We killed five mujahideen in the ambush. Among them was Oka, the leader of a large guerrilla force, and his adviser, Turan, a former Afghan Army captain. We captured weapons, documents and money. Private A. N. Sivushin was wounded in the shoulder.
Frunze Commentary: In this vignette, special attention should be given to how the commander got his platoon into the area from which to move out on his ambush. This area was constantly observed by the enemy, so he deceived the enemy by smuggling his platoon into the security outpost, while members of a different subunit rode back on his BTRs to his base camp. The platoon moved on foot to the ambush site under the cover of darkness. This is also a fine example of excellent coordination between lookouts, the snatch group and the fire support group. Finally, the brave, daring and decisive actions during the assault need to be noted.
Editor’s Commentary: This is an interesting approach, but putting both officers in the snatch group is questionable. Granted that recon troops are better trained and motivated than the average, but these are conscript soldiers and NCOs. Who would take command and get the platoon out if the snatch group were destroyed? The support group was 800 meters from the snatch group. That is a long way to support and cover, particularly if done at night.
In Vietnam, American Army units put out ambushes every night on likely trails or where intelligence reports indicated likely activity would occur. In Afghanistan, the Soviets apparently conducted ambushes against specific intelligence and on an irregular basis.
There does not appear to be any standard distance between a patrol and the main body for night dismounted movement. In Vignette 43, the forward patrol is 50–60 meters out front, while the trail patrol is 40 meters behind. In Vignette 38, the patrol is 200 meters in front. In Vignette 37, the patrol is 20 minutes out front. In this vignette, the patrol is a mere 30 meters in front of the main body. This seems very close and seems to negate the advantage of having a forward patrol.
48. A reinforced recon company conducts an ambush west of Bagram
by Major V. N. Syemin23
The Republic of Afghanistan announced a period of national reconciliation for January and February 1987. It was officially announced that in the course of one or two years, the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces would withdraw from Afghanistan. We did not conduct any combat during January and February. This allowed the guerrilla forces to stockpile a large quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives. A large guerrilla force crossed the Pakistan border and transited the Panjsher valley unmolested. It selected the remote village of Dzhobal’-Ussarazgi in the Mirbachekot Massif as its base station. The village is located in the Bagram green zone. This force conducted missions against the Kabul-Salang stretch of highway. They would attempt to destroy our convoys, attack our security outposts and observation posts, and shell the Bagram military airfield.
During the time that we did not conduct combat, the enemy grew considerably stronger. The number of guerrilla forces and their stockpiles increased dramatically. Their arsenals swelled with weapons, ammunition, communications gear and heavy weapons.
Our separate reconnaissance battalion was stationed in Bagram. We were ordered to neutralize the enemy in our AO. Our battalion experienced good results from our planned ambushes during April 1987. We thoroughly prepared our companies for these ambushes. Officers began with sketches and maps of the area. We trained our personnel on ground that was similar to the actual ambush site. We paid a great deal of attention to preparing our weapons and equipment for the upcoming action.
Senior Lieutenant Yu. N. Petrov, the commander of a recon company, received the mission to destroy a caravan which was carrying arms and ammunition for a guerrilla force located in the mountain massif west of Bagram. The company was transported inside PX trucks to the “Closer” [blizh’nyaya] security outpost on the morning of 19 April. This outpost is located on the Kabul-Salang highway. Two days prior, the company’s bronegruppa had moved to the “Southern” [Yuzhnaya] outpost as part of a reinforced road security sweep. The battalion, which was securing the road from dominant terrain, ensured the ambush force’s communications with the base camp. The company commander precisely specified the approach march and the order of movement to the ambush site to his group leaders.
Map 48: Reinforced recon company ambush west of Bagram.
At 2240 hours, the company reached the ambush site and every group occupied its position. The sapper group mined the probable route of enemy withdrawal.
When the caravan appeared, the company commander let two groups, each with three or four pack animals, pass through the kill zone. When the main body of the caravan was in the kill zone, the company commander requested planned illumination fire from a supporting artillery battalion and gave the signal for his men to open fire. The mine field was in the right place, for the fleeing enemy ran right into it. All the emplaced mines exploded. Within minutes, we destroyed the caravan.
We killed 38 mujahideen. The search group captured a large amount of weapons, ammunition, and large-caliber rounds. The sappers blew up the weapons and equipment that we could not carry off. The company successfully withdrew to a mount site where they mounted their BTRs and moved back to the battalion base camp. Two of our soldiers were slightly wounded.
Frunze Commentary: This vignette shows the use of artillery to provide battlefield illumination for an ambush. Uninterrupted communication and coordination with the artillery battalion ensured the success of the subunits in the ambush. The company commander correctly determined the probable enemy route of withdrawal and selected this site to emplace his minefield.
Editor’s Commentary: Again, reconnaissance forces are used for combat and not reconnaissance. Reconnaissance seems to be a secondary function. Yet, the lack of good tactical reconnaissance seems to have been a weakness of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Once again, the Soviets use the bronegruppa for extrication of the force. The ambush party used a good covered approach through the woods and gully to the ambush site. The question is why the ambush site was located where it was, if the mujahideen had three possible routes in the area and the route junction was near at hand. Why didn’t the commander put the ambush there, or at least put some observers at the junction and plan some RDM fires on the site? The Soviets established ambush positions on both sides of the wood-line. This seems like a good idea. Were all positions fully manned or were they merely sited so that forces could shift between them?
49. Conducting an ambush on the Yakpay Mountain Pass
by LTC V. I. Korotkikh24
During the spring and summer of 1987, guerrilla forces increased their attacks on government and Soviet forces. To support this combat, the mujahideen leaders increased their deliveries of weapons and ammunition from Pakistan. The deliveries would start at the Pakistan border with caravans of some 300 pack animals. Later, these would break into caravans of 15–20 animals which would cross the mountain passes to the guerrilla base camps.
By this time, the mujahideen knew Soviet reconnaissance and SPETSNAZ subunits’ tactics well and used this knowledge to good advantage. Thus, if their caravan was traveling during the day and was approaching a likely ambush site, the mujahideen would block the pass before-hand and hold it for two or three hours until the caravan passed through. The mujahideen would post two or three armed lookouts every 200 or 300 meters on the pass. The caravan would then come through in groups of 15–20 pack animals, with an hour between groups, until they had all crossed this dangerous area.