The situation north of the Soviet penetration certainly gave XI Corps enough to think about. At Serdyukovka and Krasny Kutor, the fighting rolled back and forth over the railroad line before noon. Although the 72nd Division managed to keep its line, the situation was critical. A regiment from the 57th Division was ordered to counterattack in the afternoon. While the regiment moved up, Soviet forces pushed further to the west and it soon became apparent that the 72nd Division was unable to hold the railroad line.190
Gaedke realized that the Soviet pressure in the Serdyukovka sector tied up German troops that were more needed elsewhere. At 17.40hrs he again brought up the issue of withdrawing 72nd Division to the Hamster positions, when he had a telephone discussion with Speidel. Again Speidel replied that he needed permission from the army group and that he would have to call back later. Speidel immediately discussed the issue with Wöhler, who promptly called Army Group South. At 19.20hrs Speidel spoke with Gaedke and told him that the permission had been given.191
It is, of course, uncertain whether the German situation would have been considerably improved by an earlier withdrawal to the Hamster line, but it certainly did not help matters to keep the division in the Smela salient, where it performed no useful role. Had the division retreated it would have been possible to send the 57th Division south at an earlier stage. While this would have been desirable, it must be remembered that the most important German effort was on the southern shoulder of the Soviet assault, where the 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions attacked. These divisions were too weak in tanks to have much prospect of making a decisive contribution. It has not been possible to establish their exact strength at the beginning of the Soviet offensive, but it seems that they had at most 40 to 50 operational tanks and assault guns between them. This was not much at all when compared to the 323 tanks and assault guns fielded by the 2nd Ukrainian Front for the operation on 25 January. Granted, Konev could not use all of them against these two German Panzer divisions, but the figures still give some indication of the odds.192
The arrival of the Panther battalion that had been on its way was, in this context, a considerable reinforcement. Actually the battalion was supposed to be part of the 26th Panzer Division, which was fighting in Italy at the time, but it never joined its parent division. It spent 1943 waiting for tanks and was finally transferred to the Eastern Front in January 1944. Initially the battalion was with the Grossdeutschland Division, but seems not to have seen any action with it. On 27 January it began to move to the XXXXVII Panzer Corps. It was almost at full strength, having reported 67 operational Panthers before leaving Grossdeutschland. On the march to the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, one Panther caught fire in its engine room and became a complete loss. Other tanks suffered mechanical breakdowns, but on the morning of 28 January the battalion could still field 61 combat-ready Panthers.193
This was a substantial reinforcement if we compare it with the tank strength of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps on 27 January. Nevertheless, one tank battalion and one artillery battalion could not have a major effect on a battle that involved hundreds of tanks, several thousand guns, and hundreds of thousands of men. Still, this was the only fresh German formation that could be expected to make its presence felt on 28 January. With such slender reinforcements there was no real reason for optimism among the German commanders.
It is less clear how Konev, Rotmistrov, Galanin, and Ryzhov regarded the prospects for the ongoing operation. The Soviet General Staff Study, which was written later in 1944, presents the German forces in the Kapitanovka area as quite strong. Subsequent Soviet literature conforms to this view. Yet the figures on German strength are inflated, possibly as a result of conscious manipulation after the battle, or possibly because they reflect the genuine perspective of the enemy held by the Soviet commanders. If the Soviets really believed their inflated figures, they were very likely to be concerned, but the reality was that the German situation was desperate. The Soviet operation could only be jeopardized if the commanders lost their nerve, and this did not happen.
On the morning of 28 January, the 20th Tank Corps’ lead brigades set out from Shpola towards Zvenigorodka. They met only scattered resistance as they advanced through Lozovatka towards their objective. To the Germans, the city was already almost lost. At 10.00hrs Speidel had called Busse and bluntly told him that unless prompt action was taken, Zvenigorodka could not be held. There were only about a hundred Cossacks in Zvenigorodka and they could not be expected to repel the approaching Soviet tank brigades. Busse and Speidel clearly realized that it was only a matter of hours before the XI and XXXXII Corps were cut off.194
Just before noon, the Soviet 8th and 155th Tank Brigades closed in on Zvenigorodka from the east and southeast. No particular resistance could be observed, but it was always prudent to be cautious when advancing in populated areas with tank formations. However, the town was easily cleared and soon another force approached from the northwest. It was the lead elements from 6th Tank Army; Konev’s and Vatutin’s fronts had made contact at Zvenigorodka.195
While the 20th Tank Corps continued its advance to the west, the Germans continued their attempts to control the Kapitanovka area. As mentioned before, the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 Panther Battalion was the strongest German unit taking part in the effort. As this unit made its combat debut, it is worth following its actions on 28 January in detail, to give some impression of the difficulties that an unseasoned unit could face in battle.
During the summer and fall of 1943 the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 had been forming and training in France, while waiting for its tanks. It was not until the beginning of December that it finally received its full complement of 76 Panthers plus two Bergepanther recovery vehicles. Orders to depart for the Eastern Front would be received shortly.196
On the evening of 5 January 1944 the battalion began loading its tanks on trains, at six small railroad stations in northern France. All in all the battalion required 12 trains to move to the Eastern Front. It took three days for the trains to arrive and to be loaded. Just before midnight on 6 January, one Panther’s engine caught on fire while on board the train. Despite frantic attempts by the men, the fire could not be extinguished and the tank became a total loss before it had even begun its journey to the front.197
The first elements of the battalion arrived at Pomoshnaia in the Ukraine on 14 January, and the battalion commander, Major Glässgen, contacted the Grossdeutschland Division, to which his battalion was to be attached. During its two weeks with the Grossdeutschland the battalion saw no action, even though its 2nd Company took up defensive positions in the front line. At 11.17hrs on 27 January the battalion received orders to transfer to XXXXVII Panzer Corps, and by 12.30hrs it began to move with its 63 operational tanks. The distance was not particularly great, about 75 kilometers, but losses nevertheless occurred. One Panther spontaneously caught fire in its engine room, just before reaching Mal. Viski, and was completely burnt out. A Bergepanther also caught fire, but the flames were extinguished before the tank suffered extensive damage. Nevertheless, as the battalion had only two Bergepanthers, it was a serious loss to have one of them rendered unserviceable. In the coming days there would be many damaged tanks to recover. Another Panther crashed through a bridge, but was recovered. A further four tanks suffered mechanical breakdowns, but during the night the rest of the battalion arrived in the Slatopol area.198