During 26 January, the XI Corps received some reinforcements. The fact that 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions had been subordinated to the corps was perhaps not seen as reinforcements, since these extra units also meant that the corps had the added responsibility to close the Soviet penetration. However, an artillery battalion with 10.5cm guns arrived, and also the 905th Assault Gun Battalion had been transferred from the XXXXVII Panzer Corps and sent to the 11th Panzer Division.165
In turn, the 2nd Ukrainian Front moved forward some substantial reinforcements, the most important of which was the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps. During the day it received orders to move to the Telepino–Burtki line, a move that was initiated at 20.00hrs. The corps was also reinforced with an antitank brigade. The 18th Tank Corps had been held in reserve by Rotmistrov but was ready to advance on 27 January. It might well be needed if the German counterattacks from the south were intensified.166
CHAPTER 6
The Soviet Breakthrough
January 26 ended in a way reminiscent of the previous day. Rotmistrov’s tanks had advanced farther to the west, but still they had not accomplished a clear breakthrough. The advance rate remained relatively slow: between the beginning of the offensive on 25 January and 23.00hrs on 26 January, the 5th Guards Tank Army had advanced only 20 to 25 kilometers. However, the Germans had no real defense to the west of the Soviet armored spearheads. If the 5th Guards Tank Army could contain the threat to its flanks, the road to the west was open. This opportunity was exploited by the 20th Tank Corps. After midnight, the 8th Guards and 155th Tank Brigades, with reconnaissance formations in the lead, began to advance towards Shpola. The town was weakly defended and by 10.00hrs on 27 January it had been cleared by the Soviet forces.167
By this stroke the Soviet spearheads had reached the German rear area, where they could expect to meet little opposition from German units. The loss of Shpola was probably not a surprise to the Germans. After all, they had suspected that this was the operational axis to be followed by the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and the weakness of the defenses made their collapse likely.
The 8th Army had no forces available that could block the Soviet thrust to the west, so Wöhler could only hope that the attacks on the shoulder of the Soviet penetration would succeed, thereby cutting off the Soviet spearheads.
The strongest German force was the 11th Panzer Division, which resumed its attack at 05.30hrs on 27 January. Fog dominated the battlefield and reduced visibility considerably. Nevertheless, the tanks of the division initially made good progress. Advancing from the hills east of Tishkovka, which had been captured on 26 January, the armor of the division managed to take the high ground east of Kapitanovka. Shortly thereafter, at 09.10hrs, the tanks made contact with Kampfgruppe von Brese, which had been cut off for nearly two days and had been forced to take up positions in a forest northeast of Kapitanovka.168
This meant that the 11th Panzer Division sat astride all the roads running east to west, which the Soviet spearheads depended on for supplies and reinforcements. However, given the low tank strength of the division, its grip on these vital roads could not be regarded as solid. Soviet follow-up forces would most likely try to open the route to the west as soon as possible. Later on 27 January, the 11th Panzer Division would report that it had 12 Panthers and three PzKw IVs operational, plus 15 StuG IIIs in the three assault gun battalions that were subordinated to the division.169
This was hardly an impressive assembly of armor, but still it was much more than the 14th Panzer Division could muster. In the evening it reported only three PzKw IVs and two StuG IIIs operational. Clearly the Germans had very little armor available and reinforcements were sorely needed. At noon a Panther battalion, the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 which had been temporarily subordinated to the Gross deutschland Division, began to move to the 11th Panzer Division, but it was not expected to be ready to attack until the following day.170
When the 11th Panzer Division interrupted the Soviet east–west communications, Rotmistrov faced a delicate situation. He could either order the spearheads of 20th and 29th Tank Corps to turn back to restore the connection to the rear units, or he could order them to continue west and rely on the following forces to open the corridor. The existing circumstances clearly favored the latter alternative. Rotmistrov had not yet sent the 18th Tank Corps into action, and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps was available in its assembly area a few kilometers east of the positions occupied by the German 11th Panzer Division. Also, the 4th Guards Army continued to push the German 389th Division back, while 53rd Army maintained pressure on the 3rd Panzer Division. These circumstances suggested that Rotmistrov should not turn 20th and 29th Tank Corps back, but that they should continue forward, while relying on the 18th Tank Corps and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps to reopen communications.171
Wöhler probably felt certain that the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts intended to encircle XI and XXXXII Corps. The chances of preventing this by blocking the 20th and 29th Tank Corps were indeed slim. All his combat units were at the shoulders of the Soviet penetration, and the thaw began to soften the roads, which deteriorated rapidly. In these conditions it would be time-consuming to shift units westward. His only realistic chance was to cut off the Soviet spearheads, which the 11th Panzer Division had actually managed to do. However, the 4th Guards Army attacked the German 389th Division’s southern wing, focusing on Pastorskoe. If this attack was successful it would enable the 2nd Ukrainian Front to restore communications to its forward units, even if the 11th Panzer Division managed to hold on to the vital ground it had occupied early on 27 January.172
The situation on the 389th Division’s southern wing was indeed critical, and available elements of 57th Division were sent to the Pastorskoe area. The 4th Guards Army had reached the railroad station at Serdyukovka, threatening to reopen the breach between the German 72nd and 389th Divisions, which they had managed to close with great difficulty. In the afternoon a regiment from 57th Division and elements from 4th Guards Army clashed in the forest north of Pastorskoe. The fighting was inconclusive, but at least the Soviet advance in this area had been temporarily checked.173
Together with many other soldiers, Anton Meiser of the 389th Division had assembled near Pastorskoye. During the night of 26 January nothing in particular happened, but the motley group of gunners and howitzers had yet no contact with other friendly units, and little knowledge about the enemy. Early in the morning of 27 January, it was decided to send three NCOs to reconnoiter, and Meiser was one of them. Each was given his own direction to scout, together with two men who would follow. Meiser was given the task of reconnoitering in a west-northwesterly direction.174
Little time was available to prepare and carry out the reconnaissance, and Meiser decided to conduct it from horseback. The cadet Damen volunteered to follow Meiser, to the latter’s delight. The second person to follow Meiser was a soldier who was a good horseman. All of them were told that if they had not returned at dusk, they would be assumed lost.175