Map 2: Motorized rifle company searching a village while separated from the main force on 22 July 1980.
At that moment, the enemy suddenly opened up on us with heavy fire from hill #2. The company went to the defense and took up positions behind the adobe walls on the south and southwest edges of the village. I decided to send two squads from the first platoon to envelop hill #2 and then destroy the enemy by an attack from the front and rear. I also decided to dispatch a patrol squad to the top of hill #1. However, just as the platoon started to move to carry out its tasks, the mujahideen opened fire [from hills #1, 2 & 3]. My forces had to stay in place and return fire. After 30 minutes, I received orders to withdraw my company to the hill from which we started [#4]. During the withdrawal from the village, my company was pinned down by fire from hill #3. After we destroyed the enemy on hills #2 and #3 with small arms fire and helicopter gunship strikes, I moved my company to the designated area.
Frunze Commentary: The positive aspect of this skirmish was that the personnel displayed high morale and rapidly reacted to all orders even though this was their first time under fire. Further, the helicopter gunships displayed great skill as they made gun runs on the enemy. However, the skirmish also showed that the company had insufficient experience in conducting combat in mountainous regions and neither the officers, sergeants, nor soldiers knew the enemy’s tactics. If the enemy had held his fire until the entire company was moving on the path between hill #1 and #2 (where there was nothing but open wheat fields to the right and left), the company would have been in a very serious predicament. Instead, the enemy opened fire immediately when the company reached the southern outskirts of the village. The Soviet force did a weak job of reconnaissance. Their failure to seize the dominant terrain allowed the enemy to suppress practically the entire company area with fire. Another shortcoming was that the company had never rehearsed breaking contact and withdrawal during training.
Data from this skirmish further shows that it is necessary to devote greater attention to commanders’ training, especially tactical training. This should be done separately from platoon, company, battalion and field training. This includes training junior commanders. Courage and bravery are excellent characteristics, however the skillful handling of squads and, consequently, of platoons in battle is what is necessary and training did not achieve this.
Editor’s Commentary: The commander learned that he must control dominant terrain and position overwatch forces before beginning the sweep. Failure to properly employ reconnaissance forces and failure to control high ground are constant problems throughout this book.
This 1980 example gives a partial look at one of the innovations in force structure which the Soviet Army made in an attempt to deal with the guerrilla forces – the mountain rifle battalion. Apparently, most of these came from the mountain training center in the Turkestan Military District.
3. Blocking and destroying a guerrilla force in Kunar Province
by Major V. A. Gukalov8
In December 1980 in Kunar Province, a 50-man guerrilla force slipped across the border from Pakistan and crossed the Kunar river at night. Then it stopped to rest in a canyon. We decided to destroy the mujahideen within the confines of the canyon which was located to the southwest of Chaghasarai. The commander planned to conduct the battle as follows: Insert an airborne company (minus one platoon) by 0400 hours, 15 December to block the southern lip of the canyon and simultaneously insert an airborne platoon and the regimental airborne reconnaissance platoon to block enemy exits to the north and west. At 0500 hours, move the rest of the battalion (minus the blocking company) into the canyon to search for and destroy the enemy which was resting in the village located in the canyon.
At 2200 hours 14 December, the blocking group moved out on GAZ 66 trucks. The trucks’ headlights were off. They drove from the battalion laager, which was located along the highway, north toward Chaghasarai. In order to deceive mujahideen reconnaissance, several GAZ 66 trucks also drove south from the laager. The trucks dropped the first group two kilometers south of the canyon and then continued north. The first group walked to their blocking positions. The second part of the blocking force was dropped north of the canyon and walked to their positions. By 0400, 15 December the exits from the canyon were sealed.
Map 3: Blocking and destroying a guerilla force in Kunar Province on 15 December 1980.
At 0500 hours, the battalion (minus the blocking company) began its sweep into the canyon. The mujahideen security discovered this force at 0600. Adhering to their tactics, part of the enemy initiated combat with our main force while the rest began a withdrawal. The withdrawing forces were caught in our ambushes.
The enemy lost 24 killed and 4 captured. We had one wounded.
Frunze Commentary: This example contains typical elements used to deceive the enemy (complete light discipline; insertion by trucks; running trucks in opposite directions; final movement into position on foot). The action succeeded despite our inability to conduct prior reconnaissance in the battle area due to time constraints and the lack of reinforcements and supporting elements.
4. Combing the city of Bamian and its outlying towns during the course of a raid
by Major A. P. Pivovarenko9
During the winter of 1980, the situation along the roads between Termez and Kabul worsened. Enemy activity was particularly heavy in the area of the Salang pass leading to the critical Salang tunnel. Guerrilla forces struck convoys of military vehicles and trucks. Our motorized rifle regiment,10 composed of three reinforced motorized rifle battalions, was tasked to secure this sector from February until May of 1980. By May, the situation along this section of road had become even more acute. Consequently one of our battalions was structured as a raiding detachment. The battalion was reinforced with a tank company, a self-propelled artillery battery from division artillery, the regiment’s reconnaissance company, a platoon of ZSU-23-4s11 and a squad of sappers.
Map 4: Sweeping Bamian and the surrounding villages in the course of a raid by a motorized rifle battalion.
The reconnaissance company carried out its first raid in the area of Ghorband during the pre-dawn hours of 20–21 May and arrived at the village at daybreak. The detachment quickly broke into Ghorband and killed up to 10 mujahideen. After this, we began a thorough search of all the houses of the village. During the search, we only found some mujahideen small arms, for the bulk of the guerrilla force had secretly withdrawn to the north. On the following day, the entire raiding detachment finally began to move onto the city of Bamian. The detachment moved by road and fell into a mujahideen ambush, losing one BMP and one ZSU-23-4. The detachment seized the city. Our companies assaulted and searched the city’s blocks. Our search showed that the mujahideen had abandoned the city. Our detachment stayed in the city for several days. During that time we searched the nearby villages but found no mujahideen. The enemy had temporarily abandoned the populated areas. My reconnaissance company received information from our Afghan agent network which was located in that city and, from that information, we were able to seize 63 weapons. The rest of the battalion was only able to capture two weapons – both of them antiques.