Frunze Commentary: The airborne subunit enjoyed success as a result of the correct, skillful organization of the ambush; the well-constructed and camouflaged firing positions; the skillful employment of mines; the use of close fire; and the control of night fire by an officer using illumination flares and tracer ammunition.
Editor’s Commentary: The force went out for seven days with rations for 10. They stayed in the same spot with the same routine for four days before they had contact. Local inhabitants had been through the area, and although the commander was sure that they had not been detected, that possibility existed. Is it a good idea to remain in the same position for so long, or is this a good way to set up a force for counter-ambush?
44. A reinforced reconnaissance platoon conducts an ambush northwest of Surubi
by Major I. V. Solonin12
In December 1985, mujahideen activity increased in the provinces of Kabul, Kandahar and Takhar. Caravans moved increasing amounts of arms, ammunition and war supplies from Pakistan to the guerrilla forces. In order to stop this anti-government activity by the mujahideen, the high command decided to conduct ambushes in its areas of responsibility.
I was the commander of an airborne battalion. Together with my battalion chief of staff and my battalion chief of reconnaissance, I received our orders to conduct ambushes. We worked to prepare our subunits and to prepare an ambush plan in an organized manner.
A guerrilla force was active in the battalion AOR. Our AOR was centered on the village of Surubi, some 50 kilometers east of Kabul on the Kabul-Jalalabad highway. The guerrillas kept pressure on the local populace by forcibly kidnapping them and taking them to Pakistan, attacking government officials, blowing up electric power lines, attacking convoys, and shelling our base camps with launch bombs. KHAD intelligence, with whom we maintained close contact, reported the movement of weapons caravans from Pakistan to the Panjsher Valley. Their reports described how these caravans passed through the battalion AOR. Further KHAD reports described how the mujahideen routinely came from Dzhigdalay to Surubi to scout our garrison and commit acts of terror.
I decided to conduct ambushes on possible mujahideen routes located five kilometers northwest of Surubi. I selected the battalion reconnaissance platoon, an airborne platoon, and engineer squad and an AGS-17 crew for the ambush. This was a total ambush force of 23 personnel. We trained the force to react to all possible combat scenarios. We prepared the force in secret, under the guise of routine training. Self-propelled mortars would support the ambush.
At dusk one evening in the second half of December, the reinforced reconnaissance platoon, commanded by Captain V. P. Bobrov, moved to the ambush site. There was difficulty in getting there since the ambush party had to skirt an Afghan Army security position.13 We did not tell our Afghan neighbors about our ambush, since we wanted to safeguard the fact that we were conducting an ambush and prevent the leakage of information.
Map 44: Reconnaissance platoon ambush northwest of Surubi.
At 0030 hours, I received a radio message that the platoon had arrived on site and occupied their positions. The engineers mined the possible mujahideen escape routes. They also emplaced a command-detonated mine. The ambush was positioned on the slope of a hill overlooking a path. The ambush force was positioned in two tiers. The snatch group occupied the first tier, while the support group was located 50 meters higher and occupied the second tier. The site was in constant radio communications with battalion. Nothing happened the first night. During the day, the personnel were concealed in a hide position and only lookouts stayed in the fighting positions. Additionally, the battalion OP on hill 2012 provided warning.
When night fell again, the ambush party reoccupied their positions. At 2345 hours, the ambush party saw a dark silhouette approach on the path from Jegdaley. They let him pass through, since they thought that he was a patrol. This was a variant that we had considered and trained against. The man returned and disappeared back down the path to Jegdaley. At 0300 hours, the ambush party saw 11 armed men approach. The platoon leader decided to capture the force. The force entered the kill zone, and after a short, intense fight, five mujahideen were killed and six were captured. The ambush party quickly started to withdrew by a different path. At that time, all the Afghan Army security posts were notified that the reconnaissance platoon was returning through their positions. At 0520 hours, the platoon returned to the battalion base camp. We had no casualties.
When the captured mujahideen were interrogated, they showed us a large weapons and ammunition cache in Surubi. Further, the prisoners gave us information which allowed us to prevent an attempt against the Surubi hydroelectric station.
Frunze Commentary: This combat experience shows that conducting a successful ambush is very hard work. Up to 90% of our ambushes were without result. There were several reasons for this. First, our units did not always get to the ambush site undetected. Second, the high command issued regulations on ambushes which specified that no fewer than 25 men had to go on every ambush and that every ambush must contain heavy crew-served weapons. These precautions were not always justified. The composition of every ambush party depended on the actual situation. Third, regulations require an inordinate number of radio reports – departure for the ambush site, arrival at the ambush site, readiness of the ambush site for battle, hourly radio checks and the return of the subunit. As a result, the enemy discovered our intentions and did not move through these areas during the time our ambushes were out. Equipment for ambush was a particular problem. Practically all the officers and soldiers equipment and uniforms were unsatisfactory in that they were uncomfortable and inhibited movement. Army boots are totally unsuited for ambushes. They are uncomfortable and too heavy for mountain climbing and the mujahideen could readily determine our ambush sites from our boot tracks.
Editor’s Commentary: The Soviets and Afghan government forces apparently did little to contest the mujahideen ownership of the night. Night patrols and ambushes were a singular planned event, not a routine mission. Battalions and companies moved into their bunkers at their base camps at night for protection from mujahideen mortar and rocket attacks. Consequently, mujahideen supply caravans routinely passed by base camps unmolested. Squad-sized ambushes were prohibited by 40th Army regulations, yet a platoon-sized ambush is frequently too cumbersome. The Soviets did not allow squad-sized ambushes in Afghanistan since their NCOs were not professional and perhaps not trusted. Yet, squad-sized ambushes, as well as platoon-sized ambushes, were part of the training program for Soviet forces not deployed in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, two officers usually accompanied every ambush. This successful ambush still did not accomplish its mission – the interception of supply caravans from Pakistan.