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11. Pz.Div.
Commander: Gen.Maj. von Wietersheim

The division was formed after the fall of France in 1940. The panzer regiment in the new division came from 5th Panzer Division. The division had been on the Eastern Front since 22 June 1941.

On 20 January, the I./Pz.Rgt. 15 had 8 operational Panthers and 39 in workshops.62 At the same time the I./Pz.Rgt. 31 had 11 operational Panthers and 28 in workshops.63 The latter was ordered to hand over its Panthers to 11. Pz.Div.64 This gave the division a total of 86 Panthers, but of these most were in workshops. It is doubtful that a significant number of them were repaired before the Soviet offensive began, since the division was seriously short of spare parts and recovery vehicles.65

The II. Abt. of the Panzer regiment seems to have been weak. On 1 January the division reported that it had five Pz III and two Pz IV operational, plus ten Pz IV in short term repair (repairable within three weeks).66 This had changed little until 1 February, when it reported no operational Pz III, two operational Pz IV and seven and eight Pz III and Pz IV respectively in short term repair (repairable within three weeks).67 During January no Pz III or Pz IV were shipped to the division,68 thus it seems unlikely that the division had more than a handful combat ready Pz III and Pz IV on 25 January, especially since the division was involved in the Kirovograd battle in mid-January.

The division was fairly strong in manpower. On 22 January it had a ration strength of 12,305, but that included some non-divisional units.69 Its infantry regiments had a ration strength of 1,100–1,200 men and a combat strength (Gefechtsstärke) of 605 and 412 respectively.70

The manpower situation remained much the same on 1 February, when the division had an authorized strength of 16,250, but a shortage of 3,786.71 Casualties during January amounted to 220 killed in action, 704 wounded and 77 missing. Also 11 officers and 419 other ranks had been evacuated due to disease and another 490 had left the division for other reasons. The 276 replacements and 34 convalescents the division received during the month was insufficient to remedy the situation.72

The division reported five Panthers operational on 1 February.73

On 22 January the division had 14 10.5 cm howitzers, 6 15 cm howitzers and 6 10 cm guns. Also it had 4 8.8 cm Flak guns.74

Tank Strength (Operational Vehicles) During the Operation:

27 January:75 12 Panther, 3 Pz IV

4 February:76 21 Panther, 8 StuG (includes I./Pz.Rgt. 26 and probably 911. StuG.Abt. too)

13 February:77 8 Panther, 1 Pz IV, 1 StuG (includes I./Pz.Rgt. 26, Pz.Abt 8, StuG.Abt 911)

14 February:78 3 operational tanks

15 February (morning):79 6 operational tanks

1 March:80 10 Panther, 4 Pz III and 3 command tanks (also 54 Panthers, 7 Pz IV, 2 Pz III and 1 command tank in workshops)

13. Pz.Div.
Commander: Generalmajor Hans Mikosch

Hitler wanted more panzer divisions after the campaign in France so the 13th Motorized Infantry Division from Magdeburg was given a panzer regiment from 2nd Panzer Division and become 13th Panzer Division. The division had been fighting on the Eastern Front since Operation Barbarossa was launched.

On 28 January it was decided to send the 13. Pz.Div. to XXXXVII. Pz.Korps and on 1 February the 13.Pz.Div. went into action.81

The 13. Pz.Div. was very weak in tanks. On 1 February it only had seven Pz III and eleven Pz IV operational. Also it possessed three Pz III and one Pz IV that were in workshops and expected to be repaired within three weeks. In fact it had almost as many self-propelled AT guns, seventeen Marders operational and two in repair.82

In terms of manpower, the division was little better off. Its authorized strength was 15,373, including 1,214 HiWi, but it was short of 4,152 officers and men (including 191 HiWi).83

Artillery was in better supply. The division had six Hummel (15 cm SP Arty) operational plus two in repair. Also it had nine Wespe (10.5 cm SP Arty) operational and one in repair. Altogether, the division had 27 artillery pieces operational and 8 in repair.84

Tank Strength (Operational Vehicles) During the Operation:

4 February:85 5 Pz IV, 1 Pz III, 1 BW

13 February:86 3 Pz IV, 2 BW

1 March:87 5 Pz IV, 1 Pz III, 1 BW (also 7 Pz IV, 3 Pz III and 2 BW in workshops)

14. Pz.Div.
Commander: Generalmajor Martin Unrein

By reinforcing and reorganizing the 4th Infantry Division, the 14th Panzer Division was formed. The division was destroyed at Stalingrad but from the remnants (wounded outside the Stalingrad pocket, soldiers on leave, etc.) of the “old division” a new 14th Panzer Division was formed. The division arrived at the Eastern Front (Army Group South) in October 1943.

The 14. Pz.Div. was in reserve on the morning of 25 January, in the Slatopol–Novo Mirgorod area, but became subordinated to XI. Korps at noon.88 Like many other panzer divisions participating in the operation it had few tanks. Its panzer regiment only had one battalion, the III./Pz.Rgt. 36.89 On 21 January, this battalion reported seven Pz IV and five StuG III operational.90 It also had a number of Pz III, but it has been impossible to establish how many.91

According to the divisional history it had seven Pz IV, four flamethower tanks and four StuG operational on 25 January, figures that are well in line with what we have found in the records.92

On 1 February the division had an authorized strength of 11,890 (including 707 HiWi) but it was short 2,948, thus it had an overall strength of less than 9,000. Its casualties during January included 354 killed in action, 692 wounded and 130 missing, while it received 240 replacements and 64 returning convalescents.93 The tank strength amounted to four Pz IV and four StuG III operational.94

The manpower shortage was reflected in the condition of its two panzer grenadier regiments. They had a ration strength of 1,097 and 1,042 respectively on 22 January and all their battalions were rated durschschnittlich. The ration strength of the reckon and engineer battalions was 557 and 504 respectively. The panzer regiment had a ration strength of 838. The entire division had a ration strength of 8,831.95

The artillery comprised 5 Wespe, 3 Hummel, 10 towed 10.5 cm howitzers and 6 towed 15 cm howitzers operational on 22 January. The division also could call upon three 8.8 cm Flak guns and it also had a Flak-Kampftrupp with an additional 8.8 cm gun. The division possessed 3 medium and 12 heavy AT guns.96

Tank Strength (Operational Vehicles) During the Operation:

27 January:97 3 Pz IV, 2 StuG III

1 February:98 4 Pz IV, 4 StuG III

4 February:99 5 Pz IV, 4 StuG III

13 February:100 4 Pz IV, 2 StuG III

1 March:101 6 Pz IV, 2 Flamm-Pz., 4 StuG, 6 command tanks (also 4 Pz IV, 1 Pz III, 2 Flamm-Pz, 3 StuG and 2 command tanks in workshops).

From Kampfgruppe von Brese, which was caught inside the pocket, 467 men managed to break out.102

16. Pz.Div.
Commander: Col. Back (Promoted to Gen.Maj. on 1 February)