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‘And that is the only reason that the defendant is being held?’ Judge Oliphant asked.

‘Yes, your honor.’

‘There is no doubt as to the identity of the defendant?’

‘No, your honor.’

‘Very well, put on your evidence.’

The district attorney called the sheriff. The sheriff related the circumstances of my arrest. He called the court stenographer, and the stenographer read my statement into evidence.

Judge Oliphant looked down at me rather kindly. ‘I think,’ he said, ‘that this is enough proof. You seem, Mr. Lam, to have confessed to what may or may not be first-degree murder. At any rate, it is homicide. The question of degree, the malice, and the amount of premeditation will have to be determined by the California courts. But it is apparent to this court that you are guilty of either first — or second-degree murder. It is, therefore—’

Thanks to the activities of the grievance committee, most of my legal experience had consisted of following involved legal doctrines through the intricacies of a law library. My courtroom experience had been very limited, and my knees were rather wobbly as I got to my feet. But I was mad enough to keep my voice from quavering as I interrupted him.

‘Is it the custom, your honor, to decide a case before the petitioner has had an opportunity to make any showing?’ I asked.

He frowned, and said, ‘I was trying to be easy on you. Go ahead and put on your case if you want to. You’ll just give the California authorities more — I think you should have a lawyer, Mr. Lam.’

‘I don’t want any lawyer,’ I said, and called the officer who had taken me to Yuma as my first witness.

‘What’s your name?’ I asked.

‘Claude Flinton.’

‘You are an officer of this state?’

‘Yes.’

‘And you brought me to Yuma?’

‘That’s right.’

‘From where?’

‘From El Centro.’

‘Did I leave El Centro voluntarily?’

He laughed and said, ‘You did not. The sheriff of El Centro and I dragged you out and put you in a car, and it was a hot job.’

‘Under what authority?’

‘Because I had a writ of extradition and a warrant of arrest on a felony embezzlement charge with a count of obtaining property under false pretenses.’

‘What did you do with me?’

‘Took you back to Arizona and lodged you here in jail in Yuma.’

‘Did I accompany you of my own free will?’

He grinned and said, ‘You did not.’

I said, ‘That’s all.’

The judge asked in icy tones, ‘Have you any more witnesses, Mr. Lam?’

‘None, your honor.’

‘Very well. I shall now decide the case.’

‘Will I have an opportunity to argue it?’

‘I fail to see where you can say anything which will affect the ruling of the court.’

I said, ‘There is plenty to be said, your honor. The State of California wants me back. A few hours ago, the State of California didn’t want me within its borders. The State of California turned me over to the State of Arizona against my will and wish. I was dragged into the State of Arizona. There can be no question of that.’

‘But what does that have to do with it?’ the judge asked. ‘You have admitted killing a man in California.’

‘Certainly, I killed him. He deserved to die. He was a rat and a double-crosser. But that isn’t the question before this court. The question before this court is whether I can be extradited to California. I can’t be extradited to California. The only authority which one state has to take prisoners from another state comes from the organic law which provides that fugitives from justice may be extradited from one sovereign state to another. I am not a fugitive from justice.’

‘If you’re not a fugitive from justice, I don’t know what you are,’ Judge Oliphant said.

‘I don’t need to argue the matter,’ I retorted, ‘for two reasons. One of them is that your honor’s mind is evidently made up, and the other is that better legal minds than I have already wrestled with the problem. The fact remains, however, that a man is not a fugitive from a state unless he flees from that state. He doesn’t flee from that state unless he does so voluntarily and in order to avoid arrest. I did not flee from California. I was dragged from California. I was taken out under legal process to answer for a crime of which I was innocent. I claimed that I was innocent. I came to Arizona and established my innocence. Any time I get good and ready to go back to California, California can arrest me for murder. Until I get good and ready to go back, I can stay here and no power on earth can make me budge.’

The judge was looking interested now. ‘When you mention that more learned minds than yours have considered the question, are you, by any chance, referring to some judicial precedent?’

‘I am, your honor. The case of In re Whittington, 34C.A.334, is a leading case and absolutely in point. I can also refer you to the case of People vs. Jones, S4C.A.423. The California doctrine has been succintly expressed in Volume 12 California jurisprudence, page 398, as follows: “Where it appears that the presence of the accused in the state of refuge is not due to any voluntary act of his own, but to legal or illegal compulsion, he is not a fugitive from justice and cannot be extradited as such. Thus where it is shown that his presence in the state of refuge is due to extradition proceedings instituted by that state itself for a previous crime and honored by the state now demanding his return, he cannot be extradited by the latter, both because he did not flee from it, and because, by honoring the first requisition, it waived any right to prosecute him for the offense committed against its laws.’

The judge sat staring at me incredulously. The district attorney got to his feet, and said, ‘Surely, your honor, that cannot be the law. If such were the law, any man could commit murder, with malice aforethought. He could coldly, deliberately, and feloniously kill another human being; then, by taking advantage of a legal loophole, avoid any punishment.’

Judge Oliphant said slowly, ‘And apparently that is exactly what the petitioner in this case has done. It needs no great imagination to realize that, step by step, he had embarked upon a course of carefully planned murder with diabolical ingenuity. If this is the law, this man has committed the perfect crime, not as it is usually planned, with such subtlety that the clues are completely concealed, but with such ingenuity that he cannot be punished. It is to be noted that the petitioner has memorized the text of that portion of California jurisprudence dealing with the point he is making: It is, therefore, readily apparent that the full possibilities of the situation have been carefully thought out by him well in advance. The entire history of this case indicates that the petitioner is possessed of an astute legal mind which, unfortunately, is not balanced by a corresponding sense of legal ethics. However much the court may deplore the latter, it cannot ignore the consummate brilliance with which this petitioner, frail in his physical appearance, apparently young, innocent and inexperienced, has jockeyed the authorities of two states into such a position that they are apparently powerless to punish him for a cold-blooded, premeditated, and deliberate murder, his part in which he has brazenly admitted. It is an astounding situation. To some extent, the defendant’s moral and legal lapse is atoned by his confession which has enabled the California authorities to arrest the petitioner’s accomplices. However, the fact remains that the petitioner at bar, despite his very apparent youth and inexperience, has the ability to discover, and the ingenuity to carry into execution, a scheme by which he has adroitly outwitted the sovereign authorities of two states. It is a most astounding situation.

‘The court will take a thirty-minute recess during which the court will endeavour to consider this matter with a fair and impartial mind. However, the court cannot remain unaware of the seriousness of leaving such a legal loophole in our social and legislative structure. The court will not construe the organic law cited by the petitioner in the light of the petitioner’s contention unless it appears that the State of California has estopped itself from asking for a different construction by a decision which is plain and unequivocal in its language.’