Without such resources at their disposal, the Germans were forced to resort to more desperate methods to scramble units. Many soldiers from the encircled units had been on leave when the Soviet pincers closed. Some of these had returned from leave and had arrived outside the pocket, only to learn that their parent units had been surrounded. These soldiers became the nucleus of a new Kampfgruppe, which was to be led by Major-General Werner Haack.454
Haack could use his artillery division staff,455 which received a number of different units, in addition to the returning soldiers from 57th Division, 72nd Division, 88th Division, 389th Division, and Korps-Abteilung B, which was used as infantry. He was also instructed to include three artillery battalions, three Nebelwerfer battalions, and one engineer battalion in his Kampfgruppe. Five assault guns that belonged to 228th Sturmgeschütz Battalion were also allotted to Haack. The latter unit was actually part of Gruppe Stemmermann, but some of its damaged assault guns had been in workshops outside the pocket and five of them had by this time been repaired.456
A unit of the kind Haack had to lead lacked cohesion, as it had no prior training as a unit. This was particularly apparent among the infantry unit, which was composed of soldiers who had little knowledge about each other. One of the most important factors behind the soldiers’ ability to withstand the strain of combat seems to have been the connection they had developed to each other within a group of limited size. When they were thrown together in this manner, there was little or no time to develop such bonds. In fact, to send such improvised units into combat was counter to German ideas on what was important to develop effective combat units; but the situation was becoming desperate.457
Haack’s mission at least partly reflected the disadvantages from which his formation suffered. He was ordered to secure crossings over the Shpolka River southeast of Zvenigorodka, and to cover the gap between 1st Panzer Army and 8th Army. His Kampfgruppe was to be prepared to receive XI and XXXXII Corps if they broke out. Since only weak Soviet units were present in the area south of Zvenigorodka, the mission did not seem unduly difficult and would not involve hard fighting, at least in the short term.458
Major Bittl continued to fly to the pocket and back. In the afternoon he reported to the 8th Army staff on Gruppe Stemmermann’s situation. No dramatic frontline changes had occurred. The salient at Burty had been evacuated, but the thick mud made all movements very slow. It was just as difficult for the German soldiers to withdraw as it was for the Soviet soldiers to pursue them. Stemmermann reported that the great strain on the soldiers had pushed them to crisis point. The soldiers’ exhaustion, coupled with the great losses among the officers, made actions slow both to initiate and to carry out. With fighting going on in daytime and regrouping taking place in darkness, there were few opportunities for the officers and men to sleep.459
The soldiers fighting at Olshana were in desperate need of sleep, but they could not hope that the coming night would offer them any rest. The defenders, of whom the Estonian soldiers of the “Narwa” battalion made up a major part, faced an untenable situation and there was no alternative but to pull out. At 23.00hrs orders were issued for the evacuation of Olshana. Tanks were sent to receive the garrison when it had broken out. The tanks were indeed observed by the garrison late in the evening and the troops began to leave Olshana. Unfortunately a bridge broke under a heavily laden truck. The bridge was along the only road available to the Germans, and the withdrawal ground to a halt. An attempt was made to haul the most important items from the truck to the other side of the now collapsed bridge, but the work had hardly begun before Soviet machine gun fire raked the column. The trucks were visible against the lighter night sky, while the Soviet troops were concealed in the darkness. Soon some of the trucks caught fire, thereby further illuminating the German vehicles.
The only alternative remaining for the German soldiers was to run as fast as possible from the trucks and throw themselves into the ditches along the road. In the darkness it was not apparent, but as soon as they got into them, the Germans became painfully aware that the ditches were clogged with melting snow, mud, and water. Crawling through the slush the German soldiers reached their goal and the temporary safety of other units belonging to XI Corps. They managed to bring many of the wounded along, but the infantry’s howitzers, the mortars, and other heavy equipment had to be left behind.460
On the morning of 6 February the two German corps had been encircled for more than a week, but still they held a fairly large area. As long as the encircled forces could be supplied by air, the Soviet commanders had reason to fear that the operation would be prolonged. Perhaps they recalled the Stalingrad operation one year earlier, when the German 6th Army had held out for almost two and a half months before finally succumbing. Such a protracted operation was better avoided since it was likely to result in more casualties.
In addition, the Korsun pocket was tying up important elements of the Red Army that could better be employed elsewhere. The most important of these were Rotmistrov’s and Kravchenko’s tank armies, which were committed to defending parts of the outer encirclement ring. The tank armies had not been designed for such a task, but there were no other options available to Vatutin and Konev. If the pocket could be compressed, or even broken up, it was likely that the battle could reach a rapid conclusion. Even if the battle did not end more quickly, a compressed pocket would require fewer troops to cover, which would free up some of the forces currently holding the inner ring to relieve the tank armies at the outer ring. These were strong arguments favoring a continued and even intensified offensive against Gruppe Stemmermann. Finally, Konev and Vatutin had to consider the German relief attempts, especially those conducted by III Panzer Corps. If the pocket could be pushed north, the distance to cover would be greater for the German forces south of the encirclement ring.
Accordingly, during the night of 5 February, Konev issued orders to 4th Guards Army and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps to take Gorodishche, 20 kilometers southeast of Korsun. Selivanov, the commander of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, decided to attack toward Valiava, located on the road between Gorodishche and Korsun. If Valiava could be taken, a German withdrawal from Gorodishche would become much more difficult, especially with heavy equipment. There was the possibility not only of capturing Gorodishche, but also of inflicting considerable losses on the German XI Corps.461
Selivanov’s Cossacks and elements of four rifle divisions from Smirnov’s 4th Guards Army hit the junction between XI and XXXXII Corps when they attacked after dawn. Intense fighting ensued, as Lieb ordered that the road between Gorodishche and Korsun had to be held at all costs. He asked for the return of the Panzers from SS-Wiking, so that they could be used together with 72nd Division to halt the Soviet attack. To Stemmermann, it was obvious that the Soviet commanders intended to split the pocket into two parts. On 6 February the German soldiers prevented this from happening by offering stubborn resistance. The progress was much slower than the Soviet commanders had hoped.462