were personally involved in training small groups. The lack of a professional NCO corps and the lack of trust in junior officers kept the battalion leadership doing jobs other armies would entrust to lieutenants and sergeants. As a result, other areas in the battalion suffered.
43. An airborne platoon conducts an ambush in Helmand Province
by Major A. A. Tolkachev9
Our airborne battalion’s mission was to control part of the frontier located some 300 kilometers southwest of the city of Kandahar. Based on intelligence reports furnished by the Afghan KHAD, my battalion commander decided to employ ambushes to attack the enemy.
My ambush party was returning to our base camp by helicopter after conducting an ambush along the border. As we flew along the Helmand River, I discovered a road that skirted the green zone of the river. We dropped down to five or ten meters off the deck and I soon noticed fresh truck tracks. When we got back to our base camp to rest, I received information that a truck-mounted guerrilla force of about 50 men had arrived in our AO. I went to the battalion commander and suggested that I set up an ambush on the newly-discovered road.
My battalion commander told me to conduct an ambush in the area from 3 to 10 December 1984. My ambush party consisted of 25 men, two of which were officers. The force had three squads, each of which consisted of the squad leader and two three-man fire teams.
I picked out my ambush site independently as we flew to the area. The helicopters faked insertions at one false airhead with two phony LZs – one LZ some 10 to 20 kilometers away from our LZ and the other five to six kilometers away from it. We landed before darkness.
I had rations and water for 10 days. We took two days supply with us and buried and concealed the rest. Each man carried 35 to 40 kilograms of equipment. When night fell, we moved to our ambush site. When we came to the road, I personally selected the firing positions, organized sectors of fire, and specified how the positions were to be protected and concealed. Every soldier dug a prone firing position. They hauled the dirt away to a depression. Our two engineers laid in a mine field, using trip-wire and MON-100 command-detonated mines.10 Two-thirds of the force were in battle positions at night while one-third rested. During the day, I had three look-outs, while the remainder rested. There was no sign of the enemy during the first night. During the day, we defused the tripwire mines, so that wild animals would not set off the mines and disclose our ambush.
Map 43: Airborne platoon ambush in Helmand province.
Our ambush site was flat desert. I picked the site since it was higher than the green zone and allowed us to observe for a distance in any direction. During the day we could see for three to five kilometers, while at night, we could detect a truck with its headlights burning 20 to 25 kilometers out. We could hear a truck when it was three to five kilometers away.
On the next day, a shepherd drove a large herd of sheep through the area between the green zone and our minefield. Later, a nomad with three camels came through. Neither man discovered our ambush. I fed my force twice a day in the “day laager” located in the depression. They received a meal in the morning when they came off ambush and in the evening before they went back to their positions. I gave each soldier a liter of water every 24 hours. Nothing happened during the first two nights. The next morning, I sent the platoon leader with several soldiers to our rations and water cache to replenish our on-site supply.
On 5 and 6 December, we had a sand storm, but finally on the evening of the 6th, the wind calmed down. Suddenly on the night of 6 and 7 December, we heard the sounds of truck engines. I gave the command “To Battle”. The men got their weapons ready and cocked their RPG-18s. After 30 minutes, three ZIL-130 heavy-duty trucks11 and two light trucks approached the site. Their lights were off. When all the trucks were in the kill zone, I detonated two mines, which was the signal to open fire. The platoon leader and I controlled the fire and used illumination flares and tracer rounds to adjust and shift the fire. All the trucks were hit by RPG-18 and small-arms fire within the first minute. One truck, which had tried to turn around and exit the ambush was destroyed by a mine. The enemy personnel were surrounded by burning, exploding ammunition. When they tried to get away from it, we cut them down. In this action, the enemy lost 44 KIA and three truck-loads of weapons, ammunition and gear. My group had no casualties.