The fighting continued on the night of 25 January, although at a somewhat lower intensity. The German 3rd Panzer Division had to create a new main defense line to be able to resist the renewed Soviet attacks that were expected. The German soldiers worked in the darkness and managed to create a coherent defense line on the sector held by Colonel Lang’s division. The situation was less clear to the north of 3rd Panzer, where Soviet units probed westwards, but made no substantial gains. The 4th Guards Army kept pressure on the north flank of the German 389th Infantry Division, causing the connection between the 389th and the 72nd Division to be fragile. In the evening, the German 72nd Infantry Division had been forced to withdraw its southern flank, to establish contact with 389th Division, a process that continued on the morning of 26 January.141
Rotmistrov’s aim for 26 January was clear: to achieve a complete penetration of the German defenses to enable his units to advance towards Zvenigorodka. He ordered his corps to continue to the west. It was obvious that delays would enable the Germans to position reinforcements in the path of his units. Time was of paramount importance, and yesterday’s gains were not particularly impressive. The offensive must continue.142
It was perhaps not fully clear to the Soviet commanders, but the German defenses in front of 5th Guards Tank Army were indeed thin.143 When the 20th Tank Corps attacked in the morning, with its 8th Guards Tank Brigade in the lead, it made good progress. The Brigade, commanded by Colonel Orlov and supported by two SU regiments, evicted the Germans from Kapitanovka and pushed on towards Zhuravka. Thus there were no longer any notable German forces between Rotmistrov’s spearheads and Zvenigorodka.144
At 08.25hrs Colonel Gaedke and Major-General Speidel, the chiefs of staff of XI Corps and 8th Army, respectively, discussed the situation over a telephone line. The 14th Panzer Division had obviously not been able to close the gap at XI Corps’ southern flank, and Gaedke told Speidel that numerous Soviet tanks had assembled on the hills north of Rossochovatka, and that further enemy reinforcements were arriving. Fighting was going on near the bridge at Tishkovka. Gaedke continued by emphasizing that a breakthrough towards Kapitanovka was occurring. The situation on the north flank of the 389th Division was also serious. Gaedke concluded his description of the situation by relating that the armored battle group of SS-Wiking had been sent to the Telepino–Yekaterinovka area, to help stabilize the situation there.145
Speidel did not doubt the gravity of the situation and asked: “What reserves do you have available; when can 57th Division go into action?”
“The 57th Division will not be relieved until tonight,” Gaedke replied. “For the moment we have no reserves.”
“Are there any rear positions designated or prepared?”
“Yes, there is a line from Rotmistrovka over Stepok, the hill 1.5 kilometers east-south-east of Tashlyk, the railroad station at Serdykovka and the farms just north of Pastorskoye. It will have to connect to the Irdyn line via Beresnik and Sapadnaja. However, only the northern section, between Rotmistrovka and the Serdyukovka railroad station, is prepared.”
“I will have to talk with the army commander to prepare him for future decisions,” Speidel replied.
Gaedke continued to describe the situation in dark colors: “Concerning the situation west of Ositniazhka, it is doubtful if the corps can ward off the enemy unless reinforcements arrive. Also, it appears doubtful whether the 57th Division will be available in time.”
“The army is not able to help in the northern sector of 389th Division,” Speidel replied.
“If so, we must certainly consider the rear position I described.”
“You are probably right. I can add that the army commander wants the 11th Panzer Division to attack near Kapitanovka.”
Gaedke and Speidel spoke over the telephone again, an hour and a half later. Gaedke suggested that 72nd Division should be withdrawn to the “Hamster” position in one leap during the night. This would enable the 57th Division to pull out without first being relieved by the SS-Wiking. However, Gaedke argued that this could not be done without the consent of the army group.146
According to earlier German military tradition, such a procedure would not be necessary. Rather the local commander would have made the decision. However, since the winter of 1941–42, Hitler had usually enforced a “no retreat” policy, which obliged field commanders to ask for permission from OKH before retreating. The necessity of asking permission from higher command brought with it many disadvantages, not least of which was loss of time.
While Gaedke and Speidel discussed their options, the battle continued. At about 09.00hrs the 11th Panzer Division received orders to attack over Pisarivka. However, the division was not yet in position and required a few more hours before it could go into action. In the meantime, the Red Army continued its advance. While the 11th Panzer Division received its orders, Soviet tanks reached a point 1.5 kilometers north of Slatopol. This was serious, as there were few bridges over the Bolshaya Vyss River. The most important were at Novo Mirgorod and at 09.45hrs the 14th Panzer Division reported that 10 T-34s were approaching the town. If the Germans were going to close the gap between the XXXXVII Panzer Corps and XI Corps, it was necessary to keep a solid position on the northern bank of the Bolshaya Vyss River. All reinforcements would have to arrive from the south, and if they then had to face an opposed river crossing, their difficulties would be considerably greater. To counter this threat the 8th Assault Gun Battalion was ordered to throw back the advancing Soviet tanks.147
Slatopol and Novo Mirgorod were not located on the main axis of the 5th Guards Tank Army attack. The 155th Tank Brigade passed between Tishkovka and Kapitanovka and continued towards Zhuravka. At noon it reached the outskirts of Zhuravka.148 Thus the Soviet forces had advanced about 14 kilometers during the last 48 hours.149
At this moment Major-General Wenck, Chief of Staff of 1st Panzer Army, called Speidel and told him that the 1st Ukrainian Front had attacked the inner flanks of VII and XXXXII Corps. The Red Army had committed strong infantry and tank forces. Speidel immediately replied that this attack was connected to the attack on the south flank of XI Corps, which appeared to be heading in the general direction of Shpola. The aim seemed to be to effect a junction between the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts.150
This was news that added to Speidel’s troubles, since half an hour earlier Colonel Gaedke had again called and reported that Kapitanovka was occupied by the enemy, and no reports were received from the 389th Division. Furthermore, Gaedke had told Speidel that there was no information about the situation in the Slatopol–Zhuravka area. But worse was to come.151
As Gaedke had asked him earlier, Speidel asked Army Group South about the proposed withdrawal of the 72nd Division. Since the question of withdrawals had been discussed before the Soviet offensive begun, and been turned down, probably by Hitler, it was understandable that Gaedke and Speidel brought the issue to Army Group South. However, later they would probably regret that they did not silently act on their own, because just before noon Theodor Busse, the Chief of Staff of Army Group South, replied that permission to withdraw 72nd Division was not granted; rather it would be better to see the results of the 11th Panzer Division’s attack.152