The formation of only one permitted motor vehicle workshop platoon was carried out only by personnel with completely inadequate equipment. It was only during the western campaign that this workshop platoon with its improvised installations became fully operational. The authorized towing vehicle for towing defective motor vehicles was never attached to the workshop company.
Many divisions suffered from gaps in motor transportation right from their initial formation. The lack of heavy trucks, all-terrain vehicles and all kinds of necessary special vehicles such as half-tracks, workshop trucks, radio vehicles, properly equipped motor ambulances, and so on, can be found in nearly all divisions, including the favourably equipped Panzer and Waffen-SS Divisions. Due to the lack of adequate production, gaps had to be filled with requisitioned vehicles from the civilian economy, which had to be converted for special tasks as shown here by fuel and equipment trucks. Also common was a lack of maintenance units. This especially resulted from the contest for technically trained men, which were also needed by both industry and the Luftwaffe. Those sent to the army were mostly sent to the mobile units with their huge vehicle parks (the same being true for special equipment such as recovery vehicles, tools and machines). What was left went to the infantry divisions, and newly formed units often did not receive even enough specialist personnel for their smaller units.
II) Exchange of seized vehicles for German [vehicles]
Equipped with these vehicles, the division participated in the campaign in Denmark and France. In France, the division could replace all losses in ample manner by captured motor vehicles, with the result that the division consisted of around 75% German and 25% captured motor vehicles.
On 2. and 4.3.41, thus 8 days before the transport to the Balkans, the ordered exchange of captured motor vehicles for vehicles manufactured in Germany took place. 22 motorcycles, 40 passenger cars and 134 trucks were exchanged. This exchange had an especially harmful effect on the motor vehicle stock of the division. The division was forced to give up its whole captured motor vehicle stock, which was in very good condition, while the division it traded with – the 253rd Infantry Division, which had to exchange with 3 divisions on the whole, and which was allowed to keep special vehicles and especially urgently needed motor vehicles of German origin – could bring its most worn out vehicles to the exchange. With few exceptions, the exchanged motor vehicles, including tires, were in very bad condition.
While the division had forced up the tonnage by using captured trucks, the vehicles it received in the exchange were without exception on the lower level of their tonnage class. Due to this, the division suffered a tonnage loss of 45 tons. Immediate and repeated demands to the Special Staff Volckheim […] responsible for the exchange action, resulted in at least 22 trucks being exchanged for vehicles of a higher class of tonnage, although only used vehicles were allocated, without any possibility of choosing others. To remedy the most urgent shortage, 5 additional heavy trucks were attached to the division.
The greatest difficulty lay in the necessary reestablishment of the operational readiness of the exchanged motor vehicles, which could not be executed before the transport on 10.3. and was not set in motion before arriving in the Balkans.
In addition, a restocking of the missing vehicles within the framework of the exchange was rejected. The division had to march to the Balkans missing the following vehicles: 24 motorcycles, 13 sidecar motorcycles, 7 passenger cars, 6 trucks, 1 bus and 9 special vehicles.
The enormous booty of French motor vehicles, as well as the access to the French civil economy for production and requisition, filled the most urgent gaps in the German motor park and allowed for the expansion of the mobile units. While French booty was by far the largest, the German army also massively relied on captured vehicles from other enemies, including those found after the British retreat from Dunkirk. It is certainly debatable whether the German army would have been able to undertake Operation Barbarossa without those stocks of captured vehicles. No fewer than 84 infantry divisions, three motorized infantry divisions and even one Panzer division were primarily equipped with captured vehicles. Additionally, many of the army’s motor transportation units were outfitted with captured trucks.
III) Balkan campaign
[…] The total losses which occurred during the Balkan campaign were not covered by replacements, so that the number of missing vehicles has again increased.
IV) Refreshing by the German Liaison Command Bucharest
To discuss the question of refreshing and other requirements for the division’s equipment, the divisional quartermaster was ordered to the General Army Office and to the General Quartermaster in Berlin. […] While the allocation of a second motor vehicle workshop platoon and all-terrain vehicles was rejected, 3 medium trucks were obtained from the Liaison Command and allocated to the horse-drawn bakery company 235. Despite numerous requests and personal visits, the division received only one of the already allocated and supplied trucks. […] During the period of refreshment, the infantry anti-tank companies formed 5cm ATG platoons. On the whole, it was necessary to make 6 5cm ATG and 6 ammunition trailers mobile. For this purpose, the allocation of 12 1.5 ton trucks A-Type or 12 motor vehicles 69 or 12 medium all-terrain passenger cars was requested at the Liaison Command. An allocation of special vehicles did not occur again. Just to make the guns mobile, 3 commercial medium trucks were allocated to the division. The remaining 9 trucks had to be extracted from the handed over 3.7cm ATG platoons. Since those old light trucks were quite inappropriate for towing the heavy guns, there had to be an exchange for medium trucks inside the division, which were missing from other positions.
In addition to constant telephone communication and continuous reports and requests, repeated personal visits were undertaken relating to the period of refreshment, including those on 5.4., 29.4., 10.5., 30.5., 17.6., and 27.6. by the divisional quartermaster and the Divisional Engineer with the Quartermaster and the motor vehicle administrator of the Liaison Command. […] Among other things, the Chief of the General Staff of the 11th Army remarked: ‘It will be naturally impossible that the division goes into the Eastern war with such a motor vehicle stock.’ […] The Corps and Army could not help materially, since the Army depots were in the process of being built up and closed until the beginning of the Eastern campaign.
Despite the serious efforts of all superior commands, the Liaison Command responsible for the division’s refreshment did not succeed in compensating for the losses of the Balkan campaigns, not to mention the large shortage of vehicles. All in all, the refreshment brought the division an increase in motor vehicles of 8 motorcycles, 9 passenger cars and 11 trucks (including an additional allocation of 3 trucks for the 5cm ATGs and 3 trucks for the bakery company 235) up until the beginning of the Eastern campaign. During the deployment for the Eastern Campaign, the division lacked the following vehicles: 32 motorcycles, 7 passenger cars, 12 trucks, 1 bus, 9 special vehicles, 2 motor ambulances.
While the time-delay effect of the Balkan campaign on Barbarossa is much discussed, it is clear that this operation had a negative effect on logistics. This included significantly more wear on the vehicles than on average, which only increased the gaps in vehicle stocks. Furthermore, the diversion of 15 divisions to the Balkans from the deployment to the east caused much friction and delay for other transports. Units that had participated in the Balkan campaign should have been refreshed in May and June 1941 as a priority but, as the report shows, this was not the case. Even more problematic for the upcoming campaign was the lack of all-terrain vehicles even for combat units such as the ATG platoons.