In the evening, Major Bittl again attempted to fly to Korsun. This time he was luckier, perhaps aided by the radio beacon at Korsun, and at about 19.00hrs he landed safely on the air strip. He soon met General Lieb and Colonel Gaedke, and handed over instructions to them. These included two alternatives for a breakout. The first, which was be initiated on the code word “Frühlingsglaube,” called for a concentration southwest of Gorodishche and a breakout toward the bridgehead at Iskrennoye.
The second alternative, to be initiated when the code word “Betriebsausflug” was received, involved concentrating the XI Corps in the Kvitki–Glushki–Derenkovets area. From this staging area together, with XXXXII Corps, it should thrust toward Morentsy, eventually to join up with III Panzer Corps. In either case, permission had to be obtained from Hitler.442
Preparations for the two alternatives could be initiated immediately, in the hopes that Hitler could be persuaded to accept one of them. The shortage of supplies demanded that an urgent decision be made. Major Bittl had been fortunate to reach Korsun by air. Some 19 Ju-52s, loaded with ammunition, had been forced to turn back to avoid Soviet fighters. Another attempt to fly supplies in would be made during the night, but when Bittl departed it was too early to tell if the attempt would be successful.443
That evening XXXXVII Panzer Corps received orders to support the efforts by III Panzer Corps and Gruppe Stemmermann. By employing mobile tactics, von Vormann was to attract Soviet units. Von Vormann was to be especially active on his west wing, but he was not to neglect opportunities to strike from Iskrennoe towards Vyasovok. The bridge at Iskrennoe should be reinforced to be able to take 60-ton vehicles.444
During the night of 4 February, the air supply operation continued. The VIII Air Corps reported that 81 tons were flown into the pocket and 259 wounded were brought out by the returning aircraft. This was barely enough to sustain Gruppe Stemmermann. During the night the 8th Army quartermaster had flown to Korsun. He confirmed that the ammunition available would only be sufficient for three days, at most. Some consolation could be found from the fact that nearly 3,000 wounded had been flown out so far, but there were approximately 300 soldiers who became wounded each day. There was every reason to continue with the air supply operation, but the weather was threatening to shut it down. The air strip at Korsun was not hardened, and the mud made it very soft. It might soon prove impossible to land and take off. Parachutes for supply drops were not immediately available, but had to be acquired somehow.445
The gravity of the situation was clear to von Manstein and his chief of staff, Busse. At 09.05hrs Busse informed Wöhler that perhaps Army Group South would, on its own responsibility, give orders to Gruppe Stemmermann to break out. To let the two corps remain in the pocket to succumb to the Soviets was out of the question. However, first an attempt was made to get permission from OKH. Such a decision was usually difficult to get and involved waiting for hours, perhaps days. When 1st Panzer Army reported that the III Panzer Corps was stuck in mud, and was not receiving even the most essential supplies, the need for a quick decision seemed even more urgent.446
On the XXXXVII Panzer Corps’ sector there were no major battles while both sides suffered from the mud, but still they persisted with local attacks. Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army conducted several minor attacks on the German bridgehead at Iskrennoe, but all were repelled. It seems that they were not intended to do more than harass the Germans there. Von Vormann, on the other hand, concentrated his efforts at the Lipyanka area, where elements of 3rd and 14th Panzer Divisions had been tasked with capturing the town.447
The eastern prong of the attack was led by the commander of Panzer Regiment 36. He commanded a Kampfgruppe consisting of one tank battalion, one armored infantry battalion, and one battalion with SP howitzers, a fairly common composition for a German Kampfgruppe. The mission was received at 06.00hrs and included clearing Lipyanka and capturing the high ground north of the village. The Panzer grenadiers were delayed due to the mud, but eventually the attack began, and at about 10.00hrs the first Soviet positions were reached. Initially visibility had been very poor, but at this moment it cleared, with the sun appearing behind the advancing German tanks. Suddenly a mine exploded beneath an assault gun, putting it out of action, although nobody in the vehicle was injured.448
The Panzer grenadiers had lagged behind the tanks and assault guns, and some of the crews had to jump out from their vehicles to fight with pistols and hand grenades. The first Soviet infantry positions were cleared in close combat. Soon Soviet antitank guns opened fire from hill 205.2, but as the Germans had the sun behind them, the Soviet gunners were blinded. The commander of III./Pz.Rgt 36, Major Bernau, decided to take advantage of the situation and ordered his tankers to roll over the enemy position, which they did without suffering any losses.449
By noon the Germans had reached the outskirts of Lipyanka. The Panzer grenadiers received orders to proceed into the village to clear it, while the tankers provided covering fire. However, the attack did not get rolling and Major Bernau decided to proceed with his tanks and assault guns. They entered the village through a fruit garden, and fierce fighting soon erupted. A mortar shell landed on 2nd Lieutenant Rheinbaben’s tank, and he was seriously wounded by the explosion. Soon thereafter Major Bernau was wounded, and Lieutenant Müller assumed command of the battalion. Despite these losses the Germans cleared the southern half of the village and took defensive positions for the night. Supplies arrived in timely fashion in the evening, as did two previously damaged Panzer IV tanks that had been repaired.450
The western prong of the attack on Lipyanka consisted of elements from 3rd Panzer Division. Encountering weak resistance, the Germans advanced into Lipyanka from the west, but they were too late to prevent the Soviet defenders from blowing up the bridge over the small river in the northern part of the village. The 3rd Panzer Division was therefore unable to assist the Kampfgruppe from 14th Panzer Division to take the northeastern part of Lipyanka. Still, most of the village was in German hands and the booty taken included nine 12.2cm guns, 10 antitank guns, and two T-34s.451
At 17.15hrs Speidel and Wenck spoke over the telephone about the situation. Wenck emphasized the supply difficulties caused by the mud. The III Panzer Corps was helplessly stuck, while simultaneously fighting strong enemy tank formations. Speidel also focused on supplies, pointing to the fact that the air supply operation so far had barely been sufficient to keep Gruppe Stemmermann struggling, and with the deep mud on the airfield at Korsun, it seemed that the situation would only deteriorate.452
Neither 1st Panzer Army nor 8th Army had any reason to hope for reinforcements. 1st Panzer Army still struggled to get 1st Panzer Division and 1st SS-Panzer Division into the frontline, but after these two division had arrived, nothing more was scheduled. 8th Army had nothing to expect, but perhaps it mattered little, since more units would aggravate the already difficult logistical situation. On the other hand, if the weather changed and the ground froze again, any reinforcements could prove valuable. In 1944, though, the Germans were hard pressed on many other sectors of the Eastern Front, and it was difficult to find reinforcements. In contrast, because of their overall superiority of numbers, it was comparatively easier for the Red Army commanders to redeploy units. Konev continued to move units from other sectors of his front, to insert them into the battle at Korsun. On 5 February the 41st Guards Rifle Division was detailed to move toward the pocket.453