The Germans tried to scramble reinforcements to the area, but only modest forces were available. At the same time as the Red Army occupied hill 222.0, one German infantry battalion reached Ositniazhka. The Panzer group of SS-Wiking was also directed towards Ositniazhka, but it was unclear if it would arrive in time to stave off the crisis, or even if it was strong enough to do so since it possessed less than 30 tanks.132
In the meantime the Soviet forces pushed on. The 20th Tank Corps advanced through Pisarivka to Kapitanovka. Simultaneously the 29th Tank Corps made progress further to the south, where it managed to reach Tishkovka. Of all Soviet units, these two corps made the greatest advance during 25 January, but the penetration was by no means deep. During the day, the two tank corps had advanced 10 kilometers.133 In itself, this would probably have been manageable for the opposing German forces, but the Soviet pressure on 3rd Panzer Division prevented it from interfering with the spearheads of 5th Guards Tank Army. However, compared to its northern neighbor, the 3rd Panzer Division was not in a particularly difficult situation. The 389th Infantry Division had borne the brunt of the Soviet offensive, and was almost falling apart under pressure from 4th Guards Army. Indeed, the 389th had been in a perilous situation already on 24 January, when the Red Army conducted its probing attacks, but as soon as the main offensive opened up, the situation became insurmountable.
The greatest danger lay in the southern sector of the 389th Division, where the Füsilier battalion initially defended, but was soon overwhelmed. By the evening of 25 January the division had lost control over the fighting on its southern sector. In the center it had been pushed back to Olyanino and Radvanovka, but was still able to maintain a continuous frontline between the northern outskirts of Ositniazhka and Yekaterinovka. North of Yekaterinovka, the 4th Guards Army had created a breach and separated one infantry battalion from the main body of the 389th Division. It was decided temporarily to subordinate the battalion to the 72nd Infantry Division. Exploiting the breach, the 4th Guards Army spearheads captured Telepino and reached the eastern outskirts of Yekaterinovka, causing the 72nd Infantry Division’s south flank to be separated from other German units.134
Although the attacks by 4th Guards Army caused great difficulties for the German 389th and 72nd Divisions, Konev had expected its great preponderance of force to produce more significant results. On the evening of 26 January he issued an order in which he emphasized that the units of 4th Guards Army had operated particularly poorly on 24 and 25 January. Instead of conducting a daring and decisive maneuver they were held down in front of weakly defended villages. They had not used indirect fire from artillery and mortars against the enemy strongpoints.135
In an order issued the same day by the 4th Guards Army to its subordinate units, Konev’s complaints were repeated in detail, as were the measures necessary to improve matters. Most important were command and control, the use of artillery, night operations, and outflanking maneuvers. The strong artillery support—with up to 121 tubes per kilometer of front in the attack sector—had not been used sufficiently and it had been poorly organized. The artillery was not close enough to the infantry, and lack of good communications hampered the coordination of the two arms. On many occasions the artillery was committed with poor timing, especially during the decisive moments, such as in support of attacks or during enemy counterattacks with tanks and infantry. Division commanders had not used their antitank assets with sufficient resolve when fending off enemy tank attacks. Rather they wasted ammunition.
Furthermore, command and control was poorly organized, particularly the communications between divisional staffs and the regiments. For example, the 7th Guards Airborne Division had no signals communication with its regiments during the night before 25 January and during 25 January itself. Due to communication breakdowns the commanders of 31st and 69th Guards Rifle Divisions could not command their troops and influence the events. Neither main nor secondary communications were used. Despite personal instruction by the army commander, orderlies remained unused. Finally, staff and observation posts, especially those of the 7th Guards Airborne Division and 20th Guards Corps, remained too far back from the combat units. Some commanders had not been present with their combat units during the fighting, instead remaining in shelters or villages.136
When summing up the events that had taken place on 25 January, both sides had reason to be disappointed with the results achieved. While the 2nd Ukrainian Front had made notable progress, it still could not claim to have made a clear breakthrough, despite committing the 5th Guards Tank Army, its main mobile force. Obviously the German 389th Division had been hard hit and was fighting desperately to hold a front. However, the penetration achieved by Rotmistrov’s tanks was relatively narrow and shallow. If the Germans had mobile reserves in the vicinity they might close the gap at Kapitanovka and Tishkovka. The second day of the offensive could prove to be decisive.
If Konev was worried, he nevertheless had a far lighter burden on his shoulders than Wöhler. Due to Soviet pressure, the 3rd Panzer Division had been fully engaged and unable to send any units north. The 14th Panzer Division had duly moved forward, but its depleted strength prevented it from halting the Soviet attack. As was to be expected from the grave situation, the XI Corps had committed all its reserves, but more were needed. Risks had to be accepted. There had been relatively little Soviet activity in the sectors held by the German 72nd and 57th Infantry Divisions. Also, the SS-Wiking Division had hardly been troubled by the enemy. It was possible that some of these units could be disengaged and sent south. Already at 08.45hrs, Wöhler had decided that the entire 57th Infantry Division, which had previously sent its 676th Infantry Regiment to support the 389th Division, should be pulled out of the front line and sent south. Fifteen minutes later orders were sent to effect this decision.137
It was a difficult decision, since the divisions of the XI Corps were already thinly stretched, but considering the gravity of the situation on the corps’ right flank, it was probably unavoidable to shift forces south. The SS-Wiking was ordered to take over the sector held by the 57th Infantry Division, but it would take some time before it was in a position to relieve the 57th. At best it could be available on 27 January.138
In the present situation this was all that could be done by the XI Corps, unless its positions along the Dnepr River were abandoned, an option that had already been ruled out. The 8th Army had one card yet to play, however: the 11th Panzer Division was ready to go into action early on 26 January, and further reinforcements were on the way.139
While Wöhler struggled to get more forces to the endangered sector, Konev had committed most of his resources. He could do little more than exhort his men to accomplish the desired breakthrough on 26 January.
The weather had been an important factor during the day, with temperatures hovering around 0° C, but the condition of the roads was still good. Dense fog covered much of the battlefield and made air support largely ineffective, despite attempts by both sides to put planes in the air. The fog also made it difficult to command the combat units. Forecasts indicated that more troublesome ground conditions could be expected in the future. Indeed, on the morning of 26 January a thaw began, with rain clouds above the battlefield. For the moment the roads were icy in places, but there were stretches that quickly became weakened by the thaw.140