Even these attacks, believed to be mere preliminaries, caused the XI Corps to use up its last reserves. The 228th Assault Gun Battalion had been committed between Radvanivka and Kokhanivka. To get some new reserves, the 57th Infantry Division was ordered to send one regiment south, to Pastorskoye, where it would be at the disposal of XI Corps. However, the reinforcements would not be available until the afternoon of 25 January.63
The gravity of the situation was clear to Army Group South, too. In the evening the chiefs of staffs of both the army group and 8th Army discussed the matter. They were unanimous in concluding that the action on 24 January had only been a prelude to the major assault which was to begin on 25 January or at the very latest on 26 January, and that the attack would be launched between Balandino and Penkino. There was little that the Germans could do. Air attacks had been directed against the Soviet assembly areas, but these could at best delay the Soviet preparations, not stop them. The relief of 11th and 14th Panzer Division was already underway. The 14th Panzer Division was expected to be available at Novy Mirgorod on the morning of 25 January and the 11th Panzer Division would follow slightly later. One GHQ artillery battalion, the I./Art.Rgt. 108, was ordered to leave the Grossdeutschland Division and move to Kapitanovka, to support the 389th Division, but it was unclear if it could reach the threatened area in time.64
Evidently the 8th Army, like its neighbor to the left, was aware of Soviet intentions and preparations. It correctly assessed where the Red Army would make its main effort and its leaders were able to follow the build-up. Indeed, the Germans even tried to interdict the build-up, but the means available to 8th Army were insufficient to the task. Wöhler tried to scramble two Panzer divisions to form a reserve, but both divisions were depleted and it was unlikely that both of them would reach the threatened area in time.
For the Red Army, the planning process was somewhat simpler. Their overall superiority of forces on the Eastern Front permitted Stalin and his generals to dictate the broader events. Local German counter attacks could be a problem, but unless the Stavka played its cards completely wrong, the Germans could not be expected to create major problems for the Red Army. They could certainly be expected to offer stubborn resistance and cause the Red Army to pay a high price for any gains, but overall, the Soviets were in charge of events at this time, as they had been for the last five months.
The problems surrounding the Korsun–Shevchenkovskii operation were mainly caused by the fact that it was an operation of much greater scope than anything else currently taking place on the Eastern Front, even as other important operations were being conducted at the same time. As a result, the Red Army was juggling conflicting demands and ambitions; but that can hardly be considered an exceptional military situation. Rather, it is a quite common problem for military forces facing a competent or powerful opponent. Another problem was the depleted condition of many of the Soviet formations. However, the Germans also suffered from worn-out units.
The Stavka ordered the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to encircle and annihilate the German forces in the Korsun–Shevchenkovskii area. The selected meeting point for the two prongs was Zvenigorodka. Since this meant that the 2nd Ukrainian Front would have 70 kilometers to cover and the 1st Ukrainian Front only 40 kilometers, the 2nd Ukrainian Front was scheduled to start moving one day earlier, on 25 January.65
On 15 January, General Konev held a conference at his headquarters in Boltushki. His subordinate commanders and their political commissars were present, as well as several officers from Konev’s own staff. Konev opened the conference by describing the order received by the front and his preliminary opinion on how it should be carried out. According to Konev it was best to launch the main attack from the area north of Kirovograd, as the Germans were believed to have weaker defenses there. This meant that a significant part of the front’s forces would have to be shifted north, among them Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army. The main weight of the initial attack would be provided by the 53rd Army and 4th Guards Army.66
Since both fronts had been conducting operations in diverging directions since Christmas 1943, they were compelled to do some regrouping of forces. The 1st Ukrainian Front formed a new army, the 6th Tank Army, on 21 January. The 6th Tank Army had no real staff or GHQ units. Rather it was the 5th Guards Tank Corps commander who, in addition to his previous duties, had been given control over the 5th Mechanized Corps too. Soviet sources do not agree upon the number of tanks available to the two corps when the Soviet offensive began. The 6th Tank Army had 190 tanks and assault guns.67 Interestingly, the 5th Mechanized Corps possessed a considerable number of lend-lease Sherman tanks.68
Although the 6th Tank Army was not fully up to strength in tanks, the 5th Mechanized Corps had its full complement of personnel, small arms weapons, and artillery. The 5th Guards Tank Corps suffered from shortages of soldiers in the motorized rifle units and in the artillery. The corps received replacements just before the offensive, but the new soldiers lacked experience and were poorly trained. Many of the soldiers came from recently liberated areas. Their desire to defeat the hated enemy was strong, but they lacked sufficient training.69
In addition to the 6th Tank Army, the 27th and 40th Armies were also to attack. The Koshevatoe and Tinovka areas were selected as their respective main efforts,70 precisely where the Germans had expected. The 6th Tank Army was deployed behind 40th Army’s shock groups, ready to exploit any penetrations.71
Unlike Vatutin’s front, the 2nd Ukrainian Front did not create any new formations for the forthcoming operation. The 4th Guards and 53rd Armies were allotted the task of penetrating the German defenses, which the 5th Guards Tank Army should exploit. However, it was deemed necessary to use some of the tanks from the tank army in the initial attacks. Hence elements of two of the tank corps were subordinated to 53rd Army, which was very weak in armor, as it only possessed 21 tanks.72
While the 53rd Army was weak in tanks, it was strong in artillery. Aside from its divisional units, the army controlled five artillery brigades, one mortar brigade, one artillery regiment, and one mortar regiment. The army possessed 611 guns (larger than 45mm) and 467 mortars (larger than 82mm). Also it had more than 300 rocket launchers. The 4th Guards Army was slightly weaker in artillery, but nevertheless, the two armies mustered considerable firepower, most of which was concentrated against the German 389th Infantry Division.73
The 5th Guards Tank Army was supposed to exploit the breach created by 53rd Army and advance towards Shpola and Zvenigorodka. The fighting around Kirovograd had been costly to the army and currently it consisted of three tank corps: the 18th, 20th, and 29th. The number of tanks in the army is a little unclear. On 21 January, the Tank Army possessed 156 operational tanks and assault guns, plus 91 in need of repair. Considerable efforts were made to repair vehicles and it seems that about half of them were repaired in time for the starting date of the operation.74