Stephan Stewman has done a yeoman’s job in redrawing all the Russian maps in the book. We have translated them into English, but retained Russian map graphics. I have worked with Soviet graphics for over 13 years of my 26 year military career. Quite frankly, I find their graphics more “user friendly” than Western graphics, flexible and illustrative. The Russians can show the sequential development of an action by adding times or identifying lines to their graphics. These lines are explained in the legend. What follows is a table of Russian map graphics. Since this is not printed in color, enemy forces are shown by double lines on the map.
There are several problems with the book. First, the place names are often pure transliterations from the Russian. Western maps of Afghanistan are often pure transliterations from the Pushtu or Dari original. Often, it is difficult to tell what the name of the actual place is – especially when dealing with small towns which may have two or three names, depending on who surveyed the map. So, it is often difficult to pinpoint the exact site of the vignette. I have used the Gazetteer of Afghanistan Second Edition published by the Defense Mapping Agency in June 1983 where possible. General Yahya M. Nawroz, formerly Chief of Operations of the pre-communist Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and strategist of the Mujahideen Military Committee, has graciously assisted me in pinpointing many other locales. Colonel Ali Ahmad Jalali, a renowned commander in both the Afghanistan Army and the resistance and a noted author in his own right, has also reviewed the book and helped clear up many of the mystery locales. But others remain mysteries to both of them.
Further, many of the maps that accompany the vignettes are problematic. Apparently, most of the maps were drawn from memory, although some of them show evidence of access to the original mapsheet. Over time, details fade and many of the sketch maps are rough approximations. Distances, directions, place names and geographic features may differ from the actual ground. Distances are transcriptions from the original except where clearly in error. Still, the maps must be used as an approximation and not as an accurate depiction of the ground.
Finally, some of the original editing of the Russian text was slipshod. Typing errors, differences in place name spellings between the map and the text, and transcription errors are evident in the Russian texts. I have done my best to correct these where possible.
Still, these vignettes are an absolute gold mine for any tactician. They are an intimate look at a battlefield where a modern, mechanized army tried to defeat a guerrilla force on rugged terrain in the middle of a civil war. Despite their best efforts, they were unable to achieve decisive military victory and their politicians finally ordered them home. Other armies would do well to study their efforts.
Lester W. Grau
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Leavenworth, Kansas
Footnotes
1. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan, London: Brassey’s 1991, p. 10; and Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy kontingent [Limited contingent], Moscow: Progress, 1994, p. 172. [return]
2. Manuscript of Aleksandr Lyakhovskiy, Tragediya I doblest’ Afghan [The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghan Veterans], Moscow: Iskona, 1995. [return]
3. Spetsnaz are “forces of special designation” or special troops and can include a variety of branches and jobs. The highly-trained, hardened Spetsnaz who performed long-range reconnaissance, commando and special forces functions are the ones referred to throughout this book. Figures of percentages of officers of various branches serving in Afghanistan are the author’s estimate based on a variety of conversations and sources. [return]
Frunze Comments About the Preparation of This Collection
This collection of tactical experiences is based on the personal experience of student-officers at the academy who, during various years, served in combat as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. The following group of military historians assisted them in the preparation of this book: Chapter One – LTC S. A. Shumaev, LTC A. M. Korelov, Major V. V. Titov and Major S. N. Zagorul’kin; Chapter Two – Major I. I. Latynin and Major Yu. B. Sinel’shchikov; Chapter Three – Major Yu. G. Legtyarev; Chapter Four – Major Yu. B. Sinel’shchkov. Chapter Five – Major S. V. Ionov; and, Chapter Six – LTC S. A. Morozov and Major A. V. Reznichenko.
The teaching faculty of the Academy’s History of Military Art Department provided assistance in the collection and editing of materials. Candidate of Historical Science Colonel Yu. N. Yarovenko headed the team of authors and served as editor-in-chief.
Frunze Foreword
The Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan garnered valuable combat experience and significantly expanded the theory and practice of combat in mountainous-desert terrain. Battalion and regimental-level1 combat was fought primarily in the mountains against separate detachments of mujahideen [insurgents]. The war was fought under conditions where the enemy lacked any aviation capabilities, but had modern air defense systems and modern mines. A lack of front lines and advances along varied axes (which were not mutually supporting) characterized the decisive actions of the opposing sides as they attempted to seize the initiative and gain control over certain territories.
The Soviet forces encountered several unique combat characteristics which necessitated that they adopt more effective methods for combating guerrilla forces of mujahideen. Combat experience disclosed that the principal types of combat included: company, battalion and regimental raids; blocking off areas where the enemy was located prior to searching out and destroying guerrilla forces; and the simultaneous attack on several groups of the enemy located at various depths and locations. The specific combat conditions influenced the way in which the advance through mountains and inhabited areas was conducted; led to a change in air assault tactics; changed the methods of conducting marches and providing convoy security; and caused a change in the tactics of organizing and conducting ambushes.
At the present time, a number of studies have been published based on the combat lessons of Afghanistan. These analyze the conditions in this Theater of Military Operations, focusing especially on the tactics of the mujahideen guerrilla forces, and the changed nature of the combat missions of Soviet battalions and regiments. This material serves as the basis for further improvement of the education of the officer corps and should be used in commanders’ preparations for combat and in training exercises in higher command-staff colleges.
At the same time, far from all is done to synthesize and analyze Afghanistan combat experience. Thus, insufficient attention is devoted to specific combat episodes and to the analysis of good and bad points in the combat situations. Further, coordination between military history and operational-tactical training of the command cadre needs improvement.
In this respect, the team of authors has made an attempt to draw general conclusions about the little-investigated experiences in the training and the conduct of combat which were influenced by Afghanistan experience. These include specific mission decisions involving blocking and destroying guerrilla forces, the offense in mountains and through populated areas, the use of air assault tactics, the conduct of the defense in a security detachment, the conduct of a march and convoy security, and the conduct of ambushes.