While the specific language of the directive may have been vague, its implications were not. In essence, the directive created an infrastructure to identify and exploit Soviet economic vulnerabilities—actual groups were established for that purpose. Though it was not as large scale, the directive was somewhat akin to the National Security Act of 1947, which authorized the creation of entire departments and groups like the NSC, CIA, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, to meet the new requirements demanded by the new war—the Cold War. Here, in late 1982, NSDD-66 spawned smaller groups for the new war silently declared by the Reagan team—the U.S. economic war against the USSR. Some of the strategies and efforts identified by these groups were pursued with the support of allies; others were not, and instead were achieved unilaterally by the administration or bilaterally with countries inside or outside Western Europe and the OECD.
Exploring where the most damage could be inflicted, Roger Robinson identified what he called the “strategic trade triad” of three critical Western resources that Moscow relied upon: bank credits, high-tech exports, and hard currency from energy exports. Among them, most vulnerable was the Soviet dependence on energy exports, which the administration was already exploiting and would continue to exploit in a number of ways.
As a result of these dependencies, there were many practical effects of NSDD-66; the Reagan administration proved to be quite successful at reducing Soviet access to Western technology. It pushed for much more vigorous prosecution of technology theft cases in order to disrupt sales of U.S. technology to Moscow; and this newly aggressive stance in fact caused a dramatic spike in the overall number of cases that were prosecuted. During the 1970s, only two or three theft cases were prosecuted by the federal government, but by January 1986, the Reagan Department of Justice was prosecuting more than 100 cases per month.
The administration also worked to limit the number of high-tech goods that could be legally shipped to the Soviet bloc, through the addition of twenty-six items to the U.S. Commodity Control List. Reagan’s team also applied substantial pressure on allies and trade partners, including neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden, in an attempt to limit their role as a transshipment point for high-tech materials headed to Moscow. COCOM, which included all NATO countries (except Iceland) and Japan, also tightened the controls on technology.70
The results were substantiaclass="underline" According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, in 1975 roughly 33% of all U.S. goods exported to the USSR were high-tech products, amounting to $219 million in sales. By 1983, the number dropped nearly seven-fold to 5%, dwindling to a paltry $39 million. By the fall of 1983, U.S. Customs agents seized some 1,400 illegal shipments headed to Moscow, valued at roughly $200 million.71
While these statistics were staggering, they were merely a sample of what was to come.72 These were life-sustaining technologies at a fatal time for a Kremlin on the ropes, and depriving Moscow of them was a severe blow. Radomir Bogdanov, a former KGB official serving as deputy director of the USA and Canada Institute, had no doubt about Washington’s mischief: The Reagan team was “trying to destroy our economy.”73
MORE RESTRICTIONS ON TECHNOLOGY
On November 30, 1982, only a day after the release of NSDD-66, came NSDD-70, which restricted the transfer of “nuclear capable missile technology” to certain nations. It also limited “dual-use” goods—products that can have both a peaceful-commercial use and a belligerent-military use. In so doing, the directive restricted a broad category of high-tech exports to the USSR. NSDD-70 allowed the Reagan administration to, “Exempt on a caseby-case basis certain U.S. friends and allies from this policy.” Soviet comrades were not among the “U.S. friends.” The directive stated:
All Executive Branch agencies having responsibilities or authorizations for export controls, including missile-related commodities, will adopt stringent export controls on technology and equipment which could make a direct or significant contribution to the design, development, production, inspection, testing or use of nuclear capable missile delivery systems and related components. At a minimum this will include guidance sub-systems and related software, propellants, propulsion systems, rocket nozzles and related control systems, re-entry sub-systems, missile structure, and unique support equipment.
An expansive rubric of high-tech items fell under this designation, particularly through the use of ambiguous terms like “unique support equipment” and “at a minimum.” Of course, the intention was to be expansive. The Reagan team was looking for a vehicle to restrict as many high-tech (and other) products as possible to the USSR—all the better to strangle the USSR. NSDD-70 offered yet another form of justification—on the nuclear side. With it, the administration could prevent even the most basic computer hardware and software from entering the USSR, plus more.74
While technology embargoes would prove to be central to the administration’s efforts, these NSDDs from the fall of 1982 served a far greater purpose than merely restricting Soviet access to trade. Through their harsh language and unmistakable goals, these NSDDs became a clear articulation of Reagan’s anti-Communist methodology for combating the Soviet economy. With the help of Clark and the NSC, the NSDDs became the frontline of Cold War combat, as Reagan demonstrated his unflinching desire to engage the Soviets on any economic front available.
As 1982 wound down, the administration was in overdrive as it sought to carry its economic assault into the new year. The NSDDs of the past year had given new focus to the administration’s strategies, as Ronald Reagan saw his words turn into actionable policy. And yet there was no time for Reagan to rest on his laurels. He was sure that he had started to back the Soviets into a corner, and it was thus important for his administration to maintain its momentum as it pressed the foreign agenda forward. The year had been a busy one in the war on Communism, and as the world would soon find out, things were about to get busier.
12. The Hottest Year in a Cold War: 1983
ON JANUARY 17, 1983, A TASS DISPATCH BY VLADIMIR SEROV fired off a warning concerning Ronald Reagan and his band of fellow “crusaders.” Making reference to the previous summer of 1982, Serov reminded readers that Reagan had devised a “strategy” that constituted a “‘crusade’ against communism”; this was a “‘roll-back communism’ policy.”1 To Moscow, 1983 was going to be a year in which the Reagan administration would pursue more of the same. More of the same rhetoric. More of the same economic sanctions. More of the same crusade. Little did the Soviets know what was actually in store.
Long after the papers had hit the stands in Russia that January 17, the day was dawning in the United States. January had begun slowly for the administration, which was still reeling from its wealth of activity in 1982. The NSDDs of the previous year were poised to yield tremendous results, all of which would take their toll on the ever-weakening USSR.