Nagib received an invitation to pledge his allegiance to the United States of America and become a full-fledged citizen. The ceremony was something of a disappointment as he felt greatly superior to most of the other people who were sworn in with his group. These were mainly people with menial jobs and little formal education whose main reason for being awarded citizenship was that their spouses, parents, siblings or children were already US citizens — in what is known as family unification. Nagib did like the proximity of the ceremony to the 4th of July celebrations and saw this as a sign from heaven to carry on with his plan.
Soon after becoming a US citizen he applied for a job at the two National Laboratories that were in the area — Sandia that was practically in Albuquerque and Los Alamos which could be reached by car in a couple of hours. Getting a job at Los Alamos would force him to leave the good life he had created for himself in Albuquerque but he expected the work there to get him closer to his objective of obtaining access to nuclear weapon designs and to fissile materials. To his pleasant surprise he was invited to interview at both sites. The job offer at Los Alamos was more attractive — the pay was higher, the scientific challenges were greater, the team leader, Dr. Brian LeClerk, was more outgoing and appeared to be sincerely interested in recruiting him, and most of all, he would be involved in research with real nuclear materials. So, sad as he was to leave Albuquerque and relocate to the much smaller town of Los Alamos, Nagib accepted the job offer, and agreed to start work as soon as his security clearance was issued, probably, as he was told, at the beginning of September.
Nagib was surprised by the naivety of the US authorities and by their approach as if being a US citizen was a sacred religious affair — if you are one of us (a US citizen) then you are entitled to a good job, you are welcome to work in our most closely guarded institutions and are welcome to share our secrets, but if you are not formally a full-fledged citizen then you are a potential enemy of the people and not to be trusted at all. It seemed as if the authorities adopted a binary approach — trustworthy citizen or unreliable alien, while life itself was more of an analog situation and consisted of many shades of gray (not only 50 as some came to believe after reading the novel or seeing the movie).
Nagib returned to GCL and gave notice that he would be leaving at the end of August. His colleagues and friends gave him a little farewell party and wished him luck with his new job. Renaldo in particular was sad to see him leave — after all they had worked together for a few years and had even become friends. Nagib promised him that he would try to bring him along to Los Alamos if he would be in a position to hire people and if Renaldo acquired his own US citizenship.
Dr. Nagib Jaber received a badge with his name as he entered through the security office of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). He looked forward to start working in the analytical chemistry laboratory but was told that as a new employee he first had to receive several orientation courses. First he attended a general orientation lecture about the history of LANL, the Lab as it was called by the veterans, and the pivotal role it played during World War II. He was surprised to see the contribution of so many Jewish scientists to the Manhattan project from J. Robert Oppenheimer, Leo Szilard and Edward Teller through the then junior physicists like Felix Bloch and Richard Feynman to mention a few. He was also shocked to learn how many of them were refugees that managed to escape from Europe as the Nazi party rose to power in Germany. Next he was given an extended course on radiation safety and the techniques for handling radioactive materials. The instructor emphasized the safety procedures that had to be followed at all times and noted that safety drills and exercises were conducted periodically. The Head of Security gave a series of boring lectures on the procedures for handling classified material and in particular warned the new employees about communication security when using a telephone, e-mail, the internet and especially cellular phones that he regarded as the invention of the Devil and the worst nightmare of security officers. He also explained that some areas were restricted and entering them required a special permit and he stressed that discussing work related issues was strictly forbidden outside the designated zone. There were also more practical and useful bits of information delivered by the deputy director of Human Resources — the cafeterias and dining facilities, the post office hours, transportation to the Lab, entertainment options, etc. This took a couple of weeks and was concluded with a series of exams. Failure to pass any of those exams resulted either in repeating the course a month later without pay, or even dismissal from the Lab and termination of the job before it began. Nagib had no trouble passing all these exams at the top of the class, so by mid-September he was granted permission to start working in the analytical laboratory and was told to report to Dr. Brian LeClerk.
Chapter 2
After two years Nagib was considered for promotion. He had proven himself as a meticulous analytical chemist who could be trusted to perform his duties with precision and accuracy second to none. He mastered the most advanced techniques practiced in the analytical laboratory and learnt how to work even with the most toxic radioactive materials with skill and confidence, while scrupulously observing all safety procedures. His duties involved determination of trace amounts of uranium, plutonium and other actinide elements in bioassays and environmental samples, as well as evaluation of the isotope composition of these elements in samples of materials used in the construction of nuclear weapons. He had not yet received permission to enter the most secure area of the Lab in which actual weapon research was conducted, but he expected that after his promotion he would be granted free and unrestricted access to the entire Lab.
One of the main lessons he learned from his work at the Lab and at the Kirtland Air Force Base was that gaining access to nuclear weapons was not as simple as he had imagined, especially after seeing how easy it was to get a job at LANL. What was even more important to his plan was that he realized that even if he could see the weapons in storage it would be practically impossible to remove one. This was due to their weight and size on the one hand and to the security measures that involved armed guards, closed circuit cameras, and special alarm systems on the warheads. He reckoned there was only one viable option and that was to capture such a weapon or warhead in transport to the Lab for maintenance or from the Lab to a military base. This did not happen frequently as the Lab was not involved in routine construction or dismantling of standard nuclear weapons. However, he did not even know where to start to obtain information on the transfer of warheads, not to mention arranging the logistics of stopping an armed convoy that escorted the transportation of these items and getting away with a warhead. So, Nagib being a practical man decided to break down the problem into two parts: first, get access to the information on the transportation of warheads and then work out the logistics of overpowering the security detail and getting the warhead to a safe place.