Enemy losses were 20 killed. My company had no casualties.
Frunze Commentary: From this local episode, one can evaluate the following characteristic features associated with a larger brigade-size block and search action:
using helicopters to seal off areas;
tight coordination between subunits;
skillful leadership and the ability to make the right decisions on the battlefield;
initiative and steadfastness by our conscript soldiers at the command post of the air assault company;
failure of communications;
the absence of platoon leaders’ initiative (a significant battle was taking place to their right, yet the platoon leaders kept their platoons in their positions awaiting orders from the company commander); and,
deception by the enemy (instead of withdrawing straight back from his forward positions, he withdrew parallel to his forward positions toward the north).
Editor’s Commentary: This encirclement differs from Soviet European tactics, since Soviet forces usually physically block all sides of an encircled area. In Afghanistan, they only used physical blocking forces when dominant terrain or a village marked a side. This was probably done to avoid fratricide between closing elements and the blocking forces. Frequently in Afghanistan, the Soviets used helicopter patrols, bronegruppa and RDM as an economy of force measure to block a side. In this vignette, the Soviets used bronegruppa and helicopter patrols. One wonders how effective the eastern helicopter patrol was overflying a forested area.
The vignette points out that small unit leaders need to be trained and given the freedom to react to combat in their area when radio contact is lost. The question is whether the platoon leaders knew that they had lost radio contact with their commander and if they took any steps to determine whether they still had contact or not.
The vignette also points out that the artillery would not fire unless the ground force commander knew his exact location. The ground commander could determine his location within 50 meters, yet the brigade commander would not fire artillery beyond that point and allow the commander to adjust that fire onto the enemy force. The company did not have a FO with it and the air assault company commander either could not adjust artillery fire or he was not trusted enough to do so. Soviet artillery was normally fired according to a preplanned schedule with all fire concentrations plotted from surveyed firing points. Normative fire destruction was used instead of more accurate, adjusted artillery fires. Soviet artillery was hard pressed to “hip shoot” without their own FO on the ground. Soviet normative firing methodology was unsuited for combating mobile guerrilla forces who refused to stay put for massed artillery fires. One wonders whether the brigade commander refused the artillery fire, since he might personally suffer more from an investigation for deaths from “friendly” fire than for enemy-inflicted deaths.
6. Blocking, searching for and destroying a guerrilla force in Ishkamesh region
by Major A. M. Kovyrshin14
The enemy established a base and training center near the village of Ishkamesh, 60 kilometers southeast of the city of Kunduz. Guerrilla forces trained at this center engaged in firing at aircraft landing at Kunduz Airport and attacked supply convoys along the Kunduz-Puli-Khumri road. This made it difficult to supply and sustain the garrisons and forces located in the province.
LTC V. M. Akimov commanded the motorized rifle regiment which was ordered to prepare for combat to destroy the guerrilla forces operating in this region.15 For this mission, the regiment was reinforced with a separate reconnaissance battalion, a separate helicopter squadron, and two artillery battalions. In addition, an Afghan infantry division supported the regiment.16
On 19 January 1984, the regiment and its subunits received their combat orders: The reconnaissance battalion, reinforced with an 82mm mortar platoon and a flamethrower squad, air assaults into the Fuloli, Marzek, and Kokabulak region to cut off the enemy in Ishkamesh and Fuloli by 0900 hours 20 January. Be prepared to cooperate with the 2nd Battalion in blocking and destroying the enemy in Fuloli.
The 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion, reinforced with a flamethrower squad, air assaults into the Kuchi, Badguzar and Apikutan region and destroys the enemy located there. Link up with your bronegruppa no later that 0700 hours and conduct a raid in the direction of Kuchi, Badguzar and Pil’kha to destroy the enemy located between Pil’kha and Ilig and to seize the ammunition stores located there. Subsequently, be prepared to link up with the reconnaissance battalion on the axis Kokabulak-Fuloli to block and destroy the enemy in the village of Fuloli.
The 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion, reinforced with a artillery battalion and a flamethrower squad, conducts a road march to arrive at Marzek by 0800 hours, 20 January and destroy the enemy located in the Marzek-Ishkamesh region. Be prepared to advance on the axis Ishkamesh-Darayi-Pashay.
Regimental subunits and the reconnaissance battalion were at 70% personnel strength and 90% equipment fill. Enemy personnel in the area numbered 1,100–1,300 men armed with approximately 70 grenade launchers, 25 DShK 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, 40 mortars, and 10 artillery pieces. Intelligence revealed approximately seven caches in the area containing weapons, ammunition and supplies.
Map 6: Destruction of the enemy in his training center in the vicinity of Ishkamesh.
At first light on 20 January, after we conducted an airstrike on the area between Kokabulak and Marzek, the reconnaissance battalion made an air assault landing east of Marzek while the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion made an air assault landing two kilometers north of Kuchi. The mujahideen did not react to the helicopter flight since we used Mi-6 helicopters – a cargo helicopter not usually used for air assaults. This deception effort against the enemy paid off.
The reconnaissance battalion, commanded by LTC Tikhonov, cut the guerrillas southern route of withdrawal and blocked them in the strongpoints of Kokabulak and Marzek.
The 1st Battalion, commanded by Major A. V. Vlasov, exploiting the success of the reconnaissance battalion, arrived at the villages of Marzek and Kokabulak by 0830 hours and joined forces with the reconnaissance forces. Over the course of the next two and one-half hours, they destroyed the enemy in these strong points.
The 2nd Battalion, commanded by LTC V. Krokhin, landed and destroyed the enemy in the strong point of Kuchi. By 0830 hours, they had linked up with the approaching bronegruppa, which had driven there under the command of the 6th Company’s commander, Senior Lieutenant R. S. Zarifov. The 2nd Battalion mounted its vehicles and conducted a raid on the axis Apikutan-Badguzar with the missions of searching and destroying weapons and ammunition caches.
The enemy, while conducting delaying actions withdrew part of their force into the mountains, while the other part withdrew into Ishkamesh – the main strong point in this mujahideen training center.
The 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion, having destroyed the enemy in Marzek and Kokabulak, moved on Ishkamesh from the south and arrived there at 1300 hours. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, having destroyed the enemy in Badguzar and Apikutan, moved on Ishkamesh from the north. The mujahideen in Ishkamesh were blocked from two sides.
After a ten-minute artillery barrage by three artillery battalions, both motorized rifle battalions, supported by a flight of helicopter gunships, attacked Ishkamesh. By 1500 hours, Ishkamesh had fallen. The 1st Battalion pursued a group of mujahideen who managed to break out and flee toward Darayi-Pashay. The 2nd Battalion moved to the area south of Fuloli to link up with the reconnaissance battalion and join forces to seal off and destroy the enemy in Fuloli.