And that is how he himself certified that he, too, deserved to plunge into those waves.
So, at long last, he had matured to the point of being turned over to the prompters and the assistant producers—this muscular man, this hunter and wrestler! (In playful tussles in the presence of the Central Committee, how many times had he landed Stalin flat on his back! And this, too, was probably something Koba couldn’t forgive him.)
And in the case of one so fully prepared, so demolished, that no torture was called for, how was his position any stronger than that of Yakubovich in 1931? How could he not be susceptible to the same two arguments? He was in fact much weaker, because Yakubovich longed for death, and Bukharin dreaded it.
There remained an easy dialogue with Vyshinsky along set lines:
“Is it true that every opposition to the Party is a struggle against the Party?” “In general it is, factually it is.” “But a struggle against the Party cannot help but grow into a war against the Party.” “According to the logic of things—yes, it must.” “And that means that in the end, given the existence of oppositionist beliefs, any foul deeds whatever might be perpetrated against the Party [espionage, murder, sellout of the Motherland]?” “But wait a minute, none were actually committed.” “But they could have been?” “Well, theoretically speaking.” (Those are your theoreticians for you!) “But for us the highest of all interests are those of the Party?” “Yes, of course, of course!” “So you see, only a very fine distinction separates us. We are required to concretize the eventuality: in the interest of discrediting for the future any idea of opposition, we are required to accept as having taken place what could only theoretically have taken place. After all, it could have, couldn’t it?” “It could have.” “And so it is necessary to recognize as actual what was possible; that’s all. It’s a small philosophical transition. Are we in agreement?… Yes, and one thing more, and it’s not for me to explain to you, but if you retreat and say something different during the trial, you understand that it will only play into the hands of the world bourgeoisie and will only do the Party harm. Well, and it’s clear that in that case you yourself will not die an easy death. But if everything goes off all right, we will, of course, allow you to go on living. We’ll send you in secret to the island of Monte Cristo, and you can work on the economics of socialism there.” “But in previous trials, as I understand it, you did shoot them all?” “But what comparison is there between you and them! And then, we also left many of them alive too. They were shot only in the newspapers.”
And so perhaps there isn’t any insoluble riddle?
It was all that same invincible theme song, persisting with only minor variations through so many different trials: “After all, we and you are Communists! How could you have gotten off the track and come out against us? Repent! After all, you and we together—is us!”
Historical comprehension ripens slowly in a society. And when it does ripen, it is so simple. Neither in 1922, nor in 1924, nor in 1937 were the defendants able to hang onto their own point of view so firmly that they could raise their heads and shout, in reply to that bewitching and anesthetizing melody:
“No, we are not revolutionaries with you! No, we are not Russians with you! No, we are not Communists with your
It would seem that if only that kind of shout had been raised, all the stage sets would have collapsed, the plaster masks would have fallen off, the Producer would have fled down the backstairs, and the prompters would have sneaked off into their ratholes. And out of doors it would have been, say, 1967!
But even the most superbly successful of these theatrical productions was expensive and troublesome. And Stalin decided not to use open trials any longer.
Or rather in 1937 he probably did have a plan for holding public trials on a wide scale in the local districts—so the black soul of the opposition would be made visible to the masses. But he couldn’t find producers who were good enough. It wasn’t practical to prepare things so carefully, and the mental processes of the accused weren’t so complex, and Stalin only got into a mess, although very few people know about it. The whole plan broke down after a few trials, and was abandoned.
It’s appropriate here to describe one such trial—the Kady case, detailed reports of which the Ivanovo provincial newspapers published initially.
At the end of 1934, a new local administrative district was created in the remote wilds of Ivanovo Province at the point where it joined Kostroma and Nizhni Novgorod Provinces, and its center was situated in the ancient, slow-moving village of Kady. New leaders were sent there from various localities, and they made one another’s acquaintance right in Kady. There they found a remote, sad, impoverished region, badly in need of money, machines, and intelligent economic management, but, instead, starved by grain procurements. It happened that Fyodor Ivanovich Smirnov, the First Secretary of the District Party Committee, was a man with a strong sense of justice; Stavrov, the head of the District Agricultural Department, was a peasant through and through, one of those peasants known as the intensivniki—in other words, the hard-working, zealous, and literate peasants who in the twenties had run their farms on a scientific basis, for which they were at that time rewarded by the Soviet government, since it had not yet been decided that all these intensivniki must be destroyed. Because Stavrov had entered the Party he had survived the liquidation of the kulaks. (And maybe he even took part in the liquidation of the kulaks?) These men tried to do something for the peasants in their new district, but directives kept pouring down from above and each one ran counter to some initiative of theirs; it was as if, up there, they were busy thinking up what they could do to make things worse and more desperate for the peasants. And at one point the leaders in Kady wrote the province leadership that it was necessary to lower the plan for procurement of breadgrains because the district couldn’t fulfill the plan without becoming impoverished well below the danger point. One has to recall the situation in the thirties (and maybe not only the thirties?) to realize what sacrilege against the plan and what rebellion against the government this represented! But, in accordance with then current style, measures were not taken directly from above, but were left to local initiative. When Smirnov was on vacation, his deputy, Vasily Fyodorovich Romanov, the Second Secretary, arranged to have a resolution passed by the District Party Committee: “The successes of the district would have been even more brilliant [?] if it were not for the Trotskyite Stavrov.” This set in motion the “individual case” of Stavrov. (An interesting approach: Divide and rule! For the time being, Smirnov was merely to be frightened, neutralized, and compelled to retreat; there would be time enough later on to get to him. And this, on a small scale, was precisely the Stalinist tactic in the Central Committee. ) At stormy Party meetings, however, it became clear that Stavrov was about as much of a Trotskyite as he was a Jesuit. The head of the District Consumer Cooperatives, Vasily Grigoryevich Vlasov, a man with a ragtag, haphazard education but one of those native talents others are so surprised to find among Russians, a born retail trade executive, eloquent, adroit in an argument, who could get fired to red heat about anything he believed to be right, tried to persuade the Party meeting to expel Romanov from the Party for slander. And they actually did give Romanov an official Party rebuke! Romanov’s last words in this dispute were typical of this kind of person, demonstrating his assurance in regard to the general situation: “Even though they proved Stavrov was not a Trotskyite, nonetheless I &m sure he is a Trotskyite. The Party will investigate, and it will also investigate the rebuke to me.” And the Party did investigate: the District NKVD arrested Stavrov almost immediately, and one month later they also arrested Univer, the Chairman of the District Executive Committee and an Estonian. And Romanov took over Univer’s job as Chairman of the District Executive Committee. Stavrov was taken to the Provincial NKVD, where he confessed he was a Trotskyite, that he had acted in coalition with the SR’s all his life, that he was a member of an underground rightist organization in his district (this is a bouquet worthy of the times, the only thing missing being a connection with the Entente). Perhaps he never really did confess these things, but no one is ever going to know, since he died from torture during interrogation in the internal prison of the Ivanovo NKVD. The pages of his deposition were there in full. Soon afterward, they arrested Smirnov, the secretary of the District Party Committee, as the head of the supposed rightist organization; and Saburov, the head of the District Financial Department, and someone else as well.