The Kremlin agreed with Jaruzelski and in mid-December 1981, the USSR opted not to employ military force and chose the next closest thing: martial law.
U.S. MILITARY FORCE IN POLAND
With concern over the Soviets possibly on the verge of committing military force to quell the Poland situation, Ronald Reagan entertained the notion of a U.S. military response. Suddenly, the Reagan commitment to Poland had reached a higher level than ever before—one that which, remarkably, over two-and-a-half decades later, the world still remains in the dark.46
Unbeknownst to the world, Ronald Reagan considered plans to actually invade Polish territory if the Soviets invaded Poland. As an indication of how few people knew this fact, as well as the volatility of such a notion, when I asked Richard Pipes if U.S. force was considered in Poland to counter the Soviets, he tersely replied: “No.” He paused before raising his voice to express shock at the mere thought: “No, no. That would have unleashed World War III! And that’s not something anybody wanted. No.” He continued: “I don’t think we would have [used military force] in any case,” said Pipes. “No. We thought of diplomatic measures, of economic measures, but never thought of military intervention. I can say that quite categorically.”47 Likewise, Richard Allen, who was national security adviser at the time, stated: “I do not believe such an option [of U.S. military force] was given any serious consideration. Generally, Ronald Reagan was against the use of force.”48 And, indeed, Reagan was ultimately against American force in Poland.
But that does not mean he did not at least privately contemplate it; in fact, he had contemplated the option a year earlier. In December 1980, the incoming secretary of defense, Cap Weinberger, discussed with incoming president Reagan the possible use of U.S. force in Poland. Reagan himself brought up the idea after one of the preinauguration security meetings, which were held at Blair House and at the State Department in the immediate weeks after the November 1980 election.
Looking back over twenty years later, Weinberger recalled the intensity of the situation in Poland then, a full year before martial law. “There was very considerable worry,” said Weinberger, “that the Soviets, with two divisions inside Poland, that had been there since the end of the war [World War II], and the constant military exercises and threatening moves around the borders of Poland, that they might very well decide to wander in there without any fear of adverse results or reprisals.” Reagan wanted no signals to the Kremlin that such action would be acceptable. “The president was very firm about that,” said Weinberger.49 The two men talked about a U.S. invasion of Poland. Weinberger remembered:
I talked to him after one meeting in a session before he was inaugurated. I said, “You know, Mr. President, this talk about [U.S.] military force against the Soviet Union if it went into Poland is all well and good… but you must know that we do not have the military strength capable of doing that now. We don’t have the ability to project our power that far and we could not, without very substantial help, successfully come to the aid of the Poles if they were invaded.”
And he said to me, “Stop.” He turned to me and said, “Yes, I know that Cap. But we must never again be in this position. We must never again not take action that we think is essential because we’re not strong enough to do it.”50
And that simply reemphasized to me [the need] to get additional military spending that would get us out of that position….
He certainly considered all ways. But he didn’t argue for a moment with my assessment that we weren’t able to do that [employ U.S. military force in Poland] at the time. We didn’t have all that many divisions and the divisions that we had were under strength. We didn’t have adequate spare parts or supplies and couldn’t do adequate training. The military that we took over needed an enormous amount.51
Weinberger added that Reagan was aware of the risk that the Soviets could build on their two divisions in Poland and could use that troop presence “to intimidate Poland from carrying out any of the things that Walesa and others were talking about at that time.” This bothered Reagan greatly, and he very much wanted to reverse that situation. Again, however, want and can were quite different.52
Though a year had passed without any military action in Poland, by either side, Reagan’s thinking remained open to the consideration of force, particularly as tensions rose in Poland during December 1981. According to Weinberger:
Force may have been considered. There were some people in the White House and on the NSC staff… who were always proposing all kinds of military actions without, I think, having any awareness of the capability of the military to carry them out…. People didn’t realize that our military strength had been very substantially eroded [in the 1970s]…. He [Reagan] very reluctantly accepted that idea and he certainly wasn’t going to launch two or three divisions into a battle that would be almost a certain loss.53
Taken together, Weinberger’s remarks at least suggest that Reagan might have thought more aggressively if he had the defense power behind him. However, the strongest statements on this issue come from Bill Clark, the future national security adviser, who knew Reagan’s thoughts on Poland better than anyone. In a November 1999 interview, Clark stated:
We [the Reagan administration and Vatican] also worked together to generate strong diplomatic pressure upon the Soviet Union, to convince the leaders in the Kremlin that they must refrain from invading Poland—from doing what the Soviet Union had done to crush the earlier freedom movements in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. We in the Reagan administration were prepared to recommend the use of force if necessary to stop such an invasion (emphasis added) following the imposition of martial law.54
Five months later in a March 2000 speech in San Francisco, Clark added: “The Soviets and their proxies in Poland declared martial law and started in the summer moving troops up to the border, which looked like another situation as had occurred in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The President said this just simply cannot happen, even if it means meeting force with force.”55
In a 2001 interview, Clark, a man who has always been cautious with his words, was careful in discussing the force matter. Still, his words were powerfuclass="underline"
Measures were discussed. Some might call them extreme, but they might have been necessary. The instructions were that we cannot allow a [repeat of the] Hungary or Czechoslovakia invasion…. And it was touch and go. The Soviets did move the troops up to the line. We decided that, effectively, force would be met with force.56
But the question remained, was the administration willing to use force, if necessary? “Well, that certainly was inferred,” said Bill Clark. Importantly, however, Clark stressed that, “Anyone familiar with decision-making processes understands that you consider a full gamut of options. That was one that was considered. But I don’t want it to seem or sound more dramatic than it was.”