The question was how long this resistance could be maintained. The hard fighting caused ammunition expenditure to rise, and on 6 February very little could be flown into the pocket. Of the 19 Junkers aircraft that had taken off, only one landed at Korsun. Twenty Heinkels flew toward the pocket, loaded with canisters to be dropped, but none of them managed to drop their loads inside the pocket. The chief of staff of Luftflotte 4, Major-General Karl-Heinrich Schulz, issued a statement to the effect that the utmost had been done to keep the two surrounded corps supplied, but the atrocious weather made it well nigh impossible to fly in supplies. Indeed, Lieutenant-General Seidemann, commander of VIII Fliegerkorps, said when he met Speidel in the afternoon that a regular supply could not be expected, despite the best efforts of the air crews.463
The rift between the field commanders and the decision makers in Berlin became even wider. The OKH had not given permission to break out, as Busse informed Speidel over the telephone in the morning. In any case, the III Panzer Corps was still about 30 kilometers away from the pocket, too far for a successful breakout. Either that distance must be reduced or any attempted breakout would be a disaster. Still, Army Group South sent a written demand for permission to break out to OKH. Although Busse and Speidel still thought it was somewhat too early to order a breakout, their previous experience suggested that the OKH would take time in reaching a decision; it was better to have the permission first and then issue the orders at the appropriate moment.464
Meanwhile, the mud was causing supply difficulties for the Red Army. At 08.20hrs Colonel Reinhard, chief of staff of XXXXVII Panzer Corps, informed 8th Army that the enemy remained silent along most of the corps’ front. At the sectors defended by 106th and 376th Divisions, there was no enemy activity worth noticing. The 320th Division was subjected to some local attacks, but these were relatively easy to repel. The 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions faced an almost silent opponent. To the Germans, it seemed very clear that lack of ammunition prevented the Soviet forces from doing much more. Only at Lipyanka did significant fighting take place, a continuation of the attack initiated by the German 3rd and 14th Panzer Divisions on 5 February. But even at Lipyanka the fighting was not intensive. The Soviet troops had already blown up most of the bridges, making it difficult for the Germans to attack the northern part of the village.465
Despite the fact that it would take several days for reinforcements to reach the battle area, Wöhler decided to try to make some additional forces available. By thinning out the line near Kirovograd, the 2nd Parachute Division could be pulled out and sent to the Korsun area. It was a risk to take the 2nd Parachute Division from LII Corps, but Wöhler had to accept the risk. He ordered the corps commander to relieve the division and to make it available for new missions.466
In the poor weather the villages assumed a greater importance. The houses could provide shelter for the soldiers and offer them some chance to dry their clothes, which provided little protection against the chilliness when they were wet. Fighting often raged in or near the villages, something Anton Meiser, who had been relegated to an infantry role as his battery was out of ammunition, became involved in. Early on 6 February a runner brought an order from Major Stelzner, who was Meiser’s battalion commander, ordering the unit to take a small village. Meiser had no confidence in Stelzner, who he regarded as a poor commander who spent most of his time sitting in a warm house a few kilometers from the front.467
Lieutenant Sorajewski, who still commanded Meiser’s battery, was an officer for whom Meiser had the greatest respect, as he combined competence, courage, and good leadership skills. Sorajewski devised a scheme for taking the village, which actually only consisted of a few houses on each side of a road. Sorajewski’s plan was a good example of how to combine fire and movement, and initially it worked very well. Covering fire was provided by a pre-positioned machine gun, as well as from the houses when they had been captured. One by one, the houses were attacked with hand grenades thrown though the windows. However, after taking four houses, Lieutenant Sorajewski was hit in the chest, just as he was about to take the fifth house. Meiser saw it happen and ordered the machine gunners to cease firing. He dashed to Sorajewski, only to find that his life could not be saved. Sorajewski’s last words were “Tell my mother and give her my watch. And now please take the remaining buildings.” A few minutes later all the buildings had been captured, but the loss of Lieutenant Sorajewski, who had been such a respected and beloved commander, made the success seem hollow. There was no time to mourn, however, as it became clear that Soviet soldiers were hiding in the cellars in some of the houses, alongside the civilians. These soldiers shot two of the Germans.468
German calls for surrender were met with silence. Meiser decided that one of the buildings with a cellar should be set on fire, which soon persuaded five men to come out with their hands held high. All were dressed in civilian clothes but had still been firing, a breach of the Geneva Convention. However, in the war on the Eastern Front, breaches of the Geneva Convention were far too frequent. It would not have been unusual if the Soviet “soldiers” had been summarily shot, but Meiser sent them to a nearby house where they could be guarded.469
The inhabitants of one cellar refused to surrender. Meiser heard that there were women and children present, before a shot was fired from the cellar. It was aimed at a corporal who approached the entrance. He replied immediately with a hand grenade, and screams followed the explosion. A woman with a wounded child came out, followed by two soldiers. Inside the cellar Meiser’s men found the corpses of two soldiers and a woman.470
As the action was over, Meiser began to scribble a report. He decided to write a separate report about the death of Lieutenant Sorajewski, but first he tried to finish the report on the action. He concluded that the casualties, except for Sorajewski, amounted to two killed and one wounded. Just as he finished his report, rifle shots cracked. Both the machine gunners, who had raised their heads from cover out of curiosity, were hit in the head. Meiser had to add two more killed to the tally, a price he thought was far too high for the capturing of a village that was likely to prove untenable, as the Red Army controlled the high ground dominating it. Meiser’s confidence in Stelzner diminished further when in the afternoon, after having buried the dead, he received orders to abandon most of the captured village. Furthermore, the order from Stelzner included a detailed plan on how the defense should be established and where the company command post should be placed. Meiser found the solution exceptionally unsuitable, as did the infantrymen with him. They wrote a message to Stelzner protesting the order, and sent it with the runner.471
Soon a second lieutenant arrived with the message that he was replacing Meiser as commander of the company Meiser had led since the death of Sorajewski. Meiser shrugged and let the officer take the responsibility of carrying out Stelzner’s orders, even though he pointed out the risks inherent in the position the battalion commander had ordered. However, the latter remained in effect, and Meiser could only wait and see what would happen.472