V) Eastern Campaign
1) Deployment in the bridgehead Sculeni, losses due to enemy fire.
In addition to high losses in men and material, the division’s first deployment in the Sculeni bridgehead already also brought the division heavy losses in vehicles, in particular by strong artillery bombardment and aerial bombing, which also affected the rear sections in Jassy. Already the division has lost 30 motorcycles, 6 passenger cars, 17 trucks and 1 motor ambulance from 22.6. to 2.7. just through enemy fire. Up to this point, all special requests after losses were directed to the XXXth Army Corps, which did not appear to be promising. Order [of the] XXXth Army Corps motor vehicle officer of 30.6.41 reads as follows: ‘The replacement of lost motor vehicles is only to be expected if the total losses have reached more than 10% of the division’s motor vehicle authorized strength. It is therefore asked to refrain from individual requests, but rather to limit to [filling] out the required reports of vehicles falling out. The difficult motor vehicle situation at the 198th Infantry Division is moreover known to the corps command. If losses exceed 10% of the authorized strength, a fully filled out Form 6 is requested, indicating the distribution of the losses among individual units and any types of unique vehicles lost. Everything has been done by the corps command to help the division.’ At this time, the number of missing motor vehicles already amounted to 157 motor vehicles from an authorized motor vehicle strength of 1,006, i.e. 16%. Despite this severe weakening of the motor vehicle stock, no allocations of any importance took place, even the more so as the allocations from the normal channels of supply did not show any increase corresponding to the losses.
2) Private acquisition of motor vehicles
In a meeting of the commanding general of the XXXth Army Corps with the divisional commanders, the latter agreed to accept the private purchase of motor vehicles, in order to compensate for the entirely inadequate replenishment and to make the division with its motor vehicle inventory operationally ready for the war in the East. Forced by the need and the will to maintain the division’s operational readiness, private car purchases in Romania were initiated. As a result, by the middle of September 1941, the division was able to provide its motor vehicles stock with 54 motorcycles, 3 sidecar motorcycles, 17 passenger cars and 21 trucks. On order [of] Eleventh Army on 12.9., car sales in Romania had to be discontinued again.
Marching into the Soviet Union with an under-strength, partly worn-out motor vehicle park that in many cases did not fulfil demands such as all-terrain ability or cargo loading capacities, the division’s high losses right from the beginning of the invasion were not surprising. Losses reached the aforementioned 16 per cent of the stock only two weeks into the campaign, an ominous foreshadowing of the upcoming months. Such losses reduced both units’ mobility and their supply capacities. It is then no surprise that German units tried desperately to fill the increasing gaps in motor transport by any means, including buying vehicles on the Romanian private market. Most of these vehicles were used despite not being fit for cross-country operations. Receiving spare parts was also difficult, so the breakdown and falling out of these vehicles was only a matter of time.
3) The impact of road conditions and the use of repair services
Constantly deployed at the front, the division had to march along horrible ‘roads’, due to periodic precipitation, during the battles in Bessarabia and Ukraine. In total, about 1,700km were travelled in modest stretches to the local area, which had to be driven mainly in low gears. This resulted in very considerable wear for the entire chassis, but especially in the steering and suspension and, what is more, in the engine itself, which had a significant increase in oil consumption and a decrease in the performance. Over time, the heavy stress on the suspension– quite apart from numerous spring bridges – caused a considerable decrease in the load-bearing capacity of the trucks. As a result of the continually increasing breakdowns, it was necessary to establish numerous vehicle collection points, which inevitably became later operating sites for the 235th workshop company. With the increase in vehicle breakdowns and the resulting number of vehicle collection points, the fact that the 235th workshop company only had one vehicle workshop platoon and thus cannot be deployed with one platoon advancing while the other works is again and again decisively disadvantageous. This resulted in long towing routes to the vehicle collection points, with no tracked vehicles available to surmount this problem. Burdened with such orders, the troops and the workshop company’s heavy commercial vehicles were exposed to extreme wear and tear in the prevailing road conditions. Maintenance work was further complicated by the circumstance that, on the one hand, there were no workshops for the maintenance of motor vehicles in the country itself, and, on the other hand, the troops did not have any scheduled repairs. This deficiency had to be remedied to a certain extent with the help of makeshift repair vehicles, which decreased the tonnage available for use.
4) Spare parts supply
The increasing decline in spare parts supply was a decisive factor in the maintenance of motor vehicles. The distances to the army motor vehicle depots were – like all supply routes – so large that the tours there could only be undertaken exceptionally. The stockpiles in the army motor vehicle depots themselves were extremely small in relation to demand, so that the workshop company was compelled to make spare parts itself in a makeshift manner and with great expenditure of time. On the other hand, motor vehicles were lost because the required spare part, which could not be procured by any means, was missing. In this way, motor vehicles whose general condition by no means justified being out of commission nonetheless had to be written off. Replacement engines were obtained only to a small extent, so a lack of suitable tow vehicles resulted in numerous motor vehicles left as total losses. These were cannibalized in the interests of the motor vehicles still in operation.
5) Reorganization of the division
As a result of the high personnel losses, the division was forced to dissolve an infantry regiment except for one battalion on 17.8. The largest motor vehicle gaps could be compensated for by the motor vehicles which were thereby released.
Not even two months into the campaign, the combined effects of an under-strength motor vehicle park consisting of vehicles generally not suited for the conditions in the east, the high demands on those motor vehicles, and structural problems such as the lack of spare part depots and maintenance and towing capacities, eroded German motor transport capabilities. This had severe consequences for units’ supply, as well as for their mobility. Only the reduction of unit size could close the most urgent gaps.
6) Reconditioning during the operation in the Dnipropetrovsk bridgehead and captured motor vehicles
During the operations in Dnipropetrovsk bridgehead, which led to stable conditions for the maintenance of motor vehicles, it was possible for the division during the four-week period of the fighting to catch-up with the neglect of the motor vehicle maintenance during the advance. During this time not only had the 235th Workshop Company repaired up to 120 motor vehicles per week, but the troops’ provisional maintenance units have also carried out a great deal of repair work in an outstanding manner, so that the number of vehicles in repair fell noticeably and only those repairs which lacked the necessary spare parts for completion remained unfinished. In recognition of the difficult motor vehicle situation, especially of the supply services, First Panzer Army and IIIrd Motorized Corps, already helped the division in the last period of advance and combat with the temporary allocation of corps [supply] columns and the bringing of supplies in close proximity. […] At the conclusion of the battles in the Dnipropetrovsk bridgehead, which brought high losses for the division, the division succeeded in capturing some motor vehicles. Here, amongst others, 10 tractors were seized, which could be made operational by the workshop company over the course of time. […] The number of missing vehicles at this time after the inclusion of the motor vehicles supplied from the army motor vehicle depot, private purchases and seized goods amounted to 42 motorcycles, 77 sidecar motorcycles, 6 passenger cars, 49 trucks, 1 bus, 10 special vehicles and 6 motor ambulances. 40% of the total losses resulted from enemy action.