According to the KGB’s account of events, in May 1983, John Varick Tunney went to Moscow to tell the Communists that Senator Ted Kennedy was “very troubled” by the state of U.S.–Soviet relations. Kennedy believed the main reason for the dangerous situation to be “Reagan’s belligerence”—particularly his commitment to deploy INFs in Western Europe. “According to Kennedy,” reported Viktor Chebrikov in his letter to Andropov, “the current threat is due to the President’s refusal to engage any modification to his politics.” That refusal, said the letter, was made worse because of Reagan’s political success, which made him even surer of his course, and obstinate.
Chebrikov’s view was that Kennedy held out hope that Reagan’s 1984 reelection bid could be thwarted. But how? Where was the president vulnerable? The Soviet interpretation of what transpired concluded that Kennedy had provided a possible answer. “The only real threats to Reagan are problems of war and peace and Soviet-American relations,” wrote Chebrikov. “These issues, according to the senator [Kennedy], will without a doubt become the most important of the election campaign.” Within the nuclear freeze movement and Congress there was resistance to Reagan. Yet, according to Chebrikov, Kennedy lamented that the opposition to Reagan was still weak; Kennedy regretted that Reagan was good at “propaganda,” whereas statements from Soviet officials (not propaganda, presumably) were quoted “out of context” or “whimsically discounted.”
Chebrikov then relayed Kennedy’s alleged offer to Andropov: “Kennedy believes that, given the state of current affairs, and in the interest of peace, it would be prudent and timely to undertake the following steps to counter the militaristic politics of Reagan.” The first step, according to the Soviet view of the Tunney meeting, was a recommendation by Kennedy that Andropov invite him to Moscow for a personal meeting. Chebrikov reported: “The main purpose of the meeting, according to the senator, would be to arm Soviet officials with explanations regarding problems of nuclear disarmament so they would be better prepared and more convincing during appearances in the USA.” Kennedy, reported Chebrikov, offered to bring along liberal Republican Senator Mark Hatfield.
Second, wrote the KGB head, “Kennedy believes that in order to influence Americans it would be important to organize in August–September of this year [1983], televised interviews with Y. V. Andropov in the USA.” By Chebrikov’s account, the Massachusetts senator had suggested a “direct appeal” by Andropov to the American people. “Kennedy and his friends,” stated Chebrikov, would hook up Andropov with television reporters like Walter Cronkite and Barbara Walters. According to Chebrikov, Kennedy suggested arranging interviews not merely for Andropov but also for “lower level Soviet officials, particularly from the military,” who “would also have an opportunity to appeal directly to the American people about the peaceful intentions of the USSR.” This was judged necessary because of so-called distortion by the Reagan administration.
In essence, Chebrikov’s interpretation was that Kennedy offered to help organize a Soviet PR campaign, which would “root out the threat of nuclear war,” “improve Soviet-American relations,” and “define the safety for the world.” “Kennedy is very impressed with the activities of Y. V. Andropov and other Soviet leaders,” explained Chebrikov.
In the final paragraph of the letter, Chebrikov talked of Kennedy’s political plans and prospects for 1984. “Kennedy does not discount that during the 1984 campaign, the Democratic Party may officially turn to him to lead the fight against the Republicans and elect their candidate president.” “We await instructions,” finished the KGB head to the head of the USSR: The senator “underscored that he eagerly awaits a reply to his appeal,” the answer to which could be delivered through Teddy Kennedy’s friend—John Tunney.
According to the KGB document, Kennedy’s goal in reaching out to Andropov was to defeat Reagan on two fronts: He hoped to reverse the president’s defense policies and foil his 1984 reelection bid. If the memo is in fact an accurate account of what transpired, it constitutes a remarkable example of the lengths to which some on the political left, including a sitting U.S. senator, were willing to go to stop Ronald Reagan—gestures not surprising to some who worked for the president.30 Reagan’s moves from the spring of 1983 into 1984, from the INFs to SDI, apparently sent some liberals over the edge. Reagan faced enormous opposition not just from Moscow but in Washington, and almost from Moscow and Washington (or at least certain elements of Washington) working together.
After Reagan left office, Tunney admitted to the London Times that he had made some fifteen trips to the USSR during the period, in which he acted as a “go-between” (his word) for a number of members of the U.S. Senate, as well as some unnamed others. He conceded: “I represented the views of some senators.” He disputed certain portions of Chebrikov’s memo, a few sentences of which were reported in the Times in February 1992. “I told them instead it would be good PR if they announced a cutback [in arms],” he said only.31
At one level, observers will decry Kennedy’s actions as shameless political opportunism. Irate conservatives may try to label his overture “treason,” charging that he sought to assist America’s enemy during a time of “war,” albeit an undeclared “cold” war, and will dub him everything from a useful idiot to Benedict Kennedy to Red Ted for reaching out to the Kremlin at the height of the Cold War.
Kennedy defenders, on the other hand, will maintain that the senator did what he felt was best for world peace, even if that meant extending his hand to Yuri Andropov.32 They will say that he was rightly concerned that the U.S.–USSR confrontation was spiraling out of control, edging closer to the precipice of nuclear oblivion. Andropov and other high-level Soviets actually feared the United States might launch a nuclear attack, as did many leftists in the West, including Ted Kennedy.
Yet, Democrats eager to defend Kennedy should know that this may not have been the first time he reportedly reached out to Moscow to undermine a sitting president’s foreign policy in an election season: according to another KGB document, the previous target of the Massachusetts senator had been Democratic President Jimmy Carter, Kennedy’s own political flesh and blood, whom Kennedy somehow believed was guilty of belligerence toward the USSR over Afghanistan. In early 1980, Kennedy, for whatever reason, seemed convinced that Leonid Brezhnev was committed to a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan—a country which the Soviets had just invaded and where they remained for the next decade. According to Vasiliy Mitrokhin’s 2002 report for the prestigious Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, which also cites Soviet documents, John Tunney went to Moscow on March 5, 1980 to relay yet another message on Kennedy’s behalf: Here, too, Kennedy reportedly blamed not the Kremlin and its dictator for aggression and escalating tensions but instead the American commander-in-chief that Kennedy was campaigning against for the presidency. Tunney said that the great Massachusetts liberal saw it as (in Mitrokhin’s words) “his duty to take action himself.”33
As the 1984 race heated up, Ted Kennedy continued to do extraordinary things to prevent Reagan’s reelection. He wrote a March 1984 article for Rolling Stone, in which he again denounced Reagan’s “Star Wars schemes” and called Reagan “the best pretender as president that we have had in modern history,” before leveling the irresponsible allegation that Reagan officials were “talking peace in 1984 as a prelude to making war in 1985.” Kennedy spoke of his “fears about an administration whose officials have spoken of winnable nuclear conflict.”34