If the caravan were to approach a pass at night, they would send out one or two unarmed patrols at twilight. These patrols were disguised as shepherds and often accompanied by children. The caravan would start to move when it became dark. Five to seven men, armed with rifles, would move forward as a reconnaissance patrol. The caravan moved behind this patrol. Drovers, armed with pistols or assault rifles, moved between every two pack animals. A rear security force of two to three men, armed with small arms, moved behind the caravan.
Based on this situation, the high command decided to increase our ambush activity. On 27 August 1987, I was ordered to select a group from my battalion to conduct ambushes in Yakpay Pass in Paktia Province.25 My commander gave me the order to move out at night to the area of Yakpay Pass and to conduct ambushes there from 28 August to 2 September to destroy a caravan. The distance from our base camp to the pass was 12 kilometers. I was the ambush commander. My 45-man party included 12 scouts from the recon platoon, 24 air-assault troopers from one of my companies, and up to two men each from my signal platoon, the sapper company and the chemical defense platoon. I also took the surgeon and the battalion’s physician’s assistant.
At 2030 hours on 28 August 1987, my group moved out for the ambush site. A three-man patrol with night binoculars moved out in front. The main body followed the patrol in a single column. By 0230 hours 29 August, my group finished its ascent and went into a day laager some 1.5 kilometers from the pass. I established two lookout posts. Toward evening, these posts spotted a caravan moving toward the guerrilla base camp.
Map 49: Ambush on the Yakpay Mountain Pass.
The caravan settled into a village. At twilight, my ambush group moved rapidly into the pass, took up ambush positions and got ready for combat. However, after we waited until 0200 hours 30 August, I decided that the caravan would not come through the pass that night. I decided to take my force back to the day laager, pick up the material that we had cached there and move further down into the pass.
During the day of 30 August, we continued to observe the area. During the afternoon, we spotted 30 armed mujahideen moving toward the pass. After they climbed the mountain, they began to establish posts in the pass. It was clear that the stretch of pass I had chosen to ambush would not do. I conferred with the recon platoon leader and then decided to put the ambush in a different place. To do so, it was necessary to move five kilometers in an uninterrupted bound. I called my unit commander on the radio, reported my situation and advised him of my decision.
I ordered my force to move to the new site and we set out at 1800 hours. We reached the new site at 2330 hours. During the next 10 to 15 minutes, I fine-tuned the plan and coordinated the group’s actions while the personnel got into firing positions. After a few minutes, a caravan started to move up from the valley. A six-man patrol moved in front of the caravan. We let it pass. When the caravan was in the kill zone, I gave the signal and my men opened fire. My illumination group fired off parachute flares to illuminate the kill zone. We destroyed the caravan within a few minutes. We killed 14 mujahideen, captured two others and seized 15 pack animals loaded with arms, ammunition and medicine. Our sappers blew up the captured ammunition.
I reported our ambush results by radio to my brigade commander. He ordered us to withdraw to an area where our BTRs would pick us up at 0800 hours. We took the prisoners, weapons and documents; linked up with our BTRs at the appointed time; and returned to our unit base camp.
Frunze Commentary: In this example, the bravery and initiative displayed by the commander should be noted. He skillfully evaluated the situation, made the decision to change ambush sites, and in a short time organized it in another area. He constituted a special illumination group to provide light so that aimed fire could be placed on the enemy.
Editor’s Commentary: The commander took both a surgeon and a medical assistant along on the ambush. The Soviets rediscovered that slight wounds at high altitude can rapidly turn fatal. Medical evacuation by helicopters in these areas was problematic and often wounded soldiers had to be carried to lower altitudes for MEDEVAC helicopters to pick them up. Wounded soldiers sometimes could not survive the hours needed to reach treatment centers.
Next: Chapter 7: And in Conclusion…
Footnotes
1. V. I. Pavlenko served in the OKSVA from 1980 through 1982 as a motorized rifle company commander. He was awarded the medal “For Bravery”. [This medal was given to enlisted men and junior lieutenants only (ed.).] [return]
2. The 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). [return]
3. V. P. Gladishev served in the OKSVA from February 1982 through June 1984. He served as the deputy commander and then the commander of an airborne battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”. [return]
4. The 103rd Airborne Division (ed.). [return]
5. V. N. Popov served in the OKSVA from February 1984 through March 1986 as the assistant to the chief of staff of a motorized rifle battalion. [return]
6. The 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion, 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 201st Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). [return]
7. A. V. Van’yants served in the OKSVA from 1982 to 1984 as a platoon leader and company commander and from 1987 to 1988 as a battalion chief of staff. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”. [return]
8. The 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). [return]
9. A. A. Tolkachev served in the OKSVA from May 1983 through May 1985 as an airborne company commander. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Banner”. [return]
10. The MON (minna oskolochnaya napravlenogo deistvie) series of mines are directional, anti-personnel mines similar to the U.S. claymore mine. They can be set to detonate from a trip-wire or with a firing device (ed.). [return]
11. The ZIL-130 is a 150 horsepower, 4x2 Soviet truck that could haul 5.5 tons (ed.). [return]
12. I. V. Solonin served in the OKSVA from 1985 to 1987 as the commander of an airborne battalion. [return]
13. The Afghan Army 14th Infantry Brigade and the Afghan 4th Sarandoy Brigade (ed.). [return]
14. A. M. Tangaev served in the OKSVA from 1985 to 1987 as the senior assistant to the chief of division reconnaissance. He was decorated with the “Order of the Red Star”, the order “For Service to the Fatherland in the Armed Forces” Third Class, and the Republic of Afghanistan”s “Order of the Star” Second Class. [return]
15. The 201st MRD (ed.). [return]
16. The systematic tactical exercise [taktiko-stroevoe zanyatie] was a field exercise by elements, in which the event was rehearsed step-by-step and progressed on as each step was mastered. [return]
17. V. P. Podvomiy served in the OKSVA from March 1985 through March 1986 as the senior assistant to the chief of the operations section of a separate motorized rifle battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”. [An operations section at the battalion level is remarkable. This must have been a particular feature of this battalion (ed.)]. [return]