Ronald Reagan had big things on his mind that day. The goal was to start the year off with a bang. The goal was to keep momentum strong and morale high. That objective for early 1983 was evident on that winter day, in the form of NSDD-75.
The embodiment of Reagan’s thinking on U.S.–USSR coexistence, NSDD-75 was probably the most important document in Cold War strategy by the Reagan administration, and certainly the most significant and sweeping directive in terms of institutionalizing the Reagan intent and grand strategy. Predicated on Ronald Reagan’s belief that the Soviet Union was rotten to the core and should be broken, the document was fully committed to pursuing this end rather than maintaining the status quo that accepted Soviet existence.2
Norm Bailey would dub NSDD-75, “the strategic plan that won the Cold War.”3 His NSC colleague, Tom Reed, called it “the blueprint for the endgame” and “a confidential declaration of economic and political war.”4 One of the longest NSDDs, the directive covered nine pages, and took quite a while to craft. Its chief author, Richard Pipes, had been working on it since the spring of 1981, first under Richard Allen and then with the backing of Bill Clark and contributions from the likes of Roger Robinson—and against heavy obstruction by the State Department.5 Pipes called it “a clear break from the past. [NSDD-75] said our goal was no longer to coexist with the Soviet Union but to change the Soviet system. At its root was the belief that we had it in our power to alter the Soviet system through the use of external pressure.”6
Indeed, NSDD-75 was revolutionary, turning on its head the doctrine of containment that had formed the cornerstone of American foreign policy since George Kennan sent his famous “Long Telegram” from Moscow in February 1946.
As Bill Clark put it, NSDD-75’s search for “internal pressure” to bring to bear on the USSR represented a “new objective of U.S. policy.” “We worked hard,” said Clark, “on that new policy element of trying to turn the Soviet Union inside itself.” He notes that, under Reagan, for the first time U.S. policy went beyond containment and negotiations and toward encouraging “antitotalitarian changes within the USSR.” America, said Clark, would “seek to weaken Moscow’s hold on its empire.”7
Partly based on previous NSDDs like 32, 45, 54, and 66, NSDD-75 was tamely titled, “U.S. Relations with the USSR.” In the first paragraph, it declared that U.S. policy would focus on “external resistance to Soviet imperialism” and “internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism.” Within that, it stated two core “U.S. tasks:” First, “To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism…. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.” And, second, “To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced.”8
It was this front-page language that reflected Pipes’ principle contribution. He wrote and fought for this language, insisting that the document articulate the central aim of striving to reform the Soviet Union. “The State Department vehemently objected to that,” recalled Pipes. “They saw it as meddling in Soviet internal affairs, as dangerous and futile in any event. We persisted and we got that in.”9
In the end, the inclusion of those lines which were at once impossible but prophetic proved to be the defining language of NSDD-75. And yet those lines, whose prescience is chilling, whose historical significance cannot be overstated, were nearly removed by the State Department, which urged they be struck from the text. In spite of the diplomatic obstacles, the language remained intact, a testament to Reagan who, said Pipes, “insisted” on the language; indeed, this was the core of everything Reagan had always wanted.10 It was the manifestation of his forty-year crusade and it would become the centerpiece of the flourishing effort to defeat Communism once and for all. It quietly signaled a new era in both presidential power and American foreign policy.
THE OBJECTIVES OF NSDD-75
The document repeatedly expressed the “U.S. objective”—which it alternately called “task” or “goal” or “policy”—of “promoting positive evolutionary change within the Soviet system” (p. 6), of “containing and reversing Soviet expansion and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself ” (p. 6), of “containing the expansion of Soviet power” (p. 7), and more. NSDD-75 reiterated these goals again three separate times on page eight.
After the introduction, a three-part analysis followed, the first part revealingly titled, “Shaping the Soviet Environment,” wherein the administration laid out how it intended to affect that environment. Militarily, NSDD-75 called for a U.S. capability to resist the USSR around the world. Politically, and very much in keeping with Reagan’s views and rhetoric, the directive said that U.S. policy “must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values…over the repressive features of Soviet Communism.” The directive advised that these differences be pointed out and broadcast over international airwaves, and suggested increased U.S. government efforts to highlight Soviet human-rights violations.
NSDD-75 emphasized that U.S. economic relations with the USSR must serve strategic goals. “Above all,” U.S. objectives must “ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the Soviet military buildup.” Here, Pipes said he had in mind past cases of U.S. and Western technology that had aided critical Soviet missile-related industries, such as the sale (by a U.S. company) in the early 1970s of equipment to manufacture miniature ball bearings, which ended up in Soviet missile-guidance systems.11 This meant a close eye on technology transfer. Hence, NSDD-75 reiterated key economic-warfare aspects of NSDD-66, notably in regard to the gas pipeline, energy exports, bank credits, and the tightening of technologies on the COCOM list.
Reiterating and expanding on many of the previous NSDDs, NSDD-75 proved to be the most comprehensive policy example of the administration’s mindset. Years later, Bill Clark elaborated on the rationale that the document expressed:
The basic premise behind this new approach was that it made little sense to seek to stop Soviet imperialism externally while helping to strengthen the regime internally. This objective was to be attained by a combination of economic and ideological instrumentalities. Thus it became United States policy to avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing the burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as not to dilute pressures for structural change within the Soviet system.12
Clark’s words matched the language of NSDD-75.13 NSDD-75 acknowledged: “The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its capacity to engage in aggression.” Additionally, NSDD-75 addressed the following specifics:
Allies. While stating that the support of overall U.S. strategy by allies was “essential,” NSDD-75 conceded that America “may on occasion” be forced to go it alone, sometimes “even in the face of Allied opposition.” (p. 4) This applied not just economically but militarily, and was a harbinger of what was to come later in the year in Grenada.
The Third World. The directive said the United States must “resist Soviet encroachment” upon the Third World and “support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States.” American efforts in the Third World must involve “an important role for security assistance and foreign military sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary.” (p. 4)