While German casualties were not as staggering as Soviet losses, they were severe enough. Up to 31 December 1943, more than a million men were recorded as killed in action or missing.89 But to this figure must be added the 25,000–30,000 men who died of disease or accidents.90 Also, almost two and a half million were recorded as wounded in action and were evacuated.91 No more than about half of the wounded could be expected to return to front line duty on the Eastern Front. Furthermore, an estimated 80,000 of the wounded men died in hospitals from complications with their injuries or other illnes. Another 100,000 had to be discharged due to injuries from accidents or disease.92 Thus, German forces in the East must have permanently lost, at minimum, around two and a half million men from service. Considering that this was almost exactly the size of the original force that launched the invasion on 22 June 1944, it was a serious drain.
As always, casualties were most serious in the infantry. The old saying “the artillery is for the killing, the infantry is for the dying” certainly had some merit. According to Soviet figures, infantry represented 86% of the casualties in 1943–45.93 Similar percentages are given by German sources. The turnover, to use a euphemism for bloodshed, was many times higher in the infantry than among average soldiers. As a result, many divisions mustered far fewer riflemen than their overall strength returns suggest. Furthermore, the greater strains on men in foxholes caused them to suffer more from various diseases. The German strength returns usually show the number of soldiers within the units, including those who were sick but not evacuated. Consequently, a division could be weaker than it seemed from the strength returns.
Most divisions that took part in the Korsun battle adhered to the prescribed tables of organization and equipment, as most had been engaged in prolonged action and were consequently depleted. One example of this is Korps-Abteilung B, which held the northern part of the German Korsun salient. A Korps-Abteilung was a kind of fusion between three depleted divisions.94 In the case of Korps-Abteilung B, the staff of 112th Infantry Division was used to form the Korps-Abteilung. To this was added elements from the 112th, 255th, and 332nd Infantry Divisions.95 The formation of a Korps-Abteilung reflected the fact that the infantry suffered most of the casualties. When the Korps-Abteilung was formed, surplus rear services and artillery personnel and other specialists were freed and put at the disposal of OKH. The new Korps-Abteilung had a more balanced composition of manpower than that possessed by any of the three depleted divisions from which it had been formed.
Manpower was not the only shortage that troubled the armies. The Soviet Union was not a country abundant in food and other items, even before the war. In Germany the situation was much better pre-1939, but as the war progressed more and more shortages became apparent. Lack of transport could cause local food shortages, even if there was an overall surplus. Finally, almost any large organization will encounter problems in distributing items precisely where they are needed, especially a military organization engaged in a war with powerful enemies, where the situation changes rapidly and drastically in a short time.
Shortages also affected important weapon systems, like the Panther tank. The 11th Panzer Division reported that about one third of its Panthers remained in workshops for a prolonged period due to lack of spare parts. The spare part situation was somewhat better for the PzKw IV tanks and the StuG III assault guns, but they suffered from shortages of high explosive ammunition instead, which hardly was much better.96
Deliveries of new tanks to replace losses could vary considerably. In early February 1944, the 13th Panzer Division complained that it had not received a single new tank during the last three months. It had so many tank crews without a vehicle that it could immediately accept 30 new PzKw IVs and put them into action at once, should it receive them. Also, lack of spare parts caused many of its tanks on hand to remain at workshops.97
Probably the most serious German shortage, except manpower, was in motor vehicles. In particular, towing vehicles were often reported to be in very short supply, causing numerous problems both when units were to regroup and when damaged vehicles were to be salvaged. Even the German Panzer divisions, expected to be the pinnacle of mobile warfare, suffered from serious problems due to lack of motor vehicles. The result was not only a loss of mobility, but of flexibility too. As long as all parts of a Panzer division were fully motorized and provided with sufficient fuel, they could simply be ordered to move and attack or defend wherever needed or desired. When insufficient vehicles were available, vehicles had to be moved forward to the units in greatest need of them and time had to be spent on establishing where vehicles were to be found.98
The Red Army experienced similar troubles. Indeed, had it not been for the substantial influx of U.S. lend-lease vehicles, the Soviet forces would have experienced considerably greater difficulties than the Germans. However, at this stage of the war the Red Army, thanks to its superior resources, enjoyed the benefit of the initiative. Thus the Red Army commanders had more choice with regard to the place and time of their actions than did the German army.
The daily life of the soldiers was also affected by shortages. The 3rd Panzer Division experienced a grave shortage of soap and especially shaving soap. It had received no new deliveries of soap since October 1943, which of course caused hygiene to suffer so that the men were increasingly more troubled by lice. To this was added the difficult climate, alternating between frost, mud, and rain, which made hygiene more important than ever. At the same time, the division was engaged in uninterrupted fighting. Gradually the soldiers became more and more exhausted. Mail only reached the soldiers irregularly, which appears to have made the hardships more difficult to bear. The 14th Panzer Division reported that mail from the soldiers’ families had not arrived for a long time, which had a negative effect on the men, especially as they were very worried about how their families fared in a Germany that was subject to increasingly severe bombing from Allied air power.99
The men who lived in the foxholes had by far the worst situation, and as the struggle on the Eastern Front had already continued for more than 30 months, one can legitimately ask what kept them fighting. Obviously, individual reasons varied, and what motivated one soldier to overcome the horrors and hardships of war may not have affected another, whose situation could have been quite different. Those who served in the rear services seldom had to face enemy fire, and suffered far fewer casualties than the infantry. They had better opportunities to wash, rest, get mail, find shelter from the elements, and to cook warm meals. On the other hand, the fact that these men were less likely to become casualties meant that they tended to serve for longer periods. Extended service brought along its own negative effects.
It has been suggested that soldiers are motivated to fight, and to continue fighting, by such factors as primary group cohesion, sense of duty, leadership, discipline, ideology, propaganda, and heroism. To assess the appropriate importance of each of these factors has been much more difficult. For example, before and during the war, ideology and propaganda were considered to play a prominent role in motivation and combat performance. Soon after the war, this theory fell out of favor, but about 25 years ago researchers again began to advance the idea that the effects of ideology and propaganda were a central part of the motivation of the German soldiers on the Eastern Front. This theory plays down the role of the primary group, which has often been regarded as the most plausible explanation for combat motivation.100