With such superior forces at its disposal in the area of the planned operation, it is no surprise that the two Soviet fronts could assemble overwhelming forces at the intended breakthrough areas. Even the Soviet General Staff Study admitted a numerical superiority of about 7:1 in infantry and 13:1 in tanks where the 2nd Ukrainian Front intended to make its attack. The fact that the Soviets generally had more men and materiél at their disposal allowed them to concentrate forces where they were needed.116
CHAPTER 5
Konev Attacks
Early on 25 January, Soviet artillery intensified its fire against the German 389th Division. No less than seven infantry divisions,117 with strong armor support, were ready to attack the sector defended by the German 389th Division, which only had 1,500 infantry to cover a front of 21 kilometers.118 Further forces were immediately made available as reserves, including two rifle divisions and most of Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army.
No less than 270 Soviet tanks were committed against the German 389th Infantry Division and its nearest neighbor to the south, the 3rd Panzer Division.119
Soon the infantry from 53rd Army and 4th Guards Army attacked, supported by tanks from 5th Guards Tank Army. The 389th Division was already weak. It had too little infantry to man a continuous front line, so instead it held a series of resistance points. The Soviet forces soon created holes in the German defenses. In particular, the situation in the Ositniazhka area quickly became serious, prompting the German XI Corps to try to comb out reinforcements from other units. The small armored battle group from SS-Wiking was directed towards Ositniazhka, as was the 676th Regiment from 57th Infantry Division, which was already on the march.
It soon became clear that these forces were insufficient and the decision was made to pull out the entire 57th Division and send it south.120
The Soviet attacks on the northern flank of XXXXVII Panzer Corps made less progress. Four infantry divisions—14th Guards, the 138th, 213th, and 233rd—were hurled, with armor support, against the German 3rd Panzer and 106th Infantry Divisions. The latter division, which was not subjected to particularly strong attacks, managed to hold its positions, but the fighting was harder for its northern neighbor, the 3rd Panzer Division. The strongest Soviet attacks were launched from the village of Burtki. South of the village the reconnaissance battalion of the 3rd Panzer Division tried to make a stand, but was soon pushed back. At 10.00hrs it was ordered to defend positions along the heights northeast of Reyementarovka, while the division’s tanks moved forward to counterattack.121
The counterattack stabilized the situation temporarily, but in the afternoon the Soviet 53rd Army, commanded by Galanin, made a determined effort near Reyementarovka. After strong artillery preparation, the Soviet infantry rushed forwards. The German defenses were breached, forcing XXXXVII Panzer Corps to order the evacuation of the defenses northeast of Reyementarovka. The Soviet attack penetrated the woods southeast of Reyementarovka and severed the junction between the 3rd Panzer Division and its southern neighbor. Not until 20.00hrs did the Germans get the situation under control, when the penetration was contained and the connection between the two divisions restored.122
14th Panzer Division Counterattacks
Thus, the 3rd Panzer Division and 106th Infantry Division managed, barely, to maintain a defensive line, but north of XXXXVII Panzer Corps, events were developing quite differently. Soviet pressure on the southern flank of 389th Division was very strong. The German division almost fell apart, severing the connection between XI Corps and XXXXVII Panzer Corps; but reinforcements were on their way. The 14th Panzer Division had been marching during the night to be available for a counterattack and shortly after 09.00hrs the division’s commander was notified that his unit would probably attack by noon. General Wöhler, the commander of 8th Army, wanted the 14th Panzer Division to conduct reconnaissance in the area where Soviet forces were breaking through. Martin Unrein, commander of 14th Panzer Division, replied that he had already ordered this and the reconnaissance was proceeding.123
Due to unexpectedly stubborn German resistance, the Red Army had not been as successful before noon as expected. However, the main force of 5th Tank Army was committed during the afternoon and it soon became apparent that the German 389th Infantry Division was already overtaxed.124
At 13.00hrs the 14th Panzer Division set out to counterattack the Soviet forces that had opened a gap between XI Corps and XXXXVII Panzer Corps. The division was divided into two groups, one operating in the Kapitanovka area and the other in the Rossochovatka area. The former was Kampfgruppe von Brese, consisting of a Panzer grenadier regiment, an armored reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion, and a small flak unit.125 The other part was the armored battle group, but it was quite weak. The 14th Panzer Division only had seven PzKw IVs, four StuG IIIs, and four flamethrower tanks in running order. Together with the mechanized infantry battalion and the self-propelled artillery battalion, these were placed under the command of Colonel Langkeit.126
Langkeit’s battle group rolled out from eastern Slatopol, along the road towards Kamenovatka, intending to turn north after a few kilometers. The fog was very dense and it was difficult to find the enemy. Neither side could use air support. Before 16.00hrs the Germans heard fire from the area north of Rossochovatka and they promptly turned north. Suddenly a column of trucks appeared in front of the German tanks, which immediately opened fire and destroyed two of the trucks before the rest disappeared, without having fired.127
Visibility deteriorated even further, making engagements very unpredictable. It was difficult to hear anything, due to the noise from the tank engines, and without any warning, Soviet and German tanks stumbled into each other. At a distance of only 50 meters Feldwebel Ziegler fired a shot from his tank, which hit a T-34 and set it on fire. Otherwise the engagement was inconclusive and each side seemed to be content with settling down for the evening. The tanks of the 14th Panzer Division assembled in Rossochovatka and waited for supplies, which arrived at 20.30hrs.128
Perhaps the tankers hoped to enjoy a calm night at Rossochovatka, but they were disappointed. At 21.30hrs a Soviet battalion-sized attack captured the northern part of the village. The German reaction followed soon. An hour later the German tanks, together with the attached Panzer grenadiers from I./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 103, recaptured the northern part of Rossochovatka.129
Kampfgruppe von Brese initially had somewhat more success. It reached the hills west of Ositniazhka. However, this was a dangerous position as it placed von Brese directly in the path of the Soviet advance, without having secure contact with friendly forces on either flank.130
While the 14th Panzer Division made an effort that was not particularly spectacular, Soviet progress continued along the Burtki–Kapitanovka axis. General Rotmistrov had chosen to advance with two tank corps abreast, the 20th to the north and the 29th to the south, while initially keeping the 18th Tank Corps behind the other two. General Lazarev, who commanded 20th Tank Corps, directed one tank brigade to envelop Ositniazhka. Just before 12.00hrs, the Soviet forces reached hill 222.0, four kilometers southeast of Ositniazhka.131