This is an interesting example since it shows that presumably strategic code-breaking assets were used to break tactical encoded radio traffic. This emphasizes the importance that the Soviet high command placed on intercepting the mujahideen LOCs.
46. A reinforced motorized rifle company conducts an ambush to the northwest of Jalalabad
by Major V. P. Podvomiy17
In the second half of 1986, the general situation in Kunar Province began to turn in favor of the Soviet forces. The ambushes conducted by our separate motorized rifle battalion in our AOR in Kunar Province were successful.18 The mujahideen had suffered appreciable losses which were causing him to improve his tactics for moving munitions and armaments by caravan.
Beginning in 1986, Soviet ambushes that had contact with the enemy noticed that the mujahideen had noticeably beefed up the forward security element on his caravans and their actions when ambushed had become more precise. When the mujahideen detected our ambush force, his counter-action took two forms. If the mujahideen had superiority in personnel and weaponry, he would try to flank the Soviet ambush force and destroy it from the flank or rear. If the mujahideen lacked superiority, then, as a rule, they would go around the ambush site using an alternate route leading to cover.
We learned that platoon-sized ambushes were pointless. A proper ambush required a motorized rifle company, reinforced with a sapper subunit and supported by artillery fire.
On the morning of 2 October, the 2nd MRC commander was directed to interdict the flow of mujahideen caravans along the road some 25 kilometers northwest of Jalalabad. The company had 96 men, 12 BTRs, and its TO&E weaponry. An artillery battery would support the company. The company would move to the ambush site in two stages. The dismounted company would hitchhike with a convoy from its base camp to the Soviet military outpost on the Jalalabad-Kabul highway. The convoy would go on to Kabul for cargo. The company BTRs would arrive later. The company would stay in the outpost and depart at night on foot more than 24 hours prior to the time they would be required to be at the ambush site. They would carry TO&E weapons, three combat loads of ammunition (one of these loads would stay on the BTRs), and three days of dry rations. They had to be ready to deploy by 0500 hours, 3 October.
The organization of combat activity in a separate motorized rifle battalion requires maintaining high combat readiness: one company was usually on combat duties, another company was on round-the-clock details and the third company was involved in combat and political training, but was kept ready for combat. The 2nd MRC was in combat training, so we had them prepare to conduct the ambush. The training included: the organization of combat; personnel training in weaponry and mission accomplishment; political-educational work; and practical work by the battalion commander, his deputies and the chief of the operations section.
The organization for combat included: the company commander’s decision and his briefing it to the battalion commander; issuing orders to the platoon leaders; and working out coordination on a terrain model. Company preparations included: studying the assigned area of combat; training in the applications of tactical fire support and engineering relevant to mission accomplishment; conducting radio checks to ensure that the radio sets were working; checking the night-vision devices; resting the personnel; and reporting to the battalion commander that the company was ready.
The battalion commander, his deputies and his chiefs of services approved the company commander’s plan; assisted in coordination with the artillery battery and the supply and maintenance support to the company; issued the battalion order to the company for combat; and conducted a full lay-down inspection of the company to check its readiness for combat.
Map 46: Ambush by a reinforced MRC supported by an artillery battery.
At 0600 hours on 3 October, the company moved out secretly with the convoy to the outpost. When night fell, the company moved out by dismounted platoons to the ambush site. By 2300 hours, they were in ambush positions with overlapping and interconnected fields of fire. Their flanks and gaps were covered by minefields.
At 0300 hours 4 October, the forward security patrol for a mujahideen caravan moved down route #1. They moved through the kill zone of the 1st Platoon and in an hour were in the kill zone of the 2nd Platoon. This particular caravan stretched out over 1.3 kilometers. The company commander decided that the bulk of the caravan was located in front of the two platoons and ordered the 1st and 2nd Platoons to open fire while the artillery pounded the caravan rear guard. The majority of the mujahideen and their pack animals were destroyed, but a part of the caravan was able to withdraw.
At 0500 hours, the caravan again began moving, but this time on route #2. The enemy thought that, as was the rule, Soviet ambush forces were small groups and were unable to cover several routes simultaneously. Further, they knew that usually these small groups rapidly abandoned their ambush sites after they sprang the ambush.
When the caravan was in the kill zones of the 3rd and 4th Platoons, the company commander gave the order to open fire. Part of the mujahideen moved to the tail of the caravan and began to withdraw hurriedly. The company commander radioed the artillery in the outpost and ordered them to open fire on the withdrawing enemy. But five to seven minutes passed from the fire command to the start of the firing and the enemy escaped.
At dawn, the company commander called in the bronegruppa and helicopter gunships. When they arrived, he arranged a search of the destroyed caravans and gathered weapons, ammunition and supplies. At 0700 hours, the company loaded onto their BTRs and, under the cover of the helicopter gunships, returned to their base camp.
Frunze Commentary: It proved advantageous, in this situation, to have a motorized rifle company with four motorized rifle platoons.19 The company was able to cover three possible caravan routes simultaneously. After they destroyed a caravan on one route, they did not abandon their positions, but continued to perform their mission. As a result, the company destroyed yet another caravan on another route that same night. It follows that one should note the skillful organization of troop control by the company commander. However, the combat revealed that the company commander could not quickly, correctly, precisely and clearly call in an artillery fire mission and adjust its fire.
Editor’s Commentary: Poor artillery adjustment by company-grade officers is a constant theme in this book. Since the book is didactic and designed to illustrate key points, this is one point that the Soviets chose to emphasize. They solved this problem by putting Forward Observers (FOs) down to company and platoon level. This suggests a training deficiency for what should be a universal skill for professionals.