The village burned down, while the women saw their men being herded away and threatened with rifle butts. The women and the children were left in the bitter cold, with almost no possessions remaining as their houses burnt down. Some of them attempted to save objects from the burning houses, despite the danger of serious injury.107
Such scenes were common.
As the ordinary soldier on the Eastern Front was enlisted, and thus expected to do his duty to his country, he did not receive any extravagant pay. Basic pay in the German army was the equivalent of about one-eighth of what an industrial worker earned, but frontline service resulted in an extra payment per day, bring the earning up to a level of about one-third of an industrial worker’s. Officers were considerably better off: a captain earned about ten times as much as an enlisted soldier in frontline service, and a general about 20–30 times a much. To some extent the low pay for a soldier was alleviated by the fact that he did not have to pay for food, lodging, clothes, etc, which he would probably have done at home.
Not that there was much else for a soldier to spend money on at the front. The canteen usually offered some merchandise, and there was always the black market, but for frontline soldiers who required a pass to get to the rear areas, access to the black market was difficult. It seems more likely that the rear services, or soldiers from units not engaged in combat, could spend their money on the products offered by the black market.
For many soldiers there was an alternative to spending the money locally, and instead they sent their money home, knowing that it would be of better use there than near the frontline. It was sometimes mentioned in letters that money had been, or soon would be, sent home to the families. At a time when the margins of life were slight, even the small amounts a soldier could send home were valuable.
The big difference in pay between an officer and a private may be interpreted as an indication of inequalities, and to a certain extent it is probably true. On the other hand, it is clear that to be an officer was a profession in peacetime too, and it would not have seemed reasonable to lower wages in war.. Furthermore, in the German army it seems that the casualty rates among officers were higher than among enlisted men, so the higher rate of pay served to recompense them for the increased danger. It is uncertain whether the officers in the Red Army suffered an equally high rate of casualties.
The balance of strength between the two armies opposing each other on the Eastern Front had changed considerably since the Germans invaded in June 1941. At first there had been approximate parity, but the Red Army enjoyed a massive influx of reinforcements during 1941, which the Germans did not even come close to matching. However, during the summer and early fall the Germans inflicted such immense losses on the Soviet forces that approximate numerical parity remained, despite massive Soviet reinforcements. With the advent of the fall mud and the ensuing winter, the Soviet loss rates shrank considerably and the influx of reinforcements gradually gave the Red Army an increasing numerical superiority.108
When the Germans launched Operation Citadel on 5 July 1943, their army in the East still was about as strong as it had been in June 1941; but from then on it almost invariably shrank, as casualty numbers were greater than reinforcements and replacements. At the beginning of 1944 the German Ostheer had shrunk to 2,528,000 men. The Red Army too found it difficult to maintain its strength, but thanks to its much greater replacements it still maintained a manpower strength of 6.1 million men. Thus the Soviet forces enjoyed a numerical superiority of 2.4:1.109 The Soviet superiority in armor was even greater. Overall, the Red Army had a 3:1 superiority, but as many German tanks were in workshops, the Soviet advantage was at least 4:1 if only operational vehicles are counted.110
One possible explanation for the lower serviceability of the German tanks may be the shortages of spare parts already described. Another factor to consider is that the turnover of tanks was more rapid in the Soviet armored forces, resulting in fewer vehicles with high mileage. Also, it seems that the percentage of irrevocably destroyed vehicles was higher among the Soviet tanks put out of action, compared to the German tanks hit by Soviet fire.
With the comfort of their overall numerical superiority, the Red Army commanders could also assemble a numerically superior force in the Korsun area. The initial forces committed comprised 451 tanks and 62 assault guns operational. This was almost four times the number of available German tanks and assault guns. To compare artillery is more difficult, as the two armies did not count the pieces in the same way. Furthermore, heavy mortars were much more prevalent in the Soviet army than in the German. It can, however, be concluded that the Soviet forces assembled for the Korsun operation comprised 2,677 guns and 2,222 mortars. The former figure includes antitank guns and can be compared to the German force with slightly less than 500 pieces of artillery and 178 antitank guns. It would thus give the two Soviet fronts a numerical superiority of about 4:1 in the Korsun area, if guns and howitzers are compared. The Germans also had a number of infantry howitzers, 75mm and 150mm short-range weapons that naturally belonged to the infantry regiments. It is somewhat difficult to establish the true number of mortars and infantry howitzers in the German units, as these weapons were not included in all reports. However, the three Panzer divisions in XXXXVII Panzer Corps had, on average, 12 mortars and 13 infantry howitzers on 22 January. Simultaneously, three infantry division of the corps had, on average, 15 mortars and 12 infantry howitzers. If these strengths are representative for the German forces in the Korsun area as a whole, it can be concluded that the Germans had about 400 mortars and infantry howitzers. Thus the two Soviet fronts probably had a 5:1 advantage in this category of weapons.111
Overall, then, the Red Army had a numerical advantage of about 4:1 in the major heavy weapons categories. It is more difficult to assess the Soviet superiority in manpower. There are many reasons for this. First of all, the German records that have survived give detailed manpower strength for some divisions, while many other divisions lack figures of any kind. It is hardly possible to establish the overall German strength. In Soviet sources there are strength figures to be found for the overall forces committed at the beginning of the operation. However, they differ considerably. For example, one source gives a strength of 254,965 men,112 while another give a much higher figure of 336,700 men.113 Probably these differences are caused by using different strength categories—for example whether non-combat troops are included or not—and whether or not all supporting echelons are included.
The latter factor is particularly important when comparing Soviet and German forces. The German divisions were, on paper, larger than their Soviet counterparts, but on the other hand, the Soviets had considerably more support from army and front resources. It is important to ensure that comparisons are made in such a manner that all the relevant factors are taken into account.
The number of divisions probably gives a fairly accurate picture of the relative troop strengths.114 For the Korsun operation the force ratio was about 40 Soviet divisions against 15 German, giving a force ratio of 2.7:1. This at least hints at the Soviet manpower superiority.115