The argument against the importance of primary groups centered around the perception that the fighting on the Eastern Front was much more dangerous than on other fronts, which has been claimed to make the cohesion of primary groups an insufficient explanation. Rather, it is concluded that ideology and propaganda were chiefly responsible for the German tenacity in this area. However, in reality, casualties per division and month were actually lower in the East than, for example, in Normandy in 1944, and this holds true for German as well as British and U.S. divisions. Even the Soviet divisions did not, on average, suffer a loss rate that was higher than experienced in Normandy.101 Of course, the overall number of casualties in the East was much higher than on other fronts, but this was the result of far more divisions being engaged over a much longer period of time.
If casualty rates have a strong negative impact on the morale of soldiers, which clearly seems plausible, it must be the number of losses suffered by individual units in a given time span that is of interest, not the overall casualties in an entire theater. In this respect the war in the East was not extreme. It is not only the fighting in Normandy that was more costly (per division and month); for example, the operations during the war between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1939–40, 1941, and 1944 showed higher casualty rates than the operations on the Eastern Front from July to December 1943, which was one of the bloodiest of all periods on that front. Furthermore, during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, casualty rates were comparable to those on World War II’s Eastern Front. There is nothing to suggest that the war on the Eastern Front was unique in its casualty rates, unit for unit.
It is inarguable that the soldiers on the Eastern Front endured severe hardships and extreme horrors, but there is no reason to assume that the soldiers’ reasons to overcome these sufferings was any different from those factors identified in other theaters of war. There have been studies on Finnish, Israeli, and American soldiers in war, as well as German soldiers fighting in Western Europe, 1944–45.102 These suggest that social factors within the combat units were chiefly responsible for cohesion and motivation, although the role of other factors, such as those discussed above, cannot be discounted completely. Nevertheless, the bonds between the men in the squads and platoons seem to have contributed the most to the men’s resilience in battle, and endurance in the face of hardship.
In most military organizations, good leadership is regarded as important in keeping the men focused. However, the effect of leadership on morale is difficult to assess. A series of questionnaires distributed to American soldiers and officers who served in World War II showed that the officers attributed much more importance to good leadership than did the soldiers.103 Partly this may have reflected the different roles, but there is another possible explanation. It may well be that the soldiers did not consciously bother much about leadership as long as it was reasonably good. When it was poor it might on the other hand have been much more obvious to them. The experience of Anton Meiser seems to be in line with this assumption. He did generally find that most officers he served under were brave, self-sacrificing, and competent, but the few exceptions seem to dominate his recollection of the Korsun battle.104
The word “hero” seems to have been used widely during the war. In many German documents it is said that a person “fand den Heldentot” (“found the hero’s death”). Similarly, Soviet accounts speak liberally about heroism among soldiers. However, it seems that the soldiers themselves did not spend much time thinking about heroism. Instead, they simply tried to survive, and what time they could spare was devoted to thoughts of relatives, loved ones, friends, and other persons who mattered to them. Of course there were exceptions, like Olaf Ehlers, who served in the artillery regiment of the 13th Panzer Division. In his diary, which reveals theological tendencies, he mused over various topics, including heroism, which he wrote about on 27 January, when his division enjoyed a lull in the fighting:105
Heroism as means and self-esteem
All I read makes me wonder about human life and existential issues. Time and again I recall the experience shared by professor Schöttle at Odessa and his stern questions that follow me.
Today I cannot refrain from thinking on the notion of heroism. What does the “idea of heroism” actually mean? Is heroism a necessary means when politicians strive to fulfil their inevitable missions; is it thus a means justified by the aim? Can it serve as an example for the educator to advance the power men would not discover unless there is a model? Is it not the educator’s task to release all power within a people to enable them to succeed in the struggle with other peoples?
But when the ideal becomes a means to an end, then its value can not be found in itself alone and it would be a contradiction to the concept of the idealistic as a value in itself. Does the aim justify persuasion? Where can the demarcation between encouragement and persusasion be found, except in the judgement of the aim?
Is heroism nothing but a life feeling? Wouldn’t it be a terrible delusion, uncharitable destruction, a callous glorification of devastation, to fall forever into meaninglessness?
No, we need theology, which deprives humankind of their ideas their autonomy and brings them back to their character as tools in the service of the Lord in the history of mankind. In him we can find the demarcations.
Hence, heroism must be allied to humbleness when acting, with the pride in oneself in the service of God and with the distance the heroic personality has to maintain to itself. If not, heroism would just be an instinctive and uncritical denial of the claims of justification of others, it would be a naïve contradiction to the self-sacrificing of others.
This is perhaps an example of thinking that was not typical, but can be seen as one example of a wide range of thoughts about how soldiers behaved on the battlefield and why.
The war in the East was particularly rife with atrocities, and this factor is also likely to have affected an unknown number of soldiers. Of course, some soldiers were fortunate enough not to be witness to atrocities; others saw but did not participate; still others took an active part. The reactions of those who saw, or who chose or were forced to participate in atrocities, varied from disgust, to an acceptance of the inevitability of such actions, even to a willingness and desire to commit them. In many cases the atrocities were ordered and planned by the top leadership, or happened as the result of policy decisions, in which cases it became a matter of duty. In other cases they were caused by more “spontaneous” action. In January 1944, Anton Meiser became witness to an event whose cause was unknown to him, as he came riding toward a village. He saw how soldiers in German uniforms assembled all men over the age of 14. Other soldiers collected the livestock. When the men and cattle had been brought outside the village, the women and children remained near their houses and begged for mercy. It was to little avail, as torches set the straw roofs ablaze.106