Just as the brief firefight was over, Captain Mayer received orders to turn his company to the left. Hardly had the radio silenced before Soviet antitank guns opened fire on his company. Mayer could see that well dug-in Soviet antitank guns occupied positions to the north as well as to the east. If he turned his company west, as he had just been ordered, his tanks would be exposed to side or rear hits, where the Panthers’ armor not was as strong as on the front. His watch showed a few minutes after 09.00hrs, as Mayer informed the battalion commander by radio. The receipt of his message was acknowledged, but nothing more was heard on the radio.
After some hesitation, Mayer decided to comply with the order and began to turn his tank. Suddenly it shuddered when an AP round hit. Both the driver and the radio operator had been wounded, and within seconds, the tank was hit by three more rounds. One of them jammed the turret, giving Mayer no choice but to order the tank abandoned. He ran to another Panther and climbed aboard, while the Soviet fire seemed to intensify. In the meantime tanks from his company returned fire and seemed to have silenced two or three of the enemy guns, but it must be emphasized that such judgments can be very difficult to make in the heat of battle. Once Mayer had entered the new tank he shouted on the radio that the company should reverse 200 meters, to take advantage of the crest line at hill 205.4, where he also found tanks from the 2nd and 4th Companies. Still, there was no contact with the battalion commander. Mayer decided to go back to Colonel Büsing’s command post to see if he could obtain some information from him.208
The 3rd Company, commanded by Lieutenant Wartmann, had initially struggled to catch up with the battalion, and had still not managed to do so when flashes from Soviet antitank guns could be seen at the southeast part of Tishkovka. The Panthers almost immediately replied with high explosive shells and machine gun fire. Soon the southeast part of Tishkovka was on fire, forcing the Soviet forces to withdraw to the north. Wartmann observed this and realized that the 2nd Company had an excellent opportunity to attack them in the flank. He tried to contact Glässgen and Lemmer on the radio, but his efforts were in vain. Later in the day Wartmann would learn that both Glässgen and Lemmer had been killed by this time.209
Lemmer’s death was in fact soon known, as his tank, number 201, burst into flames when hit by an AP round. Shortly afterwards, Lieutenant ten Brink assumed command of the 2nd Company. Glässgen’s fate was unclear for some time. It is possible that his tank, number 101, had already fallen out due to engine trouble, and that consequently he had climbed aboard another vehicle. His adjutant had turned back in order to check on the progress of 3rd Company, so he did not see what happened to the battalion commander.210
Perhaps the early death of the battalion commander, which was unknown for some time, contributed to the battalion’s rather hesitant behavior after it reached hill 205.4 at about 09.00hrs. Lieutenant Kirchhoff observed that, in addition to his own 4th Company, the 1st and 2nd Companies took up defensive positions on the hill and a sort of deadlock ensued. After a while Captain Mayer, who had been at Colonel Büsing’s command post, informed the battalion that both Major Glässgen and Captain Lemmer had been killed. Despite this, the attack was to continue further north. The objective remained the same as it had been a few hours earlier. Mayer, who was the senior surviving officer, was to command the battalion.211
Both Mayer and Kirchhoff could see that Soviet forces held strong positions north of hill 205.4, as well as along the outskirts of Pisarivka and Tishkovka. To continue forward would be very difficult, not least because fog and snow squalls made it almost impossible to discern the antitank guns. However, the German tanks remained visible to the Soviet antitank guns, which opened fire the moment Kirchhoff’s Panthers began to move forward. To him it seemed that every round hit, but no German tanks appear to have been knocked out. Still, threatened by antitank guns that he could not locate with sufficient accuracy to fire upon in turn, Kirchhoff was not inclined to continue. Rather he ordered his company to reverse, to take advantage of the crest line behind. He hoped to use the range advantage of the Panther guns to knock out the antitank guns one by one.212
At this moment Colonel Büsing arrived and said that he himself would command the battalion, not Captain Mayer. Colonel Büsing’s role in the command chain had been somewhat unclear. Actually he served with the Grossdeutschland Division, but had accompanied the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 when it departed from the division. As Major von Sievers, who commanded the Panzer regiment in 11th Panzer Division, was surrounded by Soviet forces, Büsing led the effort to open a connection. However, the only formation Büsing had was the I./Pz.Rgt. 26. Thus he was merely a link between the 11th Panzer Division commander and Glässgen, until the death of the latter. In any case, Büsing quickly concluded that the situation demanded another method of attack than had hitherto been attempted. So far, the tanks had attacked without any support from infantry, artillery, or air power. Büsing intended to arrange for artillery support before the tanks went forward again.213
Unfortunately artillery was not immediately available; in fact it could not be expected before 14.00hrs. Büsing and the commanders of the 3rd and 4th Companies decided to use the opportunity personally to reconnoiter the enemy positions. It became apparent that in front, on hill 209.4, the Red Army had a strong position defended by antitank guns, and also on the road between hill 209.4 and Tishkovka. Furthermore, there were also strong antitank defenses at the western outskirts of Pisarivka, just as Kirchhoff had observed previously. This time the German commanders also saw about 10 T-34s on the eastern and western slopes of hill 209.4. Suddenly a Soviet artillery barrage crashed down on the German officers. A shell splinter wounded Lieutenant Wartmann in the head and he had to be evacuated. He was replaced by Lieutenant Muth. Thus, within a few hours the battalion had lost its commander and two of its four company commanders.214
Anxiously the tankers waited for the artillery barrage that had been promised. There was not much they could do for the moment, except keep a vigilant eye on their surroundings. As they were without any infantry they had to ensure that Soviet antitank squads did not sneak too close to the Panthers. Perhaps they spent some time thinking about what had transpired so far on their first day of combat. They had begun the day with 61 tanks; now only about 35 remained. In fact, most of the Panthers could be repaired, but it is unclear if the tankers realized it at this moment.215
The tankers had to wait for the artillery barrage longer than desired. While the German tanks waited, the Soviet units improved their defenses. Finally, at about 14.50hrs the German artillery opened fire, then Stukas attacked Pisarevka. Unfortunately, the tankers had not been informed of the timing and duration of this attack, so they were unable to coordinate their attack with that of the artillery and Stukas. As a result, the delay between the air and artillery bombardment and the Panthers’ advance was too long, allowing the Soviet defenders enough time to recover. Furthermore, the artillery had fired first, before the Stukas attacked Pisarevka. Thus the Soviet defenders north and west of the Panthers received even more time to recover. Finally, the artillery barrage was not particularly strong and the Stuka attack was not very effective either, because the aircraft were met by strong antiaircraft fire and forced to release their bombs at too high an altitude.216