While the tankers assembled for the attack on 28 January, Glässgen and his company commanders received information on both the friendly and enemy forces in the area. They learned that Kampfgruppe von Brese was located in a forest two to three kilometers northeast of Kapitanovka. Somewhat further to the southwest, on a hill east of Kapitanovka, some 11th Panzer Division Panthers under the command of Major von Sievers were in defense. The southern part of Tishkovka was occupied by German infantry, while the northern and central parts were in Soviet hands. Pisarivka was controlled by the Red Army, but the Germans held positions south of the village. Similarly, the central part of Tishkovka was in enemy hands. Furthermore, intercepted radio messages suggested that the Soviet forces that had broken through to the west were suffering from lack of ammunition and fuel. The radio traffic caused the Germans to assume that the Soviets would turn east, to enable the replenishment of their supplies.199
The circumstances led Colonel Büsing, who was responsible for the enterprise, to order I./Pz.Rgt. 26 to attack to link up with Kampfgruppe von Brese and the Panthers commanded by Major von Sievers, and thereafter to occupy positions to repel the Soviet forces expected to return eastward. To accomplish this mission, it was decided that the battalion should move out from the Slatopol area along the road to Kamenovatka, then turn north approximately two kilometers west of the town. By advancing between Tishkovka and Pisarivka, the battalion hoped to reach the area occupied by von Brese and von Sievers. Major Glässgen ordered the 2nd Company to take the lead, with the 1st and 4th Companies on the left and right flank respectively, and the 3rd Company behind as reserve.200
While the plans matured, the soldiers continued to drive their tanks towards the assembly area. At 19.45hrs the first combat elements had reached Mal. Viski, which meant that about two thirds of the distance to Slatopol had been covered. A pause was ordered, to check the tanks and to give the crews some chance to get a little rest. At 22.30hrs the battalion resumed its march and at 01.00 on 28 January the first elements reached Slatopol. As the battalion was supposed to attack next day, the soldiers sorely needed to sleep, but only a few hours remained until dawn on 28 January. To make matters worse, time also had to be spent on other activities. The tanks had to be maintained, refueled, and loaded with rations for combat. It was vital to ensure that the tanks were in the best possible mechanical condition, because breakdowns on the battlefield could prove fatal when under enemy fire, both for the tanks and their crews. Neither did the commanders get much sleep. At 02.45hrs Glässgen summoned his company commanders, Captain Mayer (1st Company), Captain Lemmer (2nd Company), Lieutenant Wartmann (3rd Company), and Lieutenant Kirchhoff (4th Company), to give them further details on the pending attack, which was to begin within three hours.201
It was a tired group of soldiers who drove their tanks out of Slatopol at 06.00hrs on 28 January, but most likely they also felt a mixture of excitement and fear when they looked forward along the road to Kamenovatka. The mechanics had worked during the night and 61 Panthers, two of them command tanks, were available to the battalion in the morning—a considerable force for the Germans at this time in the war. Soon the lead elements had reached a point about two kilometers west of Kamenovatka and the tankers steered their vehicles to the north. They did not know that, further north, strong elements of the Soviet 18th Tank Corps had been given the task of reopening and securing the corridor that led to the units of 5th Guards Tank Army, which were advancing toward Zvenigorodka.202
Lieutenant Kirchhoff recalled that the battalion made a brief halt soon after veering off to the north, to enable it to adopt a formation suitable to the attack, after having rolled in column along the road from Slatopol. The break was too short to allow for this reformation, and instead frantic orders to drive faster were issued over the radio, although the tanks were already driving at high speed.203
With Major Glässgen and Captain Lemmer in the lead, the battalion proceeded towards its objective. It passed German positions south of Tishkovka and Pisarevka and proceeded into No Man’s Land, or rather land that was thought to be unoccupied by the enemy. It soon became obvious that the Red Army had observers overlooking the approaching German tanks, as Soviet artillery shells began to explode around them. The Panther battalion did not sustain any losses but continued north at high speed. The artillery barrage ceased and Major Glässgen ordered a short halt so that further instructions could be given.204
Lieutenant ten Brink, who commanded a tank platoon, recalled that his company, in relatively closed formation, crossed a small hill about one kilometer southeast of Tishkovka and proceeded into a depression. When he saw it, he feared that his tanks would be easy to observe from Tishkovka. His fears were justified. When the tanks reached the middle of the depression, Soviet antitank guns opened fire on his platoon’s flank. Without delay, ten Brink’s Panthers turned ninety degrees to the left, to present their heavily armored fronts, and opened fire on the antitank guns.
In the meantime, the other two platoons in the company continued forward and soon ten Brink received orders to follow. He continued north with all his tanks except one, which had to be temporarily left behind, as it could not disengage from the enemy antitank guns without exposing its less well armored side. The Panther continued to fire on the antitank guns, and when they had all been silenced it caught up with ten Brink and the other tanks in the platoon.205
While ten Brink’s platoon engaged the antitank guns near Tishkovka, the remaining two platoons of the 2nd Company continued towards hill 205.4, between Tishkovka and Pisarevka, which they reached at about 09.00hrs. Suddenly, ten Brink heard on the radio that enemy tanks had been discovered behind them, to the right. The company halted, while a few of its Panthers turned around and attacked the approaching enemy tanks. The Soviet tanks were shot up, but ten Brink saw that a few German tanks had been hit too. The brief firefight was soon over and ten Brink expected that orders to continue north would come at any moment, but nothing was heard from the company commander, Captain Lemmer.206
While the 2nd Company advanced in the lead, the 4th and 1st Companies followed closely on the flanks. Captain Mayer led his company and observed the Soviet tanks that attacked the 2nd Company in the flank. He estimated that it was about a dozen T-34s and immediately ordered his company to attack them. Within a few minutes all Soviet tanks had been shot up, according to Mayer. Soon thereafter Lieutenant Kirchhoff, who commanded the 4th Company, came close enough to see the wrecks of 10–12 T-34s and also a few Panthers.207
In fact, with Panthers from the 2nd Company turning around, as the 1st Company joined the fight, the Soviet tanks were caught from two directions. This certainly made them very vulnerable, but it also meant that the inexperienced German tank crews may have risked friendly fire. Fortunately for them the silhouettes of Panthers and T-34s were quite different, but in the heat of battle mistakes can easily occur. We have not found any evidence suggesting that friendly fire incidents did occur during this action, but it seems that neither the 1st nor 2nd Company was fully aware of what the other company did.