Two Vietnam innovations, the mechanical ambush and the “claymores and grenades only” ambush are not mentioned. The mechanical ambush, which uses claymore mines rigged with trip wires, takes control from the ambush-site commander, but leaves the ambush party undetected. The “command-detonated claymores and grenades only” ambush gives the commander control and leaves the ambush party undetected until the ambush party resorts to small-arms fire. The Soviets apparently did not employ these ambushes.
The Soviet desire for positive control at all times did generate an unnecessary number of radio reports. Radio security was not always practiced and when traffic was encoded, it was often sloppily done. As a result, the mujahideen were sometimes able to determine Soviet activities or intentions from radio traffic.
45. Conducting ambushes on the basis of radio intercept data in the area of Khanabad
by LTC A. M. Tangaev14
At the beginning of March 1986, the enemy began to amass arms and ammunition in his bases near Ishkamesh, located some 60 kilometers southeast of Kunduz. These armaments were intended for use by mujahideen subunits in the green zones of Kunduz and Khanabad. We received intelligence reports that four caravans carrying weapons and ammunition arrived at these bases in the middle of March.
After the arrival of these caravans in the enemy staging area, our radio interceptors began monitoring a wide range of radio traffic on the short wave and ultra-short wave bands. The radio traffic was encrypted in four-letter code groups. Part of the encoded radio text was broken by a higher headquarters. From a deciphered message, we determined that the enemy would transport arms and ammunition to Kunduz at the end of March, start of April. Based on this information, the division commander decided to conduct ambushes utilizing our separate reconnaissance battalion.15
Preparations for the ambush began when the commander of the 1st Reconnaissance Company and the commander of the Radio and Electronics Reconnaissance Company received their orders. The reconnaissance company commander was given the area of the future action, the mission, the composition of the ambush force, the reinforcements and the sequence of events for preparing his force for the ambush. The commander of the radio and electronics reconnaissance company was ordered to increase his radio-intercept efforts in the direction of Khanabad and Ishkamesh and determine the enemy radio-traffic pattern during movement of caravans.
The reconnaissance company commander and his platoon leaders rode to an outpost which was located five kilometers from the ambush site on the truck which normally delivered food to the outpost. They studied the terrain, the approach and withdrawal routes, and the probable enemy approach route. The company commander left one platoon leader behind to observe the area at night and returned, with the other platoon leaders, to the company base camp. During training for the ambush, the company conducted a systematic tactical exercise on terrain similar to that of the ambush site.16 The troops cleaned their weapons and drew ammunition and supplies for the ambush. On 2 April, the company stood a formal layout inspection to check the company’s readiness for the ambush.
Radio-intercept and agent reconnaissance reported that the enemy moved a caravan from Ishkamesh to Khanabad from 2000 to 2200 hours on 2 April. The division chief of reconnaissance set the time to be ready to leave on ambush – 1800 hours on 3 April.
The concept of the ambush was as follows: The 1st Reconnaissance Company would move out secretly at nightfall on 3 April to some ruins. They would establish two OPs and conceal the company. During the day, they would be in radio contact with the battalion, the radio and electronics reconnaissance company and the mortar battery. The company bronegruppa would move to a field laager ready to advance rapidly to the ambush site and give it fire support. Then, on the evening of 4 April, the company would secretly occupy its firing positions and prepare to ambush the enemy. They would wait for a signal from the reconnaissance chief or the company commander of the radio and electronics reconnaissance company that the enemy had started to move a convoy. They would allow the enemy forward security patrol to pass through the ambush and then destroy the main body. When the bronegruppa arrived, the ambush party would withdraw from the ambush site, mount the carriers and ride back to the base camp. There were 23 men in the ambush party. They carried three PK general-purpose machine guns, three RPK light machine guns, one 12.7 mm utes heavy machine gun (NSV), 16 AK-74 assault rifles, and five mines. The bronegruppa consisted of one BRDM and three BMP-2s. A mortar battery supported the company.
At 1900 hours on 3 April, the company set out for the ambush site on foot. They moved along a gully floor. Two patrols moved 50 to 60 meters in front of the main body and two patrols moved 40 meters behind it. By 0200 hours on 4 April, the company reached the ruins and established the OPs. The rest of the company moved to the day laager and concealed themselves.
Map 45: Recon company ambush using radio-intercept data in the area of Khanabad.
At 0530 hours on the 4th of April, radio interceptors detected a radio transmitter in Ishkamesh talking to a radio transmitter in Khanabad. Traffic pattern analysis indicated the enemy was preparing to move a convoy. However, our observation posts saw nothing of the enemy during the day. By 1700 hours, our radio triangulation attempts had located several radio transmitters located along the Ishkamesh-Khanabad approach. As night fell, the company occupied the ambush. The ambush consisted of two OPs, a support group, a security group and a snatch group.
At 2005 hours, two men walked down the road. Twenty minutes later, a division OP reported that a truck had entered the canyon with its lights on. He let it pass. Twenty minutes later, two trucks roared into the ambush area at the maximum possible speed. As they entered the kill zone, the company commander detonated a mine which was the signal for the support group to open fire. They destroyed both trucks. At the commanders’ signal, the snatch group then moved into the kill zone to inspect the trucks and pick up any weapons and ammunition. As the bronegruppa approached, the ambush party discovered a pocket of enemy who were moving toward the ambush. The ambush force cut down part of this group and the armored vehicle fire cut down the rest. The company then moved back to the mount-up site, loaded onto the carriers and rode back to our base camp.
Our ambush killed 12 mujahideen, and destroyed two trucks. We captured a lot of weapons and ammunition. The reconnaissance company had one soldier wounded.
Frunze Commentary: The success of this ambush was due to the following factors: the use of intelligence generated by radio intercept; the undetected deployment to the ambush site; the well-organized ambush on unfamiliar ground; the excellent employment of OPs, a support group, and a snatch group; the use of surprise; and the excellent combat training of the personnel. Further examination of the vignette, however, shows that the company commander could not adjust mortar fire effectively.
Editor’s Commentary: This is the second example of the use of a bronegruppa in an ambush. In the first example (Vignette 38), the bronegruppa sneaks the ambush party closer to the ambush site. Then, the rest of the company mounts these vehicles. Later, when the Soviets spring the ambush, this mounted company drives to the ambush site to support by fire and cut off the enemy escape. In this vignette, the bronegruppa provides fire support from the same direction as the ambush party and provides a rapid, relatively safe exit for the ambush party. Since ambush parties are frequently counter-ambushed on their way back to base camp, this appears to be a reasonable solution.