Busse had not made the decision himself, but he knew that the issue was sensitive and he simply did not want anything to happen while he consulted OKH. Within a few hours he got a negative reply: the 72nd Division could not retreat. At 15.50hrs he told Speidel about the decision. Wöhler seems to have expected that the decision would be negative, because at noon he had instructed that 72nd Division should pull out elements from its forward positions and put these in the “Hamster” position, before he received orders to keep 72nd Division in the line.153
Konev and his subordinate commanders did not have similar problems. Rather than delaying the movements of their units they were anxious to speed them up. The dense concentration of forces would make it possible to cover the flanks of the advancing armored spearheads, assuming that the latter advanced to provide room for the follow-up forces. This did, in fact, happen. By 15.00hrs, the village of Zhuravka had been cleared by units from 20th Tank Corps, which could then continue towards Lebedin.154 The advance was welcome, but it remained unclear if it was enough, because a slow advance rate could also cause another difficulty. Since the armored spearheads had advanced more than 10 kilometers, the Soviet artillery was not in a position to provide fire support unless the guns also moved forward. With the large number of units cramming the roads, it would be difficult to move substantial amounts of artillery forward, at least if they were to get forward in time to provide useful support to the forward units.
As the XI Corps lacked any significant reserves, the German hopes rested on their 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions. The actions on 25 January had been somewhat hesitant, perhaps understandable considering the very low tank strength of the 14th Panzer Division. The 11th Panzer Division was somewhat stronger, with approximately 20 Panthers and a handful of Panzer IV and Panzer III tanks. Still, this was far fewer than the 200 tanks with which the 5th Guards Tank Army had begun the offensive.155
On 25 January, the 14th Panzer Division had been split into two groups. The armored group, commanded by Colonel Langkeit, was located at Rossochovatka in the morning of 26 January, and at 08.00hrs it received orders to attack towards Ositniazhka. Fog reduced visibility to 40–60 meters, and at 10.00hrs the German tanks stumbled into a Soviet antitank front and a firefight ensued. Soon Soviet tanks arrived. One tank commander, Lieutenant Bauer had been wounded 11 days previously, but he remained with his company. When the Soviet tanks counterattacked, his tank received three direct hits and he was killed. It was not possible to recover the tank so the battalion commander ordered the assault guns to fire upon the stricken vehicle to destroy it. The Germans claimed to have destroyed one T-34 and three antitank guns.156
While this action took place, Soviet forces attacked southeast of Rossochovatka, threatening to cut off the 14th Panzer Division from 3rd Panzer Division. Colonel Langkeit’s tanks had to turn around and try to reestablish contact with 3rd Panzer Division, whose armored group was also sent to restore the situation southeast of Rossochovatka. This succeeded late in the afternoon, but in the meantime Soviet forces captured Rossochovatka.157
In the morning of 26 January, Kampfgruppe von Brese from 14th Panzer Division held positions on the hills west of the cemetery at Ositniazhka, but was surrounded by Soviet forces. Rather than halting the Soviet advance, von Brese had to ensure that his force was not engulfed. During the day he managed to inch his battle group slightly northwards, but he could only watch as most of the 5th Guards Tank Army continued towards Tishkovka and Kapitanovka.158
With the 14th Panzer Division struggling to keep its positions, the 11th Panzer Division was the remaining German hope. However, the division received its orders fairly late and it also had to move along poor roads to get into position to attack. At 13.00hrs it attacked, from the Kamenovatka area, with the armored group to the right and the 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment to the left. The armored group pushed on to Hill 205.4, west of Pisarivka, while the 111th PzG Regiment took the southern half of Tishkovka before dusk.159
Although the 11th Panzer Division did capture some terrain that looked valuable on the map, it did not really have much of an effect on the Soviet advance. From hill 205.4 it would have been possible to direct artillery fire onto the Soviet columns streaming west, but the approaching darkness prevented this. Also, the last two days had seen much fog, especially in the morning. If similar conditions prevailed on 27 January, the value of the hill would be limited. It seemed likely that the 11th Panzer Division would have to advance further the following day, but it was doubtful if the division had sufficient strength, despite receiving the 905th Assault Gun Battalion as reinforcements during the evening.160
The 11th Panzer Division’s activities on the southern flank of 5th Guards Tank Army were disturbing, but not decisive. As there were follow-up forces available, the 20th Tank Corps could resume the offensive after clearing Zhuravka late in the afternoon. With two tank brigades it continued along the valley northwest of Zhuravka, and by 23.00hrs the Soviet spearheads had reached the outskirts of Lebedin. The 29th Tank Corps, operating on an axis to the south of 20th Tank Corps, made slightly less progress, but had liberated Turiya by the end of the day.161
For the German XI Corps the situation grew more and more dangerous with every hour. The 389th Division had been able to maintain a continuous defense line during the day, but the division was seriously weakened and completely unable to interfere with the Soviet breakthrough on its southern wing. The situation on the division’s northern flank was better, since it had been possible to close the gap between the 389th and 72nd Divisions. During the evening, elements of SS-Wiking began to relieve the 57th Division, which assembled near Tashlyk, thus presenting some kind opportunity to General Stemmermann, but clearly his corps remained in a very perilous situation.162
In fact, the 389th Division was disintegrating. Already, on the previous day, Meiser’s battery had lost contact with the battalion and had pulled back toward Pastorskoye, on the initiative of the battery commander. In the morning of 26 January some 12 howitzers from various battalions of the 389th Artillery Regiment had assembled at Pastorskoye, and Meiser’s battery commander, Lieutenant Sorajewski assumed command of the motley collection of gunners and their equipment.163
While Sorajewski tried to reach his battalion commander by radio, the men kept everything ready for a hasty departure, as no one knew if Soviet forces were in the vicinity; perhaps the ragged force was already surrounded, a fear that seemed to be shared by many of the soldiers in the group. During the preceding days, various Soviet leaflets extolling the benefits of surrender had rained down on the German soldiers, but they seemed to have had little effect. The soldiers feared that becoming Soviet prisoners would mean being killed or sent to Siberia. The latter was a nightmare to the German soldiers, who were determined to avoid capture.164