There were also 632 men from 168th Division that broke out from the pocket. These belonged to the Div.Gr. 168, which was attached to 88th Division when the battle began, and the I./Art.Rgt. 248 which was subordinated to XXXXII. Korps at the beginning of the battle.189
This was one of the weakest divisions in the area, having a ration strength of only 6,028 on 22 January. The lack of manpower was especially apparent in its infantry regiments; the 239th had a ration strength of only 534 and the 240. Rgt. was even weaker at 457.190 As the division’s third infantry regiment the Divisions-Gruppe 39 served, which had a ration strength of 520.191 The situation was not much better for the rest of the division. The Füsilier battalion had a ration strength of 199 and the engineer battalion 295.192
The problems were reflected in the rating of the units. Out of its scattered infantry, it formed four battalions, but two of them were still rated abgekämpft and the remaining two schwach.193
It was better provided with artillery, since it had 27 10.5 cm howitzers and four 15 cm howitzers operational on 22 January.194 The picture was less bright for the anti tank weapons, since the division only had one 5 cm and five 7.5 cm AT guns, plus one captured Russian 4.5 cm AT gun.195
The division was subjected to Soviet attacks on 25 January, but the main effort fell further to the north.
According to the 1 February situation report the division remained weak. It had an authorized strength of 13,300, but reported a shortage of 5,243, which would thus mean the division had an actual strength of 8,057. However, this includes men on leave as weel as hospitalized, two categories that were far from insignifiacnt. During January the division had issued 1,250 tickets to soldiers scheduled for leave.196
The weakness of the division was caused by months of continous action. Casualties in January were 254 killed, 1,081 wounded and 193 missing. Also 8 officers and 353 men were evacuated due to desease. To counter this loss the division received 199 replacements during January. Also 733 convalescents returned to the division.197
As could be expected the infantry suffered from the worst shortage of manpower. The division had 2,699 infantry, including men on leave and soldiers wounded or sick, but remaining with the division.198 Other shortages affected the division. Various specialists were missing, for example radio operators. Also it only had twelve antitank guns combat ready. The situation was better in the artillery regiment, as the division had 37 howitzers ready for action on 1 February.199
For most of the battle the 106. ID. was employed on the east flank.
The division did follow the regular prescribed organization relatively well. It had three infantry regiments with two battalions each.200 Three of the battalions were rated as durchschnittlich and three were rated as schwach.201 The division had a Füsilier battalion rated as schwach and the engineer battalion was rated as durchschnittlich.202
The panzer jäger battalion only had one company, with towed AT guns, as the other two companies had not yet been formed.203
The artillery comprised two batteries with 15 cm howitzers and ten batteries with 10.5 cm howitzers. The division had four medium AT guns and ten heavy, all of them towed by motor vehicles.204
Its casualties in January amounted to 211 killed in action, 887 wounded and 211 missing.205 In the period 1–20 February it lost 105 killed in action, 509 wounded and 147 missing.206 These figures do not include non-combat losses.
When the battle began on 25 January, the 320th Division was outside the actual battle area, but after a few days it was shifted to relieve some of the panzer divisions in XXXXVII. Pz.Korps.
On 1 February the division had an authorized strength of 12791, including 2,154 HiWi, but it reported a shortage of 3,580. Almost the entire shortage was found in the three infantry regiments and the Füsilier battalion, all of them being at approximately 50% strength. Also the division lacked its antitank battalion.207
Casualties during January numbered 163 killed in action, 594 wounded and 272 missing. In addition 303 soldiers were evacuated due to disease. Replecements were wholly inadequate. Only 12 officers arrived at the division and not a single NCO or other ranks. However, 315 convalescents returned to the division, but still the casualties remained significantly higher.208
The artillery was often the backbone of the German infantry divisions, especially when casualties accumulated in the infantry regiments. However, the artillery regiment of the 320. Inf.Div. was not particularly strong, as it only had 24 howitzers.209
Further shortages plagued the division. The lack of vehicles was serious. None of the regimental commanders had a vehicle, which made it difficult for them to effectively command their units. Serious vehicle shortages were also affecting the division staff and all signals units.210
The 376. Inf.Div. had been destroyed at Stalingrad one year earlier. It was reformed and sent to the Eastern Front in the autumn of 1943, where it found itself engaged in continous combat. After having been seriously depleted, the 376th Division received considerable replacements in January 1944, when it received 63 officers plus 3,460 other ranks, in addition to 115 returning convalescents.211 This meant that on 1 February the division was still short of 2,728 officers and other ranks, compared to the authorized strength of 12,295, which included 2,154 HiWi.212 Furthermore, a significant part of the replacements were actually soldiers from the 167. Inf.Div., which was in the process of being disbanded. With many soldiers from another division to mix into the existing formations, the 376th Division would actually have needed some time behind the front, a situation exacerbated by the fact that the division had been continously in action for almost four months. However the pressure of events denied it its much needed rest.213
The process to absorb the elements of 167. Inf.Div. proceeded for weeks. Not until 22 February was it reported that the process was completed.214
The 389. Inf.Div. was also among the divisions destroyed at Stalingrad. It was rebuilt in the summer 1943 and subsequently sent to the Eastern Front. It had three infantry regiments (544, 545 and 546), all of which originally had three battalions (numbered I., II. and III. in each regiment). However, both the II./544 and III./546 were sent to other formations before the division went into action. Also, the II./545 was made into the divisional Füsilier battalion. Hence, in the end the division had three two-battalion regiments. The original numbering of the battalions and companies was retained though. The 544. Inf.Rgt. consisted of I. Btl. with companies 1–4 and the III. Btl. with companies 9–12, with the 545. Rgt. being similarly numbered. The division also had an artillery regiment, a Panzerjäger battalion and an engineer battalion.215